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ART. I.—THE BACON OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

[SECOND PAPER.]

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THE task of presenting a satisfactory alleviation for the difficulties of the sixteenth century was reserved for Francis Bacon—the father of an Instauration greater than any which preceded it, because it was the last. We should not be justified in regarding Bacon as the equal of Aristotle, if we compare the two together. Neither in versatility nor in comprehensiveness can he be legitimately esteemed as on a par with his predecessor; while the circumstances of his life, perhaps even more than the temper of his mind, denied him that habit of thorough, minute, and sustained observation, that patient sobriety of judgment, that graceful and felicitous negligence of all ostentation, which are so miraculously blended with the massive speculation of the earlier philosopher. The single epithet of *Intellect*, by which Plato happily characterized Aristotle, is preëminently appropriate to him, and to him alone. He was the intellect in its purest and simplest form, with a full mastery of all its various powers; free from weakness and without alloy. Unseduced by the imagination, though no stranger to its inspiration; untainted by passion, though susceptible of all healthy and legitimate emotion; without enthusiasm, though guided by a steady philosophic ardour; he was the perfect embodiment of the calm, self-sustaining, sober, discriminating, and all embracing mind. To this elevation Bacon never attained: but though inferior in the highest qualities of thought and feeling to his unrivalled predecessor, he had the advantage of living in a later and a more favourable age—an age of vigorous intellectual development. He had thus the vantage ground of past centuries to stand upon, and the expanding thought of the coming generation to hail and extend his dominion. The effect which he produced was thus more sensible, and his influence wider, more immediate, and more operative, than even in the case of Abelard. He became

at once, and still remains, the undoubted parent of modern science, and of all the great discoveries to which the modern intellect lays claim, and of which it might be so justly proud, if it did not suffer itself to be dazzled by the brilliancy and extent of its empire. It is only at this late day that a competitor has arisen to dispute the continued reign of Bacon; but M. Comte recognises him as the legislator of his philosophy, and the claim has been alleged by the eager followers of the great Positivist, not by himself—and still remains to be substantiated. To aid in the settlement of this claim is our object; and to inform the judgment of our readers, we proceed to examine the characteristics of the Baconian reform with the same sobriety and impartiality which we have endeavoured to exercise in the analysis of the careers of Aristotle and Abelard.

The universality contemplated by the Baconian Instauration is the first of its features to be noticed. It designed a chart of the intellectual globe, and criticised all learning and all knowledge. It scrutinized the practical as well as the theoretical, and proposed the improvement, the extension, and the expansion of both. There was no exclusive partiality for any one form of human development,—no unjust derogation from the dignity, validity, and importance of any other: but the harmonious reconstruction of all speculation was desired as a preparation for a more enlightened, efficient, and successful practical procedure. If the scholastic misapplication of logic was severely censured, its due claims were confidently asserted; and, though the necessities of the times, no less than existing abuses, directed the attention and the labours of Bacon principally to natural science, the superior dignity of moral and religious truth, and the higher authority of the Aristotelian logic are uniformly and steadily maintained by him. His philosophy, when received in a large and congenial spirit, will be found to be equally removed from the one-sided exclusiveness of transcendental rationalism, and from the narrow insufficiency of mere empiricism. It embraces in harmonious union the sober truth of either extreme, and duly subordinates all human thought to the over-ruling supremacy of a revealed religion. Taking the familiar division of knowledge into ethical and physical science, it is true that Bacon concerned himself principally with the latter, and most assiduously attempted its development. He did so, however, without forgetting, denying, or neglecting the former; and employed his talents in this direction because physical science was at that time the most diseased, and the most inefficient, in consequence of the misapplication of syllogistic logic to its investigation. But physical science was never pursued by Bacon for its own sake, nor ever regarded by him as of itself the legitimate end of

knowledge. We are aware that this judgment of the Baconian philosophy is not exactly consonant with the superficial fallacies current upon the subject; but it has been the fashion for men, like Macaulay, to declaim magisterially respecting productions of which they had read only scattered fragments, and to be listened to with a stupid credulity. The great merit of Bacon's intellectual renovation is, that it rejects no part of human knowledge, conceived or conceivable; that it proposes to render the barren places of speculation productive by a better culture, and to retain with a firm hand and under better management all old acquisitions, while extending, by the aid of a more efficacious procedure, the frontiers of science, and bringing under its jurisdiction territories as yet unknown and undiscovered.

We next notice the manner in which the proposed reform was undertaken. The errors to be corrected, as the false philosophy to be supplanted, had sprung in great measure from misapprehension of the narrowness of the special domain of scholastic logic, and from the misapplication of the syllogistic or deductive method to those physical inquiries to which it was singularly inappropriate, and in regard to which it had been sedulously, though not altogether methodically, renounced by Aristotle and the more profound sages of antiquity. In instituting a new method, or rather in giving novel prominence and a more decided type to an old one, a more correct logical procedure was required for the prosecution of scientific studies. The deductive method was to be chiefly and primarily confined to moral or ethical speculations, and nature was to be investigated, and the general laws of her action discovered, not by the new, but by the newly revived and more clearly apprehended instrumentality of induction. Induction itself, as a formal mode of reasoning, was neither invented, discovered, nor first expounded by Bacon. Aristotle gives Socrates the credit of its first scientific recognition. It was largely employed by Aristotle in his Zoological works and in his Political inquiries: its conditions were examined by the Scholiasts,* and in the eleventh century by Joannes Italus;†

* David. Prolegg. Porph. Int. Schol. Aristot., p. 18, a. 36, Alex. Aphrod. Schol., p. 585, b. 40; p. 586, a. 20.

† ἔστι δὲ τῶν διαλεκτικῶν ἀποδείξεων εἶδη δύο, τὸ μὲν ἐπαγωγὴ, τὸ δὲ συλλογισμός, κ. τ. λ., cit. Waitz. Ed. Organon, vol. i, p. 19. It has been maintained by Macaulay, and his position is in some degree justified by Bacon's own expressions, that the induction of the ancients was different from that of Bacon, and merely a simple comparison of instances; but this is disproved by Aristotle, *Metaph.* xii, iv, p. 1078, and by the above passage of Joannes Italus, which continues to criticise the inductive process in the manner and with the acuteness of Sir Wm. Hamilton, (*Discussions*, &c., p. 164.) anticipating his distinctions.

it was distinctly enunciated, and the merits of experimentation in particular were profoundly appreciated by Roger Bacon; but to the sage of Verulam unquestionably belongs the great merit of methodizing and developing its powers, and exhibiting their peculiar and exclusive aptitude for investigating the mysteries of nature, and establishing the general facts of observation and experience. It was neither accident, nor a loose affectation which dictated the title of the *Novum Organon*. It was a new Organon; not a substitute for the old, but supplementary to it; an extension of logic, under a slight, but important modification, into a realm of new conquests. The *New Organon* bore the same relation to the seventeenth century, that the first Organon did to the age of Aristotle. In both instances, the general reorganization of the intellectual world was consciously attempted by the instrumentality* of a distinctly apprehended logical reform, which introduced a more methodic, a better regulated, and a more comprehensive scheme of logic than had prevailed before. Of both it may be said, that they did not merely purify and extend the domain of speculation, but that they added

Nova nomina rebus.†

The designation of Bacon's great work was thus selected by an unerring instinct; and as this constitutes the great axis upon which his whole philosophy revolves, so the peculiar significance and the remarkable efficiency of the Great Instauration resides principally in the logical reform which he inaugurated. Subsequent generations, misled by the splendid results of the application of induction to physical research, and by a misapprehension of the general scope of Bacon's writings, have regarded the Organon of Aristotle as supplanted by the New Instrument, and have thus fallen into an error, the opposite of that of the schoolmen, from which the world had been rescued by the great philosopher. They have rejected the syllogism with derision, and have slighted the branches of knowledge with which it is more especially conversant, pursuing steadily a fragmentary development, until they are again entangled in the labyrinths of their own wilful aberrations. In our own opinion, we think that the nineteenth century might almost dispense with a new Bacon and a new Instauration, if it would adhere to the old, and

* The Organon of Aristotle received its designation from the function which logic subserves as the instrument of the mind in reasoning, David. Int. x, Cat. Schol. Aristot., p. 25, a. 1; p. 26, a. 12, and Philoponus, *ibid.*, p. 37, b. 46; also Waitz. *Org.*, vol. ii, Comm., p. 293-4. Aristotle uses the same illustration of the hand which is employed in the opening Aphorisms of the *Novum Organon*.

† Claudian., *De Raptu Proserpinæ*, lib. ii, v. 371.

fairly comprehend them in their integrity and totality. And yet, this would be nearly equivalent to another Instauration, for it would transfer to the nineteenth century the realization and completion of that undertaken in the seventeenth. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive any philosophical scheme to which the present age is adequate, or which is required by its actual wants, which would not be embraced in a complete revision, purification, and extension of the method of Bacon, and its cordial union with that of Aristotle, of which Bacon sometimes spoke slightly, though he never presumed to discard it. And the instinctive perception of this truth seems to have dictated that urgent prescription of the combination of the synthetic and analytic method, the inductive and the deductive, which, though not original with him,* and only partial, from its exclusion of all formal logic, so strikingly characterizes M. Comte's *Système de Politique Positive*.

In speaking of the reform of Lord Bacon, we have not mentioned the name of Descartes, which is generally held in even higher estimation by the French and Continental philosophers. We have intentionally disregarded him; because, however eminent his merit in applying the principles of the Baconian reform to metaphysical subjects, and however great his special services to science, he afforded merely a partial type of that reform, was largely infected with the erroneous procedure of the schoolmen, and was indebted to Bacon for the fundamental ideas, which he borrowed without acknowledgment.† Moreover, we do not hesitate to say that the physical hypotheses of Descartes impeded his science more than his mathematical discoveries advanced it; and that his arbitrary metaphysical assumptions extended the most pernicious influences of the schoolmen to our own times, and furnished the germ for the deceptive rationalism of the German transcendentalists, which has thrown such an impenetrable haze over all real knowledge. We do not desire to detract from the eminent merits of Descartes, but his only claim to the possession of a place by the side of Bacon is his possession of somewhat similar qualities in an inferior degree; and the only mode of accounting for the preëminence which has been assigned to him is by attributing it to national vanity in the first instance, and to ignorance of Bacon's writings in the second.

* "A combination of analysis and synthesis is the condition of a perfect knowledge." Sir Wm. Hamilton, *Discussions*, &c., p. 685. This principle may be traced in Kant, *Crit. de la Raison Prat.*, p. 11; in Bacon, and even in Aristotle and his Commentators.

† V. *Edinb. Rev.*, Jan., 1852. For other plagiarisms of Descartes, see same article, and Leibnitz, *Op.* tom. v, pp. 393-5.

It is significant of the efficiency of Bacon's labours, which were suggestive, not systematic, that they almost immediately manifested their general and beneficial influences in satisfying the principal necessities of the times. Physical science received a potent impulse, which has prolonged its effects till in our day they have become dangerous: commerce, industry, and the mechanic arts were developed with unexampled success: political, religious, and moral speculations manifested a new energy, if not a similar advancement.* The age of Bacon was one of remarkable excitation in all departments of human theory and practice. All convictions were unsettled, as may be evinced by the essays of Montaigne, to look no deeper. The civil and religious wars of France and the German empire, as soon afterward the Great Rebellion in England, together with the remarkable literature of the close of the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries, indicate a moral, a religious, a political, and an intellectual disturbance, which constitute a partial parallel to the disorganization by which we are now surrounded. Religious confusion had sprung from intellectual error, and each had aggravated the other; while from both united had proceeded the habitual disregard of morals, and the political disorder which afflicted those generations. The Baconian philosophy distinctly contemplated moral, political, and social amelioration as the consequence of an improved logical method: and it were well, in the present fever of rabid innovation, to recur to the sober and profound suggestions of Bacon on the subject of healthy reform.

But the most important of all the characteristics of Lord Bacon's writings is the eminently religious and Christian spirit with which they are so deeply imbued. If he projected a new scheme of scientific procedure to probe the mysteries of nature and multiply the miracles of art, it was with the confident hope that the increase of knowledge and the extension of art might illustrate the perfections, and tend to the greater glory of God. The same predominance of a religious aim is manifested constantly by him, which presided over the wonderful elaboration of Aristotle, and the brilliant but erratic career of Abelard. In none of these great men is there any trace of that supercilious impatience of the supreme authority of religion, or any indication of that desire to elevate human reason into the sole, self-sufficient legislator of the universe, which so fatally corrodes all our modern systems of intellectual reform.

When we consider retrospectively the Baconian philosophy, its

* To give one example for all, it may suffice to mention that the great treatise of Grotius, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, was confessedly instigated by Lord Bacon's writings.

principles, its influence, and its fortunes, we may readily detect its imperfections, and the sources of its injurious effects, as of late displayed. But if we place ourselves in the age of Bacon, and appreciate the condition, the appetencies, the errors, and the wants of that period, we may safely say, that no plan was ever devised by human wisdom more admirably calculated to alleviate existing evils, or to generate a long heritage of positive good.

We had nearly forgotten to mention among the prominent characteristics of the procedure of Aristotle, Abelard, and Bacon, the intimate dependence of each new instauration upon the previous forms of philosophy. There is no forced originality, no violent revolt from the associations of the past, no affectation of entire novelty, no rupture of the continuity of human development. We have already exhibited the regular gradations by which the crude theories of early Greece ascended to the lofty amplitude of the Aristotelian doctrine; we have seen, too, how Abelard clung to the instructions of Aristotle, and a close study of his life and philosophy reveals how eagerly he clutched at the floating fragments of Platonism and New Platonism, which, in the general wreck of learning, were floated within his reach by the capricious eddies of mediæval times. When we come to Bacon, this union with the past is not so perceptible, in consequence of his apparent profession of originality, of the sedulous care with which he obliterated the signs of his indebtedness, and the almost unbroken ignorance which has long prevailed relative to the middle ages and to the immediate precursors of Bacon. Yet his actual relation to the schoolmen and to his less remote predecessors, is even more close and more remarkable than in the case of either Abelard or Aristotle. We leave the proof of this statement for a more suitable occasion; but the evidence is so abundant, so minute, so various, and so conclusive, that, if exhibited *in extenso*, a loose thinker might find it difficult to recognise the real originality of Lord Bacon, which consists not so much in any special suggestion of his philosophy as in the accuracy, the sobriety, the profundity, with which all that is useless or pernicious is rejected, and the amazing delicacy and comprehensive vigour with which all that is valuable is elucidated, methodized, and enforced. We have no hesitation in assigning to Roger Bacon the entire honours of the conception of the experimental philosophy; and in declaring that Francis of Verulam owed the magnitude of his fame mainly to his historical position. But still, both the fame and the position were won in consequence of his just appreciation and cordial adoption of all that was best in the past; and it was the due reward of a constant intellectual elaboration, in obedience to such inspiration, that he merited

the high, but not very poetical, tribute of Dryden, which has been continually repeated in the more critical language of prose:—

“The world to Bacon does not only owe
Its present knowledge, but its future too.”

This brief and imperfect survey of past intellectual progress, and of the great crisis of mental development, may enable us to determine the essential conditions which must be satisfied by any philosopher who may claim the fourth throne by the side of the illustrious three—Aristotle, Abelard, and Bacon. The fulfilment of these conditions will be the *sine qua non* which must precede any legitimate pretension to the succession. Much more, indeed, will be required; but the other characteristics we will not presume to anticipate, as they can be only known after the event: and, moreover, we are endeavouring merely to establish a test by which false prophets may be detected, not to furnish in advance the portraiture of the true. We wish to supply the means for discovering and confounding the four hundred priests of Baal. We will not dare to conjecture the powers, the properties, or the credentials of him on whom the mantle of Elijah may be destined to descend. We only propose to point out the negative conditions which may authenticate the mission of the true prophet; the positive characteristics we leave to the future to disclose.

The conditions, then, are first: That the new reform shall be dictated by the contemporary disorganization of society, and contemplate its redress or alleviation as a proximate aim; then, it must appear at the close of a period in which former intellectual systems have manifested their impotency and decline, not only by their defective operation, but by their positively pernicious action; next, it must propose the revivification of moral sentiments and moral responsibilities, and must seek the agency of the meditated reform in the revision, purification, and extension of metaphysical theories and logical procedure, by starting from a more correct and enlarged determination of the principles and laws of all valid reasoning; and, finally, it must be governed by an earnest spirit of religious belief, and minister to the restoration of religious convictions. It must also, as we have already said, be in harmony with the past, but it must not be the summation of prevalent habits, or the mere systemization of vague, popular practice; or, in other words, it must not form the climax of anterior usages, but be obviously the introduction of a new *régime*. It is scarcely necessary to add that these aims must not be simply professed as vague appetencies, but that the new philosophy must manifest an undoubted aptitude for effec-

tually accomplishing the ends proposed. We may add, too, that the less pretension to system which it may possess, the greater will be the probability of its success, and the more reasonable the presumption that its mission is true. Where was the system of Socrates, of Aristotle, of Abelard, or even of Bacon himself? Their followers, indeed, produced systems in all variety and abundance, but where were their own?

The characteristics which we have indicated may appear in unequal degrees and under diverse modifications, according to the complexion of the times and the individual idiosyncrasies of the philosophers themselves; but they must all coëxist in perfect concord. We may easily recognise the realization of these conditions, in whole or in part, by Aristotle, Abelard, and Bacon; though by each with dissimilar completeness. We may, without difficulty, discover the violation of one or more of them by all of those distinguished men who failed in the reforms which they severally attempted. But all of these criteria may be imperfectly represented by one: the reformation designed must commence in the revision of logical principles, or the formal conditions of human thought and speculation. Thus, if it were not for the apparent irreverence, we might say here, that, strangely enough, after the contumely of three centuries, the indispensable aid of logic is conspicuously recognised, and "the stone which the builders (of our modern temple of science) rejected, has become the head-stone of the corner."

When we test, by the criteria proposed, M. Comte's claims to be regarded as the Bacon of the nineteenth century, and attempt to determine the probable efficacy of his writings and philosophy for the purposes proposed, it will be obvious to any one acquainted with his brilliant and elaborate works that we have an exceedingly delicate task to perform. In many respects he approximates so closely to most of the requisitions specified, that either a hasty consideration of his writings, or an appetency for their peculiar heresies, may readily inspire the conviction that they are fully satisfied by him. Even in this event, we should have no sufficient assurance of his being truly entitled to the mission claimed for him; but should be compelled to renounce our negative test, and proceed to examine his doctrines in detail. A close and discriminating comparison, however, of M. Comte's treatises with the canon which we have established, will exhibit such discrepancies, we think, as will justify the conclusion that M. Comte does not in any sufficient sense satisfy the fundamental conditions which we have pointed out. It will, indeed, appear singular that he should have so nearly approached the prescribed standard, and yet failed to attain it; and yet the causes of this very

failure will furnish us with the explanation of that equally singular phenomenon, that, after his just criticism of the errors of modern intellect, and his acute suggestions for the partial renovation of modern science, his philosophy should have eventuated in a system at once arbitrary and fantastic, and calculated rather to perpetuate existing evils than to introduce any radical reform of the intellect.

Still, though such may be the result to which we are finally brought by any diligent examination of M. Comte's philosophy, the first glance furnishes a sufficiently strong presumption of the justice of the claim alleged in his behalf, to prevent any surprise at the earnestness with which it has been asserted by his followers, and the tenacity with which it is believed. It is obvious, on the slightest inspection, that the whole theory of Positivism has been dictated by the desire to minister effectually toward the alleviation and removal of existing social distress, and the prevailing intellectual anarchy; and this purpose is constantly and expressly avowed. The new scheme is offered at a time when from all quarters we are assured that our old habits of thought and action have run into dangerous excesses, and are exhibiting pernicious tendencies which they are unable of themselves to explain or arrest. These consequences of popular error are sedulously exposed in the Positive philosophy. It contemplates as its immediate fruit, the revival of moral obligations and the acknowledgment of the predominance of duty over right, as the means necessary for the reestablishment of healthy social and political action. It seeks the accomplishment of these aims by the negation of those erroneous theories of metaphysics, and of that habitual sophistry which are supposed to have generated the present anarchy of the intellect. It professes to be actuated by a deep religious sentiment, and has actually attempted the construction of a new, scientific, and demonstrable religion. It certainly harmonizes, in many respects, most intimately with the past, and yet assumes to be the commencement of a radical regeneration. It is instinct throughout with the most absolute confidence in its own truth and adequacy; it is full of the conviction that it, and nothing else, can effectually eradicate the existing ailments of civilization; and it proclaims its own definite establishment with the most unwavering dogmatism. It is eminently systematic, it is true; but the unchanging system lies rather in the method than in the details, which are in many instances acknowledged to be only provisional, and subject to correction with the further advancement of experience and science. Such is the evidence which sustains the presumption that M. Comte is entitled to the honour of being hailed as the Bacon of the Nineteenth Century.

Let us examine these points more closely. We admit, without question, that the Positive philosophy appears at a time of lamentable intellectual anarchy, is dictated by the social wants and distresses of the time, and contemplates their redress and removal. But the same admission, in their respective periods, might be made with regard to Protagoras, Plato, Epicurus, Zeno, Arnold of Brescia, Berengarius, Giordano Bruno, Campanella, Sir Thomas More, Harrington, St. Simon, Fourier, Owen, Leroux, and hundreds of others. These characteristics appertain equally to the speculative reformers who have failed in their mission, and to those who have achieved the requisite regeneration.

The Positive system does indeed appear at a time when intellectual error is so deep-seated and so wide-spread, so operative, and yet so latent, that it has introduced almost hopeless confusion into all departments of thought and action. Previous systems are obviously effete, and the world is beginning to evince its consciousness of the necessity of new or more correct principles for an assured continuance of the race of civilization. But, though the Positive philosophy is thus unquestionably propounded at the close of an intellectual period, we think that it as unquestionably belongs to the period which it proposes to supersede, and is rather a purification, systemization, and summation of the principles of the past, than an announcement of any new or more correct method. The absence of all authority other than the individual will, the want of any extrinsic evidence of truth and right, and their entire dependence upon the human and the individual reason, resulting in the consequential anarchy of the intellect, were recognised by us in our previous article as the fatal and characteristic symptoms of present disorganization. How does the Positive philosophy propose to redress this great grievance? By arbitrarily discarding, at the dictation of the individual caprice of the author, all branches of knowledge and science which do not lend themselves to his predetermined system; by denying theology, metaphysics, logic, geology, natural history, &c.; and by assuming the mutilated body of remaining science—itself the mere creature of human reason, acting in obedience to those principles which have produced the anarchy complained of by M. Comte—by assuming this, as pruned, distorted, and perverted in accordance with his own individual interpretation, as the sole canon of truth and falsehood, of right and of wrong. Such a procedure bears upon itself the marks of all the diseases which are traced to the operation of those habits which it is designed to correct. It takes, it is true, the right of authoritative judgment from all others; but it concentrates this right and this authority in

the individual will and the individual reason of M. Comte himself, and those whom he may designate as the anointed preachers of his own individual doctrine. Nor is it possible to evade this resemblance to present popular practices by alleging that this doctrine is the result of all former research, and is the voice, the reason, the science, the sum-total of the convictions of humanity itself. Even if so, it would only be the voice of humanity in so far as the successive generations of men had disowned all authority but that of the merely human and scientific reason. It would thus resolve itself into the recognition of the justice of that authority of the individual will, or of the aggregate wills of the individuals composing humanity, which has eventuated in the modern anarchy which is to be redressed. In the former case it is the canonization of all existing evils of speculation under the form of an intellectual despotism; in the latter it is the systematic recognition of the intellectual anarchy itself, as the sole means of its abatement. On one horn or the other of this dilemma the Positive philosophy must hang; but, in either case, it proves to be equally part and parcel of the old and effete dispensation, not the inauguration of a new intellectual government. We must however say that it is a most unlicensed pretension on the part of the Positive philosophy, to claim to be the mouth-piece of humanity—for mankind in all its stages has received much of what M. Comte has rejected with a firmer, more general, and more assured belief, than anything which he has accepted: and has recognised those branches of strict science which he has cashiered in its highest civilization, while it refuses to believe in that fantastic theory of phrenology to which he assigns such prominence in his works.

Here, then, is one point, and it is a most important one, in which the claim of M. Comte most signally fails. His philosophy belongs to that one-sided interpretation of the Baconian reform, which has resulted in present anarchy. But, though his glance is toward the past in the general elaboration of his philosophy, he reveals a true prophetic instinct in declaring the necessity of a moral reform—of a revival of the controlling sense of duty—as the indispensable preliminary to either social or political reorganization. We cannot accord equal commendation to the mode in which this resuscitation of moral vitality is proposed to be effected, nor can we concede it to be efficacious, or even practicable. What is the standard of positive morality? The revealed law of God? By no means. M. Comte regards all divinity as a fiction; he is like Tasso's magician—

“D'ogni Dio sprezzator.”

Is it the law of God written in our hearts—the human conscience? Not so: he does indeed recognise, in a vague manner, the logical validity of the instinctive sentiments of man, but he never elevates the conscience of the individual into the arbiter of our actions. His morality is nothing more than implicit obedience to the interests and necessities of humanity, as demonstrated by the scientific study of the universe, and by the examination of the requirements of human society. We may admit that this is a more elevated view of duty than that taught by Bentham, but, after all, it is only a sublimated form of utilitarianism, and limits the range of morals to the narrow circle of temporal prudence. It is certainly a vain hope to expect to revive the fading sense of immutable obligations, which has been sapped by the uncontrolled ascendancy of the intellect and by the impetuous pursuit of individual interests, by recognising as a canon the mere scientific creation of human reason, and appealing to the general interests of the mass. To insure obedience to the moral law, we must be taught to listen with childish simplicity to the voice of the monitor within; and must regard its prescriptions, not as the deductions or the inductions of the reason, but as the witness of God in our hearts. The motive of our actions must be extrinsic to all temporal considerations; not the suggestion of a pliable fancy or a casuistical science, but an implicit obedience to divine command, and an humble reliance upon the justice and truth of divine authority. No other law—no fantastic scheme of our creation—can be received as a substitute for the eternal law: it could only have a transitory and partial influence over our conduct, and would yield instantly to the caprices of passion, to the temptations of interest, and to the chimeras of human reason. Although the aim of M. Comte be, then, indubitably both right and noble, the means proposed by him for its realization would prove ineffectual, and would only tend to perpetuate, under a disguised form, the present lamentable subjection of the moral sentiments to considerations of worldly prudence and to intellectual domination.

But, as if sensible of this defect, as if himself recognising the imperative necessity of some guide for human action beyond the range of human speculation, M. Comte has in his later productions proposed, with apparent inconsistency, a religious scheme as the basis for all his meditated reforms. On the construction of this Positive religion he now seems to plume himself the most, and his greatest discovery appears to be, in his opinion, the determination of the divinity of humanity:—

An gloria magna,
Insidias homini composuisse deum?

If this new religion possessed the elements or the characteristics of a valid religion, the objections which we have made to the proposed moral renovation of M. Comte would be in a great measure removed. If, however, it is the mere spectral illusion of a diseased imagination, it proves the justice of those objections, and their recognition by M. Comte himself. There is, however, another reason for devoting some attention to this new creed at present. We have seen that the great reformers of former times were governed by an ardent religious sentiment. If they deviated in some respects from the popular interpretation of religious doctrines, they received with unhesitating faith the great principles of religion, and endeavoured to explain and confirm their truth, and extend their efficacy. None of them pretended to deny supernatural religion, or dreamed for one moment of inventing a new one. This religious temperament we have recognised as one of the most significant characteristics of the true reformer. If M. Comte possesses it in any just sense, it may add another testimony in favour of his pretensions to the throne of Bacon. If he only clothes himself with the semblance of religion, imagines a mere *simulacrum* instead of a reality, and sets up in his heart, as the divine object of his adoration, a mere idol of his own fantastic invention, it is one evidence the more that his pretensions are wholly unfounded.

We ask pardon of our readers while we proceed gravely to examine this point. Ridicule seems the only appropriate weapon, and contempt the only fitting judgment. But these are not legitimate practices in philosophical investigation, and we must estimate the Positive religion with a sobriety and impartiality which it scarcely merits, though such courtesy may be due to the great name of M. Comte.

In the *Système de Politique Positive*,* the necessity is distinctly recognised of an extrinsic or extra-human authority as the guide and legislator of man; thus indicating one of those fundamental proofs of the necessity of religion which are furnished by the very constitution of human nature. But M. Comte does not perceive that a supra-human authority is in all respects superior to a coördinate, though extrinsic one. Nor does he discover that the one may be efficacious and sufficient, while the latter might be entirely inoperative. He vaguely detects the principle of the necessity, and yet vitiates its application, by his choice of lower and inadequate means. In order to render his extrinsic legislation of the scientific laws of

* "Pour nous régler ou nous valuer, la religion doit donc, avant tout nous subordonner à une puissance extérieure, dont l'irrésistible suprématie ne nous laisse aucune incertitude."—Syst. de Pol. Pos., vol. ii, p. 12.

nature valid, one of two things would be requisite: we must conceive either that we have a full and complete knowledge of all the laws of nature,—which is to assert the future stagnation of science,—or we must suppose that the laws which we now receive as such will not be materially changed or modified by future discoveries. The former is utterly at variance with the indispensable humility of true knowledge; the latter is equally opposed to the past history of science, and to its future advancement. The former, if true, might inform the reason, but it would be impotent to regenerate or to regulate the heart; the latter, besides this inefficiency, would be obnoxious to the accusation of terminating a philosophy professedly founded upon history by the negation of its lessons. In looking to God and to revelation for the requisite ultra-human authority, we recognise a fixed scheme, unchangeable by mere human action, and immutable absolutely, except by a further revelation, which we have no reason to expect, and which, even if vouchsafed, would assuredly fulfil, not destroy, the former law. We have, therefore, neither right nor need to anticipate any ulterior developments in religion, except such as may result from the more harmonious agreement between human reason and revealed prescription, or from the fuller comprehension which increased intelligence may bestow. Thus, M. Comte, in this, as in so many other instances, apprehends in his analysis the truth which he either totally vitiates or entirely abandons in his synthesis; detecting in his criticism the important principle which does not regulate his construction, because he is hopelessly led to the adoption of too low a procedure by the fatal tendency of his original prejudices.

When we consider the details of his creed, we find something superlatively ridiculous and visionary in the idea of his Humanity as an object of adoration. How is it depicted by himself? It is a supreme being, incorporeal, yet formed of infinite bodies; immaterial, yet made from matter; eternal, yet born in time and constantly dying in its members; invisible, yet whose parts are always visible before absorbed into its substance; omnipotent, yet restricted by laws which it does not make, but discover; omniscient, yet ever increasing in knowledge; ubiquitous, but never occupying any place in its aggregate capacity, and pervading only detached portions of terrestrial space by the accidental and shifting distribution of its atoms. It is a supreme being that grows by the decay of its elements, like Saturn, feeding on his own children; that increases in strength, magnitude, power, and intelligence, in proportion as the apparent need diminishes; that is non-existent at the commence-

° *Syst. de Politique Positive*, vol. ii, p. 82.

ment of its creation, expands with its expansion, and would attain the amplest proportions on the verge of extinction or decay. It is a deity that furnishes the initiatory instruction to the successive races of his servants, and receives from them a wider instruction and more comprehensive intelligence; being always superior to them in the quantum of past accretions, and always inferior in the quality of present knowledge and morality. It is the very inversion, not merely of the relations of Creator and creature, of God and man, of supreme legislator and subject, but even of the ordinary relations of parent and child. It is not the pantheism of German transcendentalists, but its converse, the panhumanism of an equally capricious and extravagant empiricism. It is not religion, however the abuse of the term may be sanctioned by etymological *tours-de-force*, but it is hollow self-worship, with only the coarseness of self-idolatry mitigated by the substitution of the shadowy image of a chimerical humanity for the familiar *genius* of each individual. Such a portentous shape bears the impress of all the worst passions and most delusive dreams of past years, and can sustain no morality which is essentially different from the prudential or impulsive morality which is at present compatible with the domination of the intellect.

It were easy to continue our criticism of M. Comte's Religion of Humanity, which, he repeatedly informs us, is definitely established,*—(Heaven save the mark!)—but this is not the place for this discussion, which must still bide its time: but we cannot abandon the subject without noticing that M. Comte's new-fangled religion of Humanity, of which he has proclaimed himself high-priest, prophet, and pope, is merely an ingenious but revolting travesty of the Christian faith. There is much acuteness and fanciful analogy in the minute parallelism preserved in this transmutation; but the process itself, and especially its detailed and sedulous elaboration, furnish instructive testimony—most cogent because unconscious—to the substantial reality, the absolute necessity of that religious scheme which it is thus proposed to supplant by another with a different external complexion and a very dissimilar internal spirit, though following the same train and arriving at the same ends. The Christian religion, in this contrast with the religion of humanity, may be illustrated by Dryden's lines:—

"She raised a mortal to the skies;
He drew an angel down."

The Salian priests, in order to preserve the sacred palladium—the Ancile which had been lowered from heaven—constructed twelve

* Syst. de Pol. Pos., vol. i, pp. 445, 448.

shields in all respects similar to the divine gift. M. Comte imitates this course in order to effect the overthrow of Christianity; but, by so doing, must be held a reluctant witness to the efficacy of that very religion which he attacks and denies, and which he parodies while proposing a substitute for it.

Can we regard the imagination of such a scheme as evidence of that religious spirit which presided over the labours of the immortal three who preceded M. Comte? Is this sort of plastic imitation—this negation of all recognised religion—this fiction of a God and this figment of a creed, any evidence of a religious spirit at all? Assuredly not; or we might estimate Moseilama or Mokanna above Mohammed, the devil-worshippers above Abelard, and even Joanna Southcote above—M. Comte.

On the score of religion, then, the Positive philosophy lamentably fails to accord with the requisitions of any new instauration. It recognises the necessity of religion as the basis of any effectual moral reform, and it proposes to us, as a religion, a wild reverie which has nothing of religion but the unwarrantable assumption of its name, and is obviously incapable of producing any persistent convictions, of any sort whatever.

But the Positive philosophy is deficient both in breadth and universality. The former defect we illustrated while exposing the illogical fallacy of confining all knowledge to the demonstrable or scientific; the latter is sufficiently proved by repeating that M. Comte excludes from the domain of his philosophy, as of knowledge, all branches of human study which directly or indirectly militate with his own mutilated and preconceived theory. He has extended the empire of science in the direction of sociology; but this conquest will not compensate for his rejection of the preliminary sciences of logic and metaphysics. He abnegates zoology and geology,* also; nominally on account of their concrete character. But they are rather descriptive than concrete sciences. The real secret of their repudiation might be suspected to be the employment which has been frequently made of them to furnish evidences of creative design, and thus to confirm the truth of revealed religion.

But the exclusion of logic and metaphysics from the sphere of his speculations is, of itself alone, amply sufficient to overthrow any pretensions of M. Comte to be welcomed as the Bacon of the nineteenth century. In a former article we declared that we had no very favourable estimation of metaphysical pursuits in general, and recognised the pernicious tendencies to which they ordinarily gave

* *Syst. de Politique Positive*, vol. i, p. 432. Cf. *Catechisme Positiviste*, pp. 53, 63.

rise; but we also acknowledged on that occasion, and now repeat, that there are periods in the progress of intellectual development when they become indispensable: and we have recently seen that it was in this particular field that the instauration of Aristotle, Abelard, and Bacon were commenced, and their main battle won. M. Comte's contemptuous scorn and renunciation of these fundamental departments of human speculation compel us to assign him a place, as a reformer of the intellectual world, even below Abelard. We are not speaking of the comparative genius of the two authors, nor of their respective ranges of investigation, but solely of the efficacy of their schemes to inaugurate a new intellectual era. M. Comte has not attempted to reexamine the conditions and first principles of human thought; he has avoided this essential inquiry by cutting off and ignoring the whole domain which required the earliest and most arduous culture. His criticism does not extend to the valid exercise of the functions of reason: it assumes a lower station for its departure, and commences below the point from which the whole current of present disorder flows; and thus it can at best produce only a deceptive impression of renovated health, for it does not rise to the full recognition of the disease. It is wholly incognizant of the first therapeutics required, and it mistakes the parts to which the curative remedies must be applied. M. Comte, it is true, even while denying the validity of logic as a legitimate branch of knowledge, has ministered most efficiently to the extension and correction of the logic of strict science. All credit is due to him for insisting so strenuously upon the necessity of combining analysis with synthesis in all speculation, and employing induction for discovery, deduction for systemization. The merit is not in the novelty of the doctrine, for it is not new, but in the prominence given to it, and its skilful elucidation. But, though we concede these services, and though they may ultimately prove to be extremely beneficial, they only withdraw our attention from the primitive seat of error, and aid a continued advance in the wrong direction, until the pure logic of human thought, the conditions and validity of all reasoning, have been reexamined and reconstituted. This subject could never be directly contemplated by M. Comte, being excluded by his own arbitrary procedure at the outset. Indeed, the "Critique of the Pure Reason" gives to Kant a much stronger presumptive claim to be recognised as a true reformer than is possessed by the French philosopher. Had M. Comte suffered himself to be guided in his general purposes by Kant, with the same docility with which he has pursued his footsteps in more trivial matters; had he commenced his criticism of human knowledge where Kant began, and

applied to the investigation his wonderful sagacity, his singular lucidity of thought and expression, his persevering industry, and his large scientific attainments, he might have attained the object of his ambition, and proved the great restorer of modern intellect—provided he had not by an arbitrary pre-judgment rejected revelation. As it is, the original error of his preliminary rejections recurs at the close of his long and brilliant elaboration, and denies him the fruition of his hopes. The hand of Tantalus is stretched toward the tempting fruit, his mouth approaches the long-desired waters; the former are nearly within his grasp, the latter have almost touched his parched lips; but both vanish irrecoverably at the very moment when the confidence of their enjoyment had almost become certainty. In the history of the papacy there is a most painful and instructive story told of a certain cardinal. San Severina, burning with the most intense but concealed ambition, had once declined the tiara from affected humility. Years rolled on, and he was at last elected by the conclave. He remained in his cell, endeavouring to subdue his eager gratification into the semblance of modest resignation. He listened for the feet of the deputation at his doors, coming to announce his elevation to the pontifical throne. Instead of the expected honour, he learned that all his hope was forever blasted by the absolute and canonical veto of the German emperor. His doom was heard in silence, and, with an heroic effort, he concealed his anguish and despair. But the prize to which his whole life had been devoted, for which he had toiled, for which, through a long existence, he had clothed himself with hypocrisy and unnatural humility, was gone from his reach forever. And that night he lay senseless in the silence of his chamber, while the blood gushed in torrents from his ears, his nostrils, and his mouth.* In refusing to M. Comte the honour claimed for him by his too eager admirers, we have the same feeling of agony that we cannot resist in contemplating the life and fate of Cardinal San Severina. Instead of succeeding to the throne of Bacon, M. Comte has hopelessly failed; his hand had almost touched the sceptre, but it is not destined for him. He must take his place by the side of Protagoras, and Roscellinus, and Giordano Bruno, and the other eminent philosophers who prematurely attempted an intellectual instauration, and missed their mark, in consequence of misapprehending the true conditions of the required reform. It is somewhat remarkable that the criticism of Brucker on Giordano Bruno is almost exactly applicable to M. Comte.

* This sad history of mingled deception and heroism is admirably given in "Ranke's History of the Popes," where it is illustrated by the graphic testimony of contemporary documents.

The philosopher of Nola failed from excess of fancy, (which is abundantly evinced in the *Système de Philosophie Positive*), and from the absence of a true religious spirit.*

We have now briefly examined M. Comte's claims to be accepted as the Bacon of the nineteenth century, and in a manner which scarcely does justice to his singular acumen in the detection of special errors, or to the sagacity with which he exposes prevalent sophistry. The investigation has not been as thorough and minute as we should have wished it to be for our own satisfaction; but our space denied us the privilege of descending to details, and showing how impracticable and inefficient the provisions of Positivism are for the adequate redress of the grievances recognised. The result of our inquiry might perhaps tempt others to underrate the splendid abilities and extensive science of the founder of the Positive philosophy; but we have spared the ridicule which his later productions invite, and we acknowledge that his critical or negative labours have facilitated the advent of an effectual instauration, and that most of his scientific conclusions will be incorporated with slight modifications in any future scheme of adequate renovation. The broad standard, too, by which we have tested his true historical position, though throwing a transient shadow over his brilliant capacities, allows us to entertain no apprehension of having done injustice to him in denying him to be the prophet which he is asserted to be, or of having been influenced in our judgment by prejudices or partialities. M. Comte is not he who should come, but we must look for another. If the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton were only rigidly settled and sufficiently developed, we should give it precedence over the Positive philosophy, because it commences at the right point, and looks in the right direction, although the scope of the author be, as yet, too limited for a complete renovation.

The Baconian philosophy has been the peculiar boast of the late centuries, but it has been accepted and construed in a much narrower spirit than that which animated its great founder, and has been dwarfed into a mean and beggarly limitation to things sensible and material, to the exclusion of its aptitudes for higher thoughts, feel-

* "Prima, autem, quæ in eo vigeat, imaginationis vis fuit, adeo effusa et extra orbitam rapta, ut nisi nos omnia fallant, vix simile vagantis per innumeras easque mire inter se connexas complicatasque imagines ingenii exemplum invenire liceat."—Brucker's Hist. Crit. Phil., tom. v, p. 29. And again: "Quamquam enim animo regebatur magno, excelso, errorum contemto, et imperterrito in subjugandis præjudiciis, nec ab eruditione erat imparatus, iudicii tamen acumine (*sobriety*) destitutus . . . totumque imaginationis delirii se permittens, veram viam invenire non potuit."—Id., p. 36.

ings, and objects. Man, matter, and money—an ominous alliteration—have been venerated as the triune divinity of the nineteenth century, and conceived to be the legitimate idol set up by Lord Bacon. The experimental philosophy has been the only part of his labours that has been cordially accepted; and the Baconian instauration, thus shrunk and withered, has been made at once the tool and the divinity of the age. This spirit of the times has met its fullest expression and most consistent development in the immense systems of M. Comte, which have accepted all the logical consequences of exclusively experimental knowledge, but, with that instinctive resilience from what is base and unworthy which characterizes the highest order of genius, have rejected the beggarly sentiments, the selfish policy, the self-idolatrous vanity, which in meaner natures have been the fruits of a defective system. Still, the Positive philosophy is merely the systemization of the mutilated fraction of the Baconian philosophy, which has been hitherto illogically received by self-seeking generations: and the pernicious results which it eliminates in theory would be sure to return in practice. Between the rigid, materialistic, humanized philosophy of M. Comte, and the vague but glorious visions of something higher than humanity and human science which irradiate the works of Lord Bacon, the distance is vast indeed; but something more definite and distinct than the undeveloped inspirations of the sage of Verulam, and something less purely human than anything which M. Comte has conceived, is requisite to counteract the tendencies of the times, to correct its evils, heal the wounds of intellect, and breathe again the breath of life into an unbelieving and degraded society.

The philosophy of Aristotle embraced both the great branches of human knowledge—the ethical and physical—the speculative and scientific: not both with equal intensity, or with equal completeness; for the necessities of the times demanded the aid of the former, and the condition of science denied the extensive prosecution of the latter. The logical reform was thus the most prominent and significant part of Aristotle's labours; this was cultivated by his followers, while, after Theophrastus and Dioscorides, his researches in natural science were almost abandoned, and were neglected by the Romans. Abelard applied his genius merely to the promulgation of the ethical division of Aristotelism, and thus logic, in process of time, was extended to subjects which it was never designed to usurp, and science was corrupted and retarded by vain syllogistic discussions. Bacon relieved it from this incubus, and placed it under the jurisdiction of observation, experiment, and induction; but without disowning the validity of logic in its proper domain, or disclaiming the

superior authority and importance of ethical pursuits. His disciples overlooked this universality, and prosecuted a fragmentary elaboration of knowledge; slighting and denouncing the logic of deduction, and confining themselves to purely scientific construction. M. Comte has pushed still further forward in the same march. He has exposed many of the inconsistencies and sophisms of the received empiricism, but he has for the first time given a formal denial to that knowledge, lying beyond the sphere of science, which was so highly prized by Bacon. He is thus the standard-bearer only of the popular and received fragment of the Baconian philosophy, not the successor to its whole dominion. But the evils of the time result from this exclusive pursuit of the materialistic side of Baconism, and their redress requires a recurrence to the ethical branches of knowledge. M. Comte is thus on the same side with the existing evil, not on that of the necessary reform. He stands toward Bacon in a relation somewhat analogous to that occupied by Abelard to Aristotle; not in the relation of Bacon to Aristotle, or of either of those great men to the intellectual progress of humanity. Ethical and physical science never both flourish with equal vigour at the same periods, but the progress of intellect proceeds by an oscillation from one to the other. At the inception of Greek philosophy, the latter was in the ascendant; the former from the days of Socrates till the time of Bacon. The continuance of the exclusive domination of speculative inquiry then eventuated in evil; and Bacon, without denying its validity within its legitimate range, reformed natural science, and thus gave to it greater prominence. Physical pursuits have now been sedulously and almost exclusively pursued for two centuries and a half, and have brought the present harvest of woes. The remedy is a return toward Aristotle, by the rectification of logic and of ethical knowledge; not by the absolutely exclusive prosecution of that one-sided Baconism, which is the source of modern anarchy. It is thus in the hemisphere of ethical science that we must expect the dawn of the new instauration, and must look for that future philosophy which may be hailed as the *Instauratio Maxima*.

That intellectual regeneration, which the civilized world now languishes for and desires, must, indeed, partake of the universal character which we have recognised in the intellectual creations of Aristotle and Bacon, and must fulfil all the requisites which we have pointed out. It must and will introduce order and tranquillity into the political life of states, by establishing a healthier social harmony in the bosom of our modern communities. A larger development of human action, a more expansive play of human sentiment, a more liberal

exercise of scientific and speculative talent will result from a less selfish and greedy constitution of society. But this great change must be effectuated by a livelier sense of the stringency of moral obligations—by a substitution of the idea of duty for the degrading though arrogant notion of right; (a position emphatically asserted by M. Comte, but not announced by him alone, nor, we think, first;) by a revivification of human charities and susceptibilities; by the appreciation of worth above intellect, and genuine goodness above all other qualities. So far we run parallel with the aims of M. Comte, and cordially agree with them; but our agreement is subject to the same limitations as the concurrence of Leibnitz with the physical speculations of Descartes.* Such a vital reformation of society, as is thus proposed, can be achieved only through the instrumentality of a renewed faith in things divine; by rekindling a spirit of submissive obedience to the prescriptions of God and the teaching of revelation; by the restoration of Christian doctrine to its true position as the authoritative rule of human conduct, instead of regarding it, as is now too often the case, as the mere holiday profession of a pharisaical hypocrisy or sanctimonious self-delusion. It is this war between profession and practice, between our pretended creeds and our pursuits, between the spirit of Christianity and the temptations of mammon, between faith and reason, between the heart and the intellect, between the fear of the devil and the love of gold, which has offered so many practicable breaches to all the assailants of Christianity, and has strewed the world with the seeds which have sprung up into an abundant harvest of the most poisonous weeds. Before, however, this renovation of the true spirit of religion can be effected, or, at any rate, coincident with its germination, a negative reform at least of our habits of reasoning is required. We must reëxamine the conditions of human thought, discover the characteristics of cognizable truth, determine the limitations beyond which human reasoning and speculation cannot hope to be valid, renounce the arrogance of our intellectual self-confidence, and the sophistical presumption of the aspiring intellect; we must reconstitute our logic, find the ground of harmony between our reason and the faith required for the reception of divine ordinances, and once more, like little children, recommence our education in things human and divine. This preliminary task is absolutely essential. Before we can pretend to any satisfactory and settled belief in a Christian doctrine, which may regulate our lives, we must discover and reject

* "Methodi ejus tantum propositum amo; nam quum in rem præsentem ventum est, ab illa severitate prorsus remisit, et ad hypotheses quasdam miras ex abrupto delapsus est."

those latent fallacies in our habitual maxims and recognised principles of thought and action, which militate against Christianity, and introduce into our minds an apparently fatal and irremediable discord between the conclusions of science and the doctrines of revelation. We may hail a philosophy, which may be competent to do all this, as something even greater than the *Novum Organon*, or the whole scheme of that *Instauratio Magna*, which Bacon sketched in outline, but never completed. From it we may hope for an alleviation of present political disorder, and the removal of the present intense social distress. We may expect it to strengthen the empire of religion while extending the bounds of knowledge; and to elevate and ennoble human science, while ministering to the more efficient satisfaction of the real wants, not of the caprices or passions of men. From it, too, we may anticipate the restoration of the true dignity of man, which will be no longer left to be the accidents of wealth, of popular clamour, or of seductive talents. It will consecrate the heart to the service of God, to the full discharge of every duty, to the sympathizing benefaction of humanity. It will subject the intellect, however brilliant, to the prescriptions of a genial morality, and employ it as the minister, but no longer as the tyrant, of right affections and lofty sentiments. It will discrown that intellectual despotism which has paralyzed the more generous springs of human action, has withered the green verdure of simplicity and innocence, and has dried up the refreshing fountains at which the weary traveller through the arid wilderness of worldly life was of old wont to quench his thirst. Such is the philosophy for which we yearn, and in which alone we will consent to repose our hopes. Such a philosophy, we believe, will, before many more long years, be vouchsafed to us. We wait patiently for its advent: and recognising with grateful admiration what is true and valuable in Positivism, we shall not suffer ourselves to be seduced by it, or any other scheme narrower than the one which we have indicated. We want something more than Positivism, something more accordant with the more mysterious and lofty aspirations of our half-angelic, half-human nature. That purely humanitarian philosophy, starting from the mere material frame-work of creation, sees nothing beyond it but the operation of phenomenal laws, without ascending to the Lawgiver, and limits the highest range of its flight to the deification of humanity, without attaining to the acknowledgment of the Creator of the universe, on whom man, as all things else, are dependent. This anthropological fetichism—for it is a recurrence to the lowest and earliest form of heathen superstition—is the culminating point of the despotism of the intellect. As we wander

through the long, systematic, and elaborately constructed system of M. Comte, we cannot but recall in fancy that dazzling but terrific palace of art, in which the poet's song clothes the prophet's wisdom, and remember how the intellect, the mistress of that vast pile, found the domain, which acknowledged no jurisdiction but her own, barren, lifeless, and productive only of despair and dismay:—

“Back on herself her serpent pride had curl'd—
 ‘No voice,’ she shriek'd, ‘in that lone hall,
 No voice breaks through the stillness of this world;
 One deep—deep silence all!’

“She, mouldering with the dull earth's mouldering sod,
 Inwrapt ten-fold in slothful shame,
 Lay there, exiled from the eternal God,
 Lost to her place and name.”

Such is the autocracy of the intellect; such nearly all the philosophy of the nineteenth century; such preëminently the system of M. Comte, and, as such, it is weighed in the balance and found wanting; and we look forward with hope to a better time and better things to come.

ART. II.—THE GROUND OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

By *ground* of moral obligation, is meant the *reason* or *cause* of it; and by reason or cause, not the *efficient* cause, or that *by* which it is produced, but the *final* reason or cause; that is, the ultimate end *for* which it is produced.

This explication of the principal term in the proposition is the more important, here in the outset, as a little attention to the subject is to satisfy us that the ground of moral obligation and the reason of it, and, consequently, the ultimate ground and the ultimate reason of it, are identical.

Still further to narrow the proposed inquiry we remark, that by *obligation* is intended the consideration which obliges or binds the subject, not to suffer the penalty of the law—if obligation in this sense could be supposed to hold with relation to it—but to comply with its precept; and, finally, that by *moral* obligation is mainly meant the obligation which man is under to obey God.

These preliminaries settled, we address ourselves to the inquiry, What is the ground of moral obligation? The most obvious answer is, The law of God. But what is the basis of the law of God? Answer, Relation; which is the basis of all law. And what

relation? The absolute propriety which the Author of the law has in the subject of it. What endues him with that propriety? Communication of being, involving, with its other properties, capability for the required obedience. But there must have been a cause, ground, or reason for that communication; what was it? Proximately—though this is to speak, not of a moral, but the efficient cause—it was volition or choice. And there was a ground on which that choice was exercised; what was that ground? Goodness. Under what specific form? Benevolence, or the willing of good to its object. Thus, combining the latter processes, while Infinite Goodness willed man's existence, he also willed his happiness, and the former out of regard to the latter.

But though we now seem to have reached the primitive base on which the other and upper strata are superposed, yet neither this nor they exhibit the natural adaptation which we have a right to look for in the object of our inquiry. If law rests on relation, and relation on ownership, and ownership on creation, and creation on volition,—that is, goodness willing happiness to its object,—the question then arises, as to how this good-willing can constitute the final ground or reason of obligation. That final reason, whatever it is, must be identical with the final end, out of regard to which the Deity imposes obligation. To suppose benevolence in him to be the final reason of obligation, is the same as to suppose it the final end of it; which is a palpable confounding of the end with the means to which it is related. For benevolence in him is necessarily objective; and the object of it is but another name for the end to which it is related; and it is only as a means that it can be related to it. Therefore, as the object and end of divine benevolence are necessarily extraneous to it, and identical with each other, at the same time, so they must be mutually identical with that only object and end to which benevolence can have any intelligible relation—the happiness of being.

And this final end, out of regard to which the divine Agent must have imposed obligation, must also be the final end out of regard to which the subject ought, that is, is bound, to submit to it. For that which is a reason to him for doing so, must, as the very term implies, affect, operate on, impress him, as such; as otherwise it would be a contradiction to suppose it a reason to him for the action in question, or for anything else. But benevolence, (as discriminate from beneficence,) that is, mere good will—as it does not affect nor even reach its object, and cannot therefore impress him—has in it nothing of the nature of a reason, either for the claim of service on the one hand, or for its rendition on the other.

We say *mere* benevolence. No being is qualified to impose moral obligation who is devoid of it; but, by itself, it cannot justify its imposal. Satan is devoid of it; and, for that reason, whatever other qualifications we might suppose him to possess—as omniscience and omnipotence—he could bind no being to his service. And he could not, for the simple reason that, being essentially void of goodness, he is under the moral disability of willing good, from which results the corresponding disability of doing it, and from all of which would ultimately result, that the only consideration which impresses moral obligation would, in his case, be a moral impossibility. Omniscience and omnipotence, then, cannot impose obligation on other ground than that of good, or well-being, produced in the subject of it. The anchorite, on the other hand, whatever amount of benevolence we suppose him to possess, cannot, merely on that ground, bind the object to his service; because, as that mental action is, from the obvious nature of it, limited to his own bosom, and so does neither reach nor affect its object, to suppose it to bind him, at the same time, is to suppose a contradiction.

Neither sheer goodness, nor that intransitive action of it which only wills the bestowment of good on its object, can create obligation. To do this it must not only act within itself, but it must go out of itself. It must reach its object, and it must act upon it. It must not only will to do it good, but it must do it the good which it wills. The former act is benevolence, the latter is beneficence,—that wills good, this does it.

As a precedent and concurrent condition, benevolence, as has been already explained, is indispensable to obligation. As an intermediate cause, it is also indispensable; and it is so in both these characters for the reason that, as obligation depends on good *done* to the subject, so the act which affects that good, does as naturally depend on the benevolence or good-will of the agent, as his good-will depends on his goodness.

But it is the good done which finally causes obligation, and not the mere willing of good,—any more than it is mere goodness, or creation, or propriety, or relation, or law. Benevolence wills you an estate, subject to a proviso that you shall make it pay him certain annual returns; but the rendition of the returns cannot be felt as matter of actual obligation for any other final reason than that of actual investment. Here is law; here is relation; here is propriety; here is volition; here is goodness. Here also is goodness willing; and here, finally, is goodness acting—acting directly on the subject of the obligation, and in such a way as to create the obligation by the identical act which imposes it.

Benefit, then—good done to the subject, to which beneficence in the agent corresponds, as a cause to its effect—is the ultimate and proper ground of what we call moral obligation. In all its innumerable modifications, as recognised among men—whether legal, social, or political—it stands upon this ground: nor is it so much as possible to suppose its absence, without putting out of our minds every intelligible conception of moral obligation.

That it is obviously present in a great majority of those modifications, will not be disputed, on the one hand; that it is obscurely present in some, is admitted on the other. But still, it is present: for instance, in the obligation which relates to helpless children and the poor. In these and similar cases we feel the obligation, with no very vivid consciousness of the constituent benefit. But, apart from the development and indulgence of refined and ennobling sympathies, which are real benefits, we draw upon the consideration, that the interests of society are mutually inseparable, and that our present and future well-being is conditioned on our discharge of these, with our other obligations.

That moral obligation is ultimately based on benefit or well-being in the subject, as the final end to which the obligation itself is related, is shown by the insufficiency of all other assignable grounds of it, as well as by the manifest absurdity of founding that obligation on any or all such grounds; and, finally, by the terms in which it is stated and referred to in the divine rescript itself.

I. Our first proof that God can impress obligation on the subject of his government on no other ground than that of communicated benefit, is derived from *the insufficiency of any or all the other reasons which can be assigned for it.*

1. Benevolence in God—to resume a preliminary topic, not to repeat, but to add a single thought—benevolence in him is not a sufficient ground of our obligation to obey him. If it were so, then would not only beneficence be a superfluity in the matter of such cause for obligation, but benevolence itself, which consists in willing good to prospective or actual being, would accomplish the whole of its ultimate purpose, as far as moral government is concerned, without ever effecting that very good which it has willed;—a supposition which is attended by the further absurdity, that benevolence—which can only exercise itself with relation to prospective or actual being—is satisfied by doing so with relation to being which it only wills to exist; or that—supposing the being to have become actual—it can satisfy itself by giving it a constitution involving no benefit to the subject, which is an equal absurdity. But if benevolence,

which can have no outgoing in the direction of its object but through the medium of beneficence, can only be satisfied by reaching and affecting its object through that medium—and it were a contradiction to suppose otherwise—then it follows, that, while beneficence is not necessary to obligation, benevolence does, necessarily, enlist its agency in the premises, notwithstanding: and how that differs from another contradiction, let the reader judge.

2. If willing goodness, producing no actual good to the object, is not a sufficient ground of obligation, abstract goodness—goodness in a state of inaction—would be no more, nor even as much so, for the same and other reasons equally obvious.

3. Nor would the communication of existence, with its known endowments, present a sufficient reason, considered, as we are now considering it, apart from the bestowment of benefit: for, in that case, as existence, with its endowments, would contain no consideration of any value to the subject, it could, by no possibility, impress him with any other than a fallacious sense of such obligation as is admitted to be incumbent. The obligation of love is admitted to be incumbent—love to the uncreated; and we are soon to see that it is so to the exclusion of everything not identical with its own essence. But the obligation of love can only be impressed by the consideration upon which love itself is impressible; and love itself can only be impressed by that object which excites desire; and nothing can excite desire which is totally devoid of value to the subject.

Therefore, as love itself, so also the obligation of it, cannot be impressed by a worthless consideration. But the communication of existence, with its known endowments, abstracted from all actual benefit to the subject, as we are now supposing it, would have no value; and, by consequence, could impress him with no other than a fallacious sense of his admitted obligation. This will be seen in a still clearer light, if we admit, with some of the great masters of analytics, that, while love fulfils the bond of obedience, gratitude is the satisfaction of the bond of love,—as being the highest exercise of that affection of which the finite mind is capable. At all events—and it is sufficient for the present purpose of the argument—it is admitted that gratitude, as a large component of love, even if not wholly inclusive of it, is matter of actually incumbent obligation; but how can he be obliged to gratitude who has received no favour? or on what ground can he be obliged to gratitude but that of his actual receipt of favour?

4. If the bestowment of being, with only such appurtenances as leave it void of good to the subject, and, consequently, void of

any matter, motive, or reason for gratitude, would be no sufficient basis of obligation, so neither could the relation of the parties, in that case, constitute it. For, as the relation, in that case, depends on the communication of being, with its endowments, the former could not possibly furnish what we have seen is not found in the latter; for the same reason that an effect cannot rise above, or contain more than its cause.

5. Leaving behind us, as we have done, the idea of good done to the subject, as the only true ground of moral obligation, we have now, with one exception, examined all the assignable substitutes for it, with no other result than that of their utter insufficiency.* The exception referred to is the law itself.

* Other substitutes, not formally included in the above enumeration, are:—“*The Fitness of Things*,” “*The Greatest Good*,” “*The Glory of God*, or, *The Manifestation of Divine All-Sufficiency*.” Drs. Cudworth and Harris represent the first and the third, while Professor Finney, of our own country, is the vigorous assenter of the second.

As the first substantially identifies itself with the supposition that relation supplies the last reason for the obligation of moral agents, and as that supposition has been dealt with in the body of this article, any further notice of it may be dispensed with in this place.

The second, which bases duty on the greatest good, makes this to include, not merely the greatest good of creatures, but “the greatest good of God.” This is admirably *explicit*. It is to suppose the greatest good or happiness of God, instead of being eternal and dependant on nothing out of himself, depends, partly at least, on the result of a proceeding had in time, and which result, for that very reason, is, necessarily, not infinite, but finite. This is admirably *absurd*. This absurdity is supposed to have been rendered sufficiently evident in the text; but there is one aspect of the professor’s theory which claims a more marked attention. It is this: That while the greatest good underlies obligation, as being the final reason for its enactment, and consequently the object to be accomplished by it, that object is to be sought by the individual, acting under his obligation, not on his *own* account, more or less—that were selfishness, and the sin of sins—but simply on account of its value to the great commonwealth of being, including the unoriginated. A must not affect it for A, nor B for B; but B must do it for A, and A for B; while both must do it for all the rest, and be very careful that that concern be innocent of any glances at their own interest in the object. If, in the great issue, either is to find his own interest secure, well; but woe to him if his action in the premises chance to have been overtaken by the sin of caring anything about it for his *own* sake. And should it finally appear that his personal interest in the object had dropped out of the divine account, or that it was never *in*, he will be as much bound as ever to go on, seeking the “greatest good” of other intelligences—mundane, supra and inframundane, solar and stellar, cherubic, seraphic, angelic, arch-angelic, and divine—just as if nothing had happened.

To the mere mortal, not endued with the exalted *mentality* which achieves these transcendental reaches of abnormal thought, it would seem quite as probable that, since an interest in the greatest good is not wholly appropriated by the Deity,

"Law is a rule of action,—a precept or command coming from a superior authority,—which an inferior is bound to obey." Starting with this definition, which is not more applicable to law, generally,

but rendered common, among other orders of intelligences, to those of human kind, and since every particular individual is bound, as such, to seek the general interest, that he should be so bound by motives derived, not from the general to the exclusion of his particular interest, but from those which include the particular with the general,—and all for the palpable reason that the particular interest is included in the general, and that that particular interest is as much his interest, as the general is the general interest.

Or, if the general is not supposed to contain his particular interest, nor, consequently, to warrant his derivel from it of any motive of particular interest, then equity would demand, he being shut out from all personal and particular interest and motive in the premises, that his obligation to seek the object in question should be equally characterized by the absence of the personal and particular; so that, when the rewards and penalties of the obligation are administered, his participation in the one shall not exceed the measure of his original interest in the other.

That no divine constitution enforces such a benevolence as is irrespective of personal interest, is evident from the following hints of proof:—

1. Analogy. It is a settled principle, and the practice under it is uniform, that, in all the departments of social life, where there is an object of general interest, it is right for the individual to promote it under the influence of motives taken from his individual interest in it.

2. "Whate'er the Almighty's subsequent command,
His first command is this,—Man, love thyself:"—

a law as all-controlling as the God-implanted instinct which coerces the hatred of misery and the love of happiness.

3. This oldest constitution, whose import is as unmistakable as universal consciousness, and which can only be controlled by the shock that annihilates the nature to which it is essential, is but repeated in that benign edict: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." That self-love is right, is as certain as that God has made it the legal standard of social love, and that he would not legalize a false one.

Thus it is certain that no law is extant which obliges to the exercise of such a regard for the interests of others as necessitates indifference to our own: to infinite goodness, wisdom, and power, it would be alike impossible. Wisdom and goodness could neither originate nor approve it: omnipotence could not enforce it.

The third of these alleged causes of moral requirement is, the glory of God; or, as the author's phrase is, "*The Manifestation of Divine All-Sufficiency*;" which he explains as meaning, generally, the exhibition to created intelligences of his own infinite excellencies.

That any manifestation to creatures of the perfections of the Deity is a desideratum to him, for reasons ultimately relating to his own well-being, is an absurdity, the reader will probably think is made sufficiently apparent in the text. If, then, such manifestation cannot be an object of desire to him for any reason finally relating to himself, it results, that, to him, as its final end, such manifestation is not a good—has no value. And it further results either, 1. That

than to that of the Deity in particular we remark, that the consideration which gives to law its binding force does not reside in the law itself. The proof of this is found in the very terms of the definition: for, according to those terms, law must issue, not only from a "superior" being, but from such a being "having authority" to impose it. Waiving the term as applied to derived authority, we can only understand it, in its relation to the Divine Being, as expressing the idea of his original right to the government of his creatures. We say original; not as actually antedating the bestowment of good, but potentially,—both as regards the good itself and the bestowment of it. Obviously, then, as the authority of law, which simply means the right of imposing it, is not contained in the law itself, the final cause of imposing it, which necessarily lies behind the imposing act, must also be sought for, not in the law, but out of it. To this must be added the absurdity common to all the other substitutions, that, while the law is supposed to be, not only the prescript but the final cause of obligation, it is all this—and here is the common absurdity—without any, the least, benefit to the subject.

The path by which we are to prosecute our search for the final cause of moral obligation, therefore, does not terminate in, but is distinctly traceable through, law, relation, ownership, creation, goodness, benevolence, and beneficence,* to this tangential point—the benefit or well-being of the subject—as the immediate and true ground, the ultimate reason upon which its awful form reposes.

As the other points at which we have searched for our object do not severally disclose it, it were scarcely worthy of our time to test their joint ability to do so; for having no individual competency, their totality can possess none.

Though some of these supposed causes—as goodness and benevolence—are really such, yet, standing as they do, at several removes from the ultimate cause, they are, speaking *grammaticæ*, penultimate, antepenultimate, or otherwise, according to their degrees of distance from the ultimate cause. In a word, they are intermediate; whereas we are in quest of a cause which is so in the meaning of an end—the end, the final end, or purpose—for attaining which

such manifestation is a good in itself, and not relatively, which is absurd; or, 2. That it is neither a good in itself, nor relatively to any being, or in any sense whatever; or, 3. That it is a good to the creatures to whom it is made; and that, as they are the only beings to whom it can be an ultimate good, it is an ultimate good to them, and, consequently, that their well-being is the only ultimate end to which it can be related. For the consideration of those Scriptures which are supposed to conflict with the teleology of this article, the reader is referred to a note in the third general section.

* Beneficence is here to be understood *subjectively*.

moral obligation has been instituted, and hence denominated the final cause, inasmuch as it was the desideratum which caused the divine Mind to produce moral obligation, as the best adapted means for the attainment of the desired end.

In the light of these distinctions, now, it is hoped, sufficiently clear to the reader, it will be perceived, that the remaining claimants of the honour in question—creation, ownership, relation, and law—are, from their greater remoteness in nature and position, still more deeply involved in the common inaptitude. They are conditions—precedent and concurrent—without which moral obligation could not have been produced; while, at the same time, as we flatter ourselves, it has been already shown, they can neither be the final reason for such obligation, nor take, in our minds, the place of it. To illustrate this distinction: Obligation cannot exist without subjects; nor they without creation; nor creation without involving certain relations. Creation, therefore, with its subjects and relations, is indispensable to moral obligation. But it can be only as a condition that it is so, and not as the final cause; for the reason that creation being the exhibition of nothing more than the efficient cause of things, is as naturally incapable of being the final cause of obligation, or indeed of anything else, as the production of a thing is incapable of being the reason of that production,—or *vice versa*.

That these, and possibly other ideas, not included in our canvass, are severally entitled, according to their natures and relations, to enter either among the conditions or subordinate causes of the obligation in question, is readily admitted. But so far are they from constituting the ultimate cause of it, that they derive their sole value, as conditions and subordinate causes, from that final cause which underlies them—in as far as they are conditions and subordinate causes—as it underlies the whole structure of divine moral government in all departments of the universe.*

II. That moral obligation is imposed out of regard to the well-being of its subjects, and that regard to that object is the sole and final

* To obviate misapprehension: This final cause is here said to underlie its subordinates—these being taken as including the attribute of divine goodness—in the sense of being the object to which they are related, and on which, as being so, they are dependant. Having instanced goodness, we add that, as a divine attribute, it offers itself to our consideration under two aspects,—the subjective, in which sense it is absolute, that is, unrelated to objects external to the Deity; and objective, a term which marks its relation to such objects: it is in this latter sense that the affirmation is made of it in the text. As objective, it is relative; and, by consequence, derives its existence and sole value, as the subject of that relation, from the object of it.

reason of its imposal, is further attested by the absurdities which follow the opposite proposition.

If creatures are bound to the service of God on other grounds or for other reasons than such as are ultimately related to their well-being, it follows,

1. That they are bound to the performance of *impossibilities*.

He has bound them to love him, and to nothing else; to nothing else, we mean, which is not naturally resolvable into this. But, as has been already shown, it is impossible to *love* an object for that which is not equally a reason for *desiring* it; and it is impossible we should feel that to be a reason for desiring an object which does not invest it with an adaptation to our happiness. By a plain consequence, therefore, if creatures are bound to the service of God for any other than a cause ultimately related to their happiness, they are bound to the performance of impossibilities.

Further: as the service to which he binds us is resolvable into love, so the love to which he binds us is resolvable into gratitude. Of the correctness of this, as the last analysis of the subject, the reader will find additional evidence in another place. But this modification of love depends, for its first breath, on the consciousness of benefit received from him to whom it is offered. If benefit then be not the ground or reason upon which God claims the obedience of love, and the love of gratitude, it follows that he claims it on no grounds at all; inasmuch as communicated good is the only possible ground on which he can claim it. Obedience to such a claim would be an absolute impossibility, which, if made in one, might be made in any and in all cases. No being in the universe could act with a more palpable disregard of the plainest principles of moral equity.

2. If the happiness of his subjects is not the final cause of his claim to their service, it is impossible to conceive of a final cause for it. If the happiness of any being constitutes that cause, it must be that of his subjects or his own; for the universe is divided between them. Is it his own? Does his claim upon his creatures stand on the ground of his regard to his own ultimate well-being? Call it what you will that he claims from them,—obedience, service, homage, honour, glory,—if demanded out of ultimate regard to himself, it must be for the reason that his own ultimate advantage, interest, happiness, is augmentable by it. Or if his well-being is not augmentable by it, while he still demands it for a reason ultimately relating to himself, that reason, examined in the light of that very relation, resolves itself into no reason at all.

Either way, the assumption that God imposes moral obligation

out of final regard to himself is clearly atheistic in some of its nearest and most obvious consequences: for that which is inconsistent with one or more of the absolute perfections of the Deity, is, by a plain consequence, inconsistent with the existence of the Deity itself. But the assumption in question is inconsistent both with the perfection of absolute happiness, and with the perfection of absolute self-sufficiency, on which it naturally depends; and so, by ultimate consequence, undeifies the Deity. For if his well-being can be affected by anything out of himself—as the government, or result of the government of moral intelligences—it follows that neither is his happiness absolute, nor that self-sufficiency on which absolute happiness naturally depends. But his happiness being absolute, besides the more obvious impossibility that it should spring from any foreign origin, or admit of increase, it involves a contradiction to suppose it to be an END, and related, as such, to moral obligation, as a MEANS or instrument by which it can either be produced, increased, or affected, in any sense whatever; inasmuch as it is identical with the supposition that it is at once both absolute and relative, which is a plain contradiction. His well-being, therefore, cannot by any possibility be a final reason for the demand in question.

If, then, the happiness of his subjects does not supply the reason upon which their obedience is demanded, it must, of necessity, be demanded on *some* reason, if *any*, which involves no benefit to any being in the universe. How that which contains nothing of good to any being in the wide realm of the Creator, and is therefore good for nothing, can be a reason for the action of a Being infinitely wise and good; and, especially, how it can be the reason upon which he grounds that action which binds all intelligences to his throne, defies all intelligible conception.

3. If God obliges his subjects to a service which, whether found upon due analysis to consist wholly, or, though largely, only in part, of gratitude; if he thus obliges them, for no reason whatever, as follows from our first *reductio ad absurdum*; or if he obliges them for some reason involving nothing of good to any being in the universe, as results from the second; then, with the well-being of his subjects before him, as matter for his reason in placing them under obligation to him—the only objects whose well-being could have supplied the reason for so doing—he must have decided to waive it in favour of no reason at all, or of such a reason as concerns itself with the interest of no being in the universe. Still further to condense this conclusion: in the only transaction of any value or consequence to created intelligences, God has chosen to act without

reason, or with only such as is foreign to the interest of any being in existence. Or still more briefly: God binds us to moral goodness, for no good reason whatever. For certainly that can be no good reason which involves no good to being,—i. e., sentient and conscious being; unless, indeed, it could be established that good exists by itself, and not relatively; or, at least, that sentient and conscious beings should be placed under bonds for the benefit of those who are wholly insentient and unconscious.

4. A being who could employ his power and wisdom in the creation and government of moral agents on some other ground than that of their happiness, thus proving himself indifferent to their interests, is clearly devoid of any appreciable philanthropy, and stands before the universe in the character of utter apathism, or of supreme selfishness. In a word—for it comes to this—such a being is not God.

5. Such a being, among men, if clothed with authority—such authority as naked intelligence and power alone can furnish—would be called a tyrant; and if the intelligence and power were unlimited, so also would be the tyrant and the tyranny: for he who does not make the well-being of his subjects the controlling motive of his administration, will unscrupulously disregard or sacrifice that well-being that he may reach his own selfish ends, or whatever else that other object consists of, out of regard to which he may be supposed to have acted in the premises.

6. And, finally, the mandate of such a being, imposed out of ultimate regard to some other end than the public good, and consequently adapted and made efficient for accomplishing that other end, whatever it may be, and not the public good—the only ultimate end of a wise and beneficent government—such mandate, imposed for such reason, and to such an end, could impress the individual or public mind with no sense of just obligation, and it could be thrown off without the taint of crime.

Such are some of the absurdities legitimately issuing from the substitution of any final cause of moral obligation, other than the well-being of its subjects. The government of such a being, absolute in his own blessedness, can, in the nature of things, stand on no other, because it can stand on no higher or more commanding ground. He could have had no higher reason for its institution; he can enforce it by no consideration more imperative. With no interest of his own to be provided for, what could possibly have been a worthier motive in him who governs? what can possibly weigh more with those he governs than their happiness?

As an ultimate end, is there a greater good? Is holiness a

greater? Rather, high as holiness is, as an end, is it not, in its relation to happiness, a means for reaching another, a higher, the highest end?—an end which, as we can conceive of nothing more valuable, our mental constitution forces us to regard as that end beyond which there can be no other. If this is not the true relative position of the two ideas, it remains that a change of their relation exhibits them in the true position,—i. e., that, instead of holiness being the means of happiness, happiness is the means of holiness; or, finally, that there is no such relation between them as that of a means and an end; that neither is happiness the means of holiness, nor holiness the means of—the path that leads to—happiness. Again, therefore, is the conclusion forced upon us, that the government of the empire of mind can, by no moral possibility, have been undertaken otherwise than as a system of means for accomplishing the happiness of the subjects of that vast and ever-growing empire; and that, by final consequence, that object was the final cause of its institution.

To the assumption that any other than an infinite end is unworthy the action of an infinite Being; and that, as the happiness of creatures is not infinite, it is unworthy of being the end of his action; we reply, that such an end would be unworthy of such action, were the action itself infinite, as the end is finite. But we are speaking not of action *ad intra*, but *ad extra*. The clear distinction between the two is this: when the Infinite is the object of his own action, he acts infinitely; as when he conceives of or knows himself, he conceives or knows infinitely. But for the same reason that, when he conceives of or knows an object external to himself, which, because it is external, is necessarily finite, he conceives of or knows it not infinitely, but finitely,—he can only act finitely in relation to finite objects. And the reason is plain from hence, that as the true idea of action is the idea of an actual cause, as distinguished from a cause in the potential sense; and as it is as necessary that the actual effect of an actual cause should equal that cause, as that the actual cause should equal the actual effect, to affirm infinite *ad extra* action of the Deity, is to affirm that the *ad extra* effect or object of that action is also infinite: which, besides amounting to a concession of the main point at issue—that a finite cannot be the ultimate end of divine action—implies a contradiction; as the existence of more than one infinite object is a natural impossibility. Therefore, vast as is the effect of divine action,—in the creation, conservation, and government of the universe,—as that effect is strictly finite, so also is the action which produces it.

This easy distinction effected, it were obvious to remark, that

instead of supposing a waste of action in reaching the end in question, we only suppose the action which reaches that end to be adapted quantitatively, as we have seen it must be qualitatively, to the object itself. On the whole, we are brought to the conclusion—whether just, or, being so, whether it takes the key-stone out of any venerable theory on this subject, let him who *can* and *dares* think otherwise than by prescription, judge—that the ever-increasing happiness of myriads of intelligences, as the ultimate end of the divine action in their creation and government, can never be proved from the nature of that action to be an end unworthy of the expense incurred in producing it. Both are vast beyond conception, but both are limited. Who shall say that they are not worthy of each other?

III. That moral government exists, and asserts its claim out of ultimate regard to the happiness of the subject, and for the subordinate reason of its instrumental adaptation to that end, is shown, thirdly, *by the divine law itself, which distinctly and repeatedly urges its claim on this ground, and which never does it on any other.* For though, as we have seen, the law does not contain the matter of the reason upon which its claim is founded, its habit is that of frequent reference to it. In passing, however, to this section of the argument, our attention is due to that small class of texts supposed to conclude against the teleological scope of this writing. And here our limits constrain us, instead of treating them hermeneutically, and in detail, to collect what is taken to be their common signification, leaving the reader not only to perceive its harmony with our general principles and deductions, but to judge whether any received canon of exegesis can find them fairly seized of any other.

“Of him, and through him, and to him, are all things.” “He hath made all things for himself.” “For thy pleasure they are and were created.” With which collate: “My goodness extendeth not to thee, but to the saints.” “God is not worshipped as though he needed anything.” Taken together, these passages authorize the following harmony of conclusions:—

1. That God is the origin of the external universe, together with its relations and laws, and whatever duly results from either or all.
2. That this origination of existence, together with the control of it by appropriate laws—physical and moral—is not for any reason ultimately relating to himself particularly.
3. That right moral action, and consequently the obligation of such action, as they are alike limited in kind and consequence,

have no natural adaptation or tendency to affect his well-being in any proper sense whatever.

4. That creation, conservation, and the exercise of rectoral authority, are for the ultimate purpose of his benevolence, as conditions and media of the happiness of his creatures :

5. That, under his all-controlling skill and energy, all beings, his dominion over them, together with all that duly results from both or either, are subservient to that ultimate purpose ; and, finally,

6. It is in this sense, that "all things are *to him*," "*for him*," and "*for his pleasure*;" inasmuch as, having originated in him, as conditions and means of happiness to his creatures, they thus return to him, by becoming tributary to that same ultimate purpose.

But we are now to verify the general remark, that while the divine law urges its claim on the ground of the finite interests to be subserved by it ; and while its habit is that of frequent reference to that object as the declared reason for its action, it never intimates the existence or operation of any other reason. This frequency of reference to the well-being of the subject, as the only ground on which his obedience is demanded, is common,

1. To the ante-Mosaic law. We have a right to assume, because universally conceded, that the divinely-uttered inhibition to the progenitor of our race, was a perfect epitome of the perfect requirement of the supreme love of the Creator. That the reason of this requirement could have had no connexion with the interests of its Author, personally and ultimately considered, we have already seen ; that there were no other interests save those of the subject, to which it could have related, we have also seen. When, therefore, the law enunciates, "Thou shalt not eat of it,"—from whence, or from whose interest, does it fetch the impressive reason upon which it fixes the authority of its action—"for, in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die?"

The command which was to expatriate Abraham, and attach him to the service of his Maker,—on what other ground did it proceed than that God, whose beneficence he had begun to experience, would further add to his happiness by making his name great, and by rendering him at once the medium and recipient of immense and endless blessing? "Walk before me, and be thou perfect;" for, "I am the Almighty God—thy shield, and thy exceeding great reward."

Was Moses under obligation to choose the reproach of Christ instead of the treasures in Egypt? And for what other reason was he obliged to do so, than that the riches of the former were greater,

and, by consequence, more valuable than those of the latter,—i. e., the riches of Christ than the treasures in Egypt? The divine record being allowed to determine, he makes the commanded sacrifice of a partial and temporary good, on the one hand, on the ground of—that is, out of regard to—the affluence of eternal advantage on the other: “For he had respect unto the recompense of the reward.” Other than this reason, if Moses or his Maker knew of a good one, that record has never been made to speak it.

The citation of the same sole reason for the divine requirement is common,

2. To the institutes of Moses themselves. Among these we have, in one class, the festivals: as of the passover, the pentecost, and the tabernacles. Commemorative of corresponding benefits, and leading, through the medium of present blessing, and, by the most obvious consequences, to future, paramount, and final felicity, it will hardly be questioned that their institution and observance stood alike on the ground of those considerations; especially as that is the declared ground on which they are placed, and as there is not the slightest reference to any other.

Passing for the present the political, judicial, and, more properly, religious obligations of the same code, as growing out of the great principia of the Decalogue, I ask, in relation to the last-mentioned, does it challenge submission *for*, or *without*, reason? If the former, then, as we have already seen, that reason must have been fetched from some valuable consideration; as, otherwise, being worth nothing itself, the reason derived from it would be worth nothing; and, by consequence, the challenged submission would rest on something else, if anything, than a good reason. If, as the fact is, however, the consideration which furnished the reason in question is worth, at least, something; and if that worth is necessarily relative to some being; and if, to that being it must necessarily be a matter of some interest, by which we can only mean that it identifies itself with his well-being or happiness; then, it having thus resulted that the reason for the Ten Commandments must have been taken from the consideration of the happiness of some being, it were scarcely necessary to ask,—Of what being? having been so frequently forced before to the same conclusion, that the subject of the obligation was the only being whose happiness could, by any possibility, have been affected by it.

But does this law of the two tables itself urge its claims on this ground, and on no other? It speaks: “Hear,”—that is, obey this law,—“O Israel!” Do it,

1. On the ground of the good issued and issuing from existing

relations: "For I am the Lord thy God, who brought thee out of the house of bondage." Obey it,

2. For the reason that doing so is the natural and fixed condition of thy future well-being,—“That it may be well with thee, and that thou mayest live long on the earth.”

Good, then, the good of the subject, it is respectfully submitted, is the ground, and the only ground, on which this oldest of written constitutions, known to human intelligences, imposes its obligation.

This habit of reference to obligation as reposing on benefit, present and prospective, is equally common,

3. To all the prophets and teachers of the Old Testament. To verify this position, we had purposed an induction of at least a few of the more appropriate instances. Happily, however, for the necessity which limits our argument, as well as for a pardonable solicitude for its success, that measure may be safely waived upon a reasonable presumption, that those who are likely to feel an interest in the general question, must have anticipated us in the requisite examination of this particular point. It will be only in passing, then, and more for the purpose of establishing a collateral issue than of directly strengthening the main argument, that we shall ask an audience for so much as one of this great cloud of witnesses. The collateral issue referred to is this: That as love is the declared essence of all obedience, so gratitude is the essence of all the love that God requires, or that the human soul can exercise.

Love regards the Deity, either *absolutely*,—that is, as exercising his perfections in himself, with no relation to the external universe,—or *relatively*; that is, as exercising his wisdom, power, goodness, and other qualities, with relation to his creatures. Now, however it may be a law of dialectics, that before we examine the relations of an object we should ascertain its absolute qualities; and however, in acting on this principle, we suppose the above qualities of wisdom, power, and goodness, to be absolute qualities in the Deity, and that, as such, they may excite certain emotions—as of admiration, approval, and delight; and however these emotions may constitute such a love to God as befits the dream of a poet, yet the theopathy of the Bible, instead of deriving itself from any such distant sight of absolute qualities, kindles into its own living ardour upon the apprehension of God, as related to us; whose fatherly regards are fixed upon us; who is not only Creator, Preserver, Benefactor, Redeemer, Saviour, and Lord, but who is *ours* in all these relations. This is gratitude. If it is urged that the theopathy of the Bible transcends this; that it surveys, adores, and loves its object as possessing “infinite and harmonious perfections in

himself," and not as marked by any relation, near or remote, direct or indirect, to creatures or their interests, we reply,

1. The impossibility of loving such an object—utterly unrelated and unadapted to our constitutional wants—has been already proved.

2. Waiving any further question, however, as to the sheer possibility of supreme love to an object devoid of relation or adaptation of any kind to the wants of our nature; and even supposing it to involve no contradiction, either that we should love an object having no adaptation to excite desire, or that we should desire an object having no adaptation to our happiness, or that we should be supremely interested in reference to that object, but that we should be so in some strange sense, consistent with our being perfectly disinterested with regard to the same object, and at the same time,—waiving, we say, all these aspects of the subject, we ask: Where, in his Word, does God command us to love him in this *a priori* way—"out of regard to what he is *absolutely*, as a Being of infinite perfections"—and not for the reason that those perfections are known, from testimony or experience, to adapt him to the necessities of a nature which he has made dependant on himself, and thus attracting us to him by the natural force of a felt interest in him? Where, we ask again, is such love commanded? and by whom was it ever felt? Not—as far as his testimony goes—by the great master of the Hebrew lyre; and we are soon to perceive that he is but the echo of the universal testimony on this subject. But the witness—he will answer two simple questions:—1. Do you love the Lord? Answer. Yea, verily; "I love the Lord." 2. For what cause do you love him? Answer. "I love the Lord because he hath heard my voice and my supplications."

As a sedative to any nervous dread of departure from uninspired authority, we shall subjoin the brief note of a great theologue and very learned commentator: "How vain and foolish is the talk, 'To love God for his benefits to us is mercenary, and cannot be pure love!' Whether pure or impure, there is no other love that can flow from the heart of the creature to its Creator." To which the reader will excuse us for adding the suffrage of one of the highest of ethical authorities: "The love of God is the sublimest gratitude."

IV. That divine requisition is preferred on the ground of benefit received, and to be received, is, fourthly, *the constant declaration of the New Testament.*

1. That all the precepts of the New Testament are poised

on the consideration of good done, and to be done, to us, were as easy of proof as the quotation of the precepts themselves. But we must prepare a shorter process; or rather rest this present issue on one prepared for us by the faithful and true Witness himself. First, then, he resolves all human obligation into,—“Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbour as thyself.” And, secondly, he places that all-embracing bond on the ground of God’s unreserved bestowment upon us of the gift of his Son; and through him, on the conditional communication of eternal happiness: “For God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life.”

That this two-fold gratuity of his Son, and everlasting happiness through him, to all believers, is the final reason upon which he claims our love to him is obvious, first, because it possesses all the adaptation as such which we can either imagine, or the nature of the case admit; secondly, because no other is ever assigned; or, which is the same thing, no other which is not naturally resolvable into it; and, thirdly, because, in effect, this reason is repeatedly assigned by inspired men; and expressly so by the beloved disciple, on his own, and the behalf of all the other members of the heavenly family: “We love”—are bound to, and therefore do love—“him, because he first loved us,”—so as to bestow the immense benefit of redemption. On this text two commentators of opposing schools—Calvinian and Arminian—respectively remark:—

“His love is the moral cause of ours.”

“This is the foundation of our love to God,”—“We love him for the benefits bestowed on us. Love begets love.” These various terms give, as their united sense of the place,—that love to God is caused or excited in our minds by the consideration of the benefit which his love has caused to us.

Now, as this moral cause or foundation of our love to God is identical with the moral cause or foundation of our obligation to love him,—that is, the consideration out of regard to which the obligation must have been originated and imposed, so is it the ultimate or final cause; as above or beyond this it is not conceivable, as has been variously demonstrated, that any object should have been present to the Divine Intelligence, out of regard to which he could have originated and imposed it.

2. With regard to the rest of the apostles, and to save time, it must suffice to remark, that as they cannot, so a careful induction will satisfy us that they do not present any other cause of our obligation than that already so clearly stated by the sovereign authority of

Him who lay in the bosom of the Father, preaffirmed, as we have seen it, by those who spake as they were moved by his own Spirit; and so appositely and pointedly re-affirmed by that one of his chosen witnesses who had lain in his own bosom: "Other foundation"—of acceptable obedience, or of the obligation which binds us to its exercises—"can no man lay, than that which is laid in Jesus Christ,"—considered as the offspring of that infinite goodness which conferred so inestimable a benefit on our fallen race.

As not only lapsed, but dissevered from any interest in that goodness, utterly and finally,—the obligation originating in and depending on it would expire. Of punitive obligation we speak not, further than that, succeeding the preceptive, as it must from the fact that their joint effect on the same subject is impossible, it constitutes the only sense in which the law, in its application to those who bear its penalty, can be considered eternal.*

* As this point, aside from its intrinsic interest, is too material to the main purpose of this paper to be dismissed without a more extended notice than could consistently be given it in the text, the attention of the reader is solicited to this marginal attempt to set it in its proper light. The point is, whether the preceptive obligation of the divine law rests alike on those whom it abandons and execrates, as on those whom it protects and blesses; or, in other words, whether the penalty and precept of the law are jointly and eternally enforced with regard to the same subject. To this we reply, that the happiness of the subject having been the original and direct aim of the law, and to be accomplished by means of his submission to its preceptive requirement, it were a gross absurdity to suppose him a subject of its punitive, while he is also a subject of its preceptive action. The precept requires him to love God, and looks through that, as a medium, to his happiness as an end. The penalty supposes him to have forfeited the happiness, and with it, of course, the means of happiness, which is neither less nor more than loving God. If we suppose, then, that God requires the subject of punishment to love him, we must further suppose it to be his will that he should love him, or that it is not. If he requires him to love him, while at the same time it is not his will that he should do so, then it follows that his requirement and his will are at mutual odds; in other words, that not loving him is as much in accordance with his will, on the one hand, as it is a violation of his command on the other—which is absurd. But if—to take the other horn of the dilemma—it be supposed that, while God requires the subject to love him, it is equally his will that he should love him—it follows that, as loving is the means of, and necessarily leads to happiness, it is his will that the subject of obligation to the means should, by virtue of that means, be connected with the happiness to which it stands related, as an end; or, which is the same thing, that he requires and wills both his holiness and his happiness—which is also absurd. On the whole, then, we are forced to the conclusion, that since God, in the punishment of the sinner, does not require him to love him, either with or without willing that he should do so, inasmuch as either supposition involves a gross absurdity—he does not require him to love him at all. Indeed, it equally results—unless the punishment were disciplinary and benignant, which it is

But to resume the interrupted thought. With our moral constitution utterly and hopelessly wrecked,—with our eternal interests lost sight of by our Maker,—we could, by no possibility, feel obliged to that love of him without which he could acknowledge no obedience. Nor would the love itself be less impossible than the feeling of obligation to exercise it; as there would remain no possibility of adaptation in the object to those constitutional conditions of our nature on which the exercise of love depends,—no principle in the intellectual or moral constitution of the subject upon which the requisite power could rally,—no fulcrum upon which its action could fix.

Happily for us that utter wreck was never permitted; that disregard for our interests was never indulged. To obviate so huge a calamity there did, it is true, arise, under the divine administration, a necessity of the great sacrifice; but, anticipating that necessity, it was provided for in the "Lamb slain from the foundation of the world." Emanating from Infinite Goodness, himself the action of that goodness, sinlessly embodied in the sinning nature, he holds that nature in such vital conjunction with his own, that it is made to partake of his quickening Spirit, and to share his availing and ever-active sympathies. In this way, while lapsed man, as the subject of law, is ever supplied with virtue to fulfil it, he is ever presented with the all-embracing cause, ground, or reason for his obligation to

not—that the delinquent cannot be bound to do anything, but only to suffer,—to suffer that punishment, a part of which, at least, results from the loss, as well of the power and privilege of loving God as of the happiness of which the exercise of that power and privilege is the divinely-constituted means.

To the venerable allegation, "That the loss of power to obey does not impair the divine right to command," we answer,

1. The divine right in question, having for its ultimate aim the well-being of the subject, as has been variously demonstrated, would—that aim surrendered—be surrendered along with it; or, which is an absurdity, it would be maintained with reference to no ultimate aim whatever.

2. The right of commanding supreme love, after his own punitive and positive action had rendered it absolutely impossible—after he had absolutely *willed* its impossibility—is a right, the vindication of which can be prompted by no enlightened regard for the honour of the divine equity.

The unmixed and unmitigable pains of eternal death are not less incompatible with the obligation of loving God, than with the felicity of loving him. When, therefore, he gives up, or ceases to will the happiness of the delinquent, he ceases to will the holiness which would lead him to it; and when he ceases to will his holiness, he ceases to require or command it; and when he ceases to will, require, or command holiness, he ceases to oblige or bind the delinquent to its exercise. The obligation to suffer still remains; and that, as remarked in the text, is the only sense in which the obligation of the law, in the premises, can be considered eternal.

do so; a reason which, if we mistake not, has been shown to be rooted in the inherent value of well-being to the subject, considered as a final end,—an end of sufficient moment to justify the institution and maintenance of the existing scheme of moral government, as a means divinely adapted to that end.

With the following condensed view of the argument, we have done:—

1. God wills our happiness; for it is a contradiction to suppose that Infinite Goodness could will otherwise.

2. Holiness, by a divine constitution, is the means of that happiness; for, willing the end, it would contradict God's wisdom and goodness to suppose that he does not equally will the means, or that he wills other means than that of holiness.

3. Holiness being willed as the means of happiness, is willed with reference to that end, and no other; that is, it is willed on the sole ground of its aforesaid relation to happiness; and that is equivalent to our original affirmation, that moral obligation is imposed out of ultimate regard to that consideration. That consideration is sufficient; no other can be. It is, therefore, *the sufficient and only ground of man's obligation to obey his Maker.*

ART. III.—ON THE SECOND EPISTLE OF ST. PAUL TO TIMOTHY.

SOME writings derive importance from their date, as well as their intrinsic character; and to understand them accurately, and duly to appreciate their worth, it is necessary to be acquainted with the facts of contemporaneous history. Those facts, especially, which attest the general state of the world, and more particularly those which come into immediate contact with the subject matter of the document under consideration, the character of the principal personages that appeared upon the stage of action, as well as the particular exigencies of the times, must be accurately understood in order to elucidate the peculiar phrases of the writer, and to explain the facts and incidents detailed.

That Timothy lived in a very eventful era of the world is manifest. The Roman empire had, under the reign of Augustus Cæsar, about sixty-five years before the time of writing this epistle, achieved the conquest of the world, and was now under the government of a prince who exceeded all his more immediate predecessors in wickedness,—Tiberius, Caligula, and Claudius, whose licentious-

ness and many acts of cruelty had filled Rome with mutilated limbs, and corpses, and all kinds of miseries, in the midst of enervating luxuries and debasing debaucheries;—Rome, we say, at this time, was under the government of a prince who plunged deeper into the muddy pool of depravity than any of his predecessors, however debased they may have been—a prince whose dissolute character has handed his name down to posterity with the blackest infamy. Nero, a name associated with every vice which can degrade human nature, was now at the head of the Roman empire, and he rendered himself notorious by a precocity of profligacy which ripened into maturity at an early period of his inglorious reign.

He who could sport himself with inflicting barbarous tortures upon mankind, not caring to discriminate between the innocent and guilty, merely to gratify a capricious humour—who could indulge in the profane mirth of dancing around the mangled corpse of his own mother, after having had her ripped open that he might feast his voluptuous eyes upon the place of his conception—who could order the city of Rome to be set on fire that he might have a plausible pretext for crushing and punishing the Christians for burning the city—he that could deliberately do such things may well be supposed fully equal to any act of barbarous cruelty, however atrocious and malicious. Yet Nero is said to have done all this, together with a thousand other acts of inhumanity, at the bare recital of which we instinctively recoil with horror. It was under such a monster in human shape that Timothy lived. Is it not a wonder that he lived at all?

In the mean time, during those reigns of blood and carnage, the Christian religion had been silently advancing in the world. For about sixty-five years from the birth of its Founder, and thirty-two from his death and resurrection, it had been steadily making its way amidst opposition of the most formidable character, its disciples inhumanly punished as bleeding victims upon those very altars their own hands had erected for the sacrifice of prayer and thanksgiving, as a penalty for their testimony to its truth. This religion, thus propagated, opposed, and persecuted, had excited great attention, and enlisted the interests, the prejudices, and the passions of mankind, very generally, both for and against it. Among its early converts there were some who had been its most virulent opposers and persecutors, one of whom was the author of the epistle before us. Zealous for all the peculiarities of the Mosaic economy, learned in the laws of human jurisprudence, an active partisan for the Jewish Sanhedrim, a devout Pharisee by birth and education,

and a violent persecutor of the followers of Jesus Christ, he was selected by the high-priests of the Jews to execute their malicious decree to extirpate the Christians from the face of the earth. While on his way to Damascus, with his bloody commission in his pocket, and his heart palpitating with hatred to the Christians, determined to bring all that called on the name of the Lord Jesus, whether men, women, or children, bound to Jerusalem, this zealous partisan was suddenly arrested in his mad career by a voice from heaven sounding in his ears, "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?" Ignorant of the person whose voice he heard, and yet surprised by such an unexpected recognition of his name, though prostrate upon the earth from the overpowering brilliancy of that light from heaven which shone around him, he answered from the fulness of his heart, "Who art thou, Lord?" What an unexpected answer was given to this question, "I am Jesus, whom thou persecutest!" "Jesus whom I persecute! I thought thou wast dead and buried. Thou certainly wast crucified at Jerusalem, and thy body committed to the tomb; and I was told that thy disciples came by night and stole thy body, and conveyed it to a secret burying-place. I know, indeed, that thou hast a few straggling followers upon the earth, but I was on my way to destroy even them, in the hope that thou and thy name would soon be forgotten. But dost thou live?" "Yes, I live; I have the keys of death and hell, and I have you as my prisoner. Submit, therefore, to my authority, or suffer the vengeance due to thy sins." "I submit. What wouldst thou have me to do?" "Arise, and go to Damascus, and it shall be told thee." Away he goes, being led by those who accompanied him; for the brightness of the light which shone upon him had blinded his eyes.

Of his subsequent conversion, his call to the ministry of reconciliation, his success and sufferings, we cannot speak particularly. Among others converted to the faith of the gospel, one of the most eminent was Timothy, to whom the epistle before us is directed. It seems necessary, however, to remark that for his fidelity in his calling, his success in winning souls to Christ, the bold manner in which he confronted the Jews and supplanted the Gentile worship, he provoked the ire of the Jews and stirred up the wrath of the Gentiles. For these things he was brought before the civil magistrates, condemned, and cast into prison, and was now, when he wrote the epistle before us, a second time a prisoner in Rome under the blood-thirsty tyrant Nero, the persecutor of the Christians. Having no hope of an exemption from death, he sends to his son Timothy this farewell discourse.

Timothy, as before remarked, had been converted by the

ministry of the apostle, had commenced itinerant preaching, and had given ample evidence of his ability to teach, as well as of his fidelity in the cause of Christ. Accordingly, the apostle had chosen him for his companion in his travels, had adopted him as his son in the gospel, and employed him as his assistant in the government of the Church. Timothy was, therefore, properly speaking, an itinerating evangelist, or bishop, sent by the apostle from place to place to superintend the affairs of the Church, to set things in order, and to ordain elders in every city where they were needed—in a word, to do all that which the apostle himself would have done had he been present. These are the persons and these the circumstances which called forth the document under consideration.

Nothing can be more affecting than the circumstances under which the apostle addresses his son Timothy in this epistle. It is Paul, the aged Paul, the spiritual father of Timothy—Paul the prisoner at Rome, already under sentence of death—Paul the apostle of Jesus Christ—that addresses himself to Timothy the evangelist. Standing on the margin of time, with eternity full in his view, the Judge of heaven and earth before his face, he speaks with all the solemnity which these awful circumstances are naturally calculated to inspire, and with all the tender affection which a father feels for his son. Not only the circumstances under which he was placed, but the subject on which he discoursed, was well calculated to awaken the most lively interest and to excite the deepest and most holy sympathies of the soul. He is not discoursing respecting an earthly but a heavenly inheritance—not about the empty pageantry of this world, which passeth away, but of those eternal realities of a future world—not of those ephemeral things which float upon the surface of human life and soon disappear forever, but of those substantial glories which shall be revealed in that august day when Jesus Christ shall descend from heaven with a shout and with the voice of the archangel, to awaken the dead and call all to judgment. Nor is he discoursing about human science, literature, and the arts—all of which have their relative importance—but respecting the science of salvation, the literature of religion, and the art of holy living. These are the solemn, the sublime, the all-important subjects that occupy the heart and inspire the pen of the apostle.

Now take all these things into consideration, and then judge if they are not most worthy the time, the circumstances, the character of the writer, his destiny, and the calling, character, and peculiar work of the person addressed. A man may, while blessed with health, surrounded with friends, and enjoying freedom of thought and action,

be cheerful and speak flippantly enough of the necessity of sacrificing the pleasures of the world, and descant in glowing language upon the attractions of religion and of its future rewards, and yet feel but very little of what he says. But let him be placed in a similar situation with the Apostle Paul when he wrote this epistle—let him be able to reflect upon a long life of devotion to the best of all causes, a life of daily sacrifice, of labour, of suffering, and, finally, be sent into prison, where he is doomed to linger out his wearisome days and nights in a gloomy dungeon, whence he looks forward to a speedy and ignominious death, and then let him speak of the substantial realities of that religion which buoys up the soul amid these sufferings, these temptations, and these agonies which arise from the treachery of false friends, while he rises above them all in view of the bright prospect before him, and we shall be compelled to believe in his sincerity, and to pay homage, almost involuntarily, to his virtues. This was the situation and this the discourse of the author of the document we are reviewing. And shall we not listen to him with believing hearts?

But let us notice particularly some of the most important topics upon which the apostle treats. Let it be remembered that this is the *second* epistle to Timothy. He had before, during his first imprisonment, instructed him in many things pertaining to his office as a superintendent of the Church, as an itinerating evangelist, and had delineated the character of those who might be consecrated to the work of elders in the Church of God.* In that epistle he had expressed his anticipation of a speedy deliverance from his captivity, and he lived to realize his expectation. But the malice of his enemies would not allow him long to enjoy his liberty: he was thrust a second time into the prison; and now he abandons all hope of a restoration to the free exercise of his apostolic functions, but says expressly, "I am now ready to be offered up, and the time of my departure is at hand." It would appear, therefore, that the sentence of death had been already passed upon him; and, indeed, it was soon carried into execution.

We have already intimated that Timothy was an assistant of the apostle, and, as such, was commissioned to do what the apostle would have done himself had he been present. And now that his departure was near at hand, he wished to instruct Timothy more perfectly in his duty as an evangelist, and as a ruler in the Church of Jesus Christ, that he might be fully qualified, after the apostle's death, to fill his place as his successor in the apostleship, not only in "preaching the word" with acceptance, but

* 1 Tim. ch. iii.

more especially in governing the Church with discretion, and thus be prepared to transmit to others duly qualified the functions of his ministry. Happy would it have been for the Church and the world had this succession of holy, wise, and faithful evangelists been preserved in a regular line of descent, for then would not the Church have been cursed with "unpreaching prelates," nor the earth drenched with the blood of the saints, under the pretence of eradicating heresy from among the faithful. What a disgrace to Christianity has the conduct of that unholy priesthood been! Had, indeed, this command of the apostle been obeyed from generation to generation, that race of monsters in human shape, the apostate popes and cardinals, whose vile characters have been delineated upon the page of history, had never existed. Nor would the doctrine of succession have needed a defence, as there would have been none to call it in question. As facts are, however, which put it beyond all controversy that this holy succession has not been kept up, but has been broken in upon from time to time by the vilest of men, surely a man must be hard pushed for arguments to justify his practice to resort to this debased and rotten succession for the authority of his ministrations.

All that an inspired apostle could do to prevent such a fatal catastrophe from befalling the Church was done in St. Paul's instructions to Timothy respecting the qualifications of his successors in the episcopal office. And as God will not, and indeed cannot, consistently with the government he exercises over free, responsible beings, force men to honour and obey him, so neither can he, without violating the eternal order of things, interpose his sovereignty to prevent a desecration of sacred things. Everything which infinite wisdom, power, and goodness could consistently do, God did to preserve the Church from being devoured by such "wolves in sheep's clothing."

Had the apostle believed that it was a matter of little consequence how the priesthood lived, what its character should be, whether holy or unholy, if only its incumbents were consecrated to their office by prayer and imposition of hands, he never would have taken such pains to impress upon Timothy the indispensable necessity of devoting himself exclusively to God, and of selecting other holy men and committing to them the same office which he himself held. He knew perfectly well that a departing from moral rectitude would vitiate the character of a bishop, and render all his acts null and void; and therefore he urged upon Timothy the necessity of holding fast the "form of sound words," and of transmitting to others of like character the sacred deposit which had been committed to him

"by the laying on of the hands of the presbytery." And to stimulate him to diligence in the discharge of his highly important duty, he proposes his own example for his imitation, reminding him in the mean time that he had been an eye-witness of his conduct. In chap. iii, ver. 10, 11, he says: "But thou hast fully known my doctrine, manner of life, purpose, faith, long-suffering, charity, patience, persecutions, afflictions, which came unto me at Antioch, at Iconium, at Lystra; what persecutions I endured: but out of them all the Lord delivered me;" and, in verse 14, he exhorts Timothy to "continue in the things which thou hast learned" from my teaching and example, for thou hast had an opportunity, from an intimate acquaintance with my doctrine and manners of life, of fully understanding both, and "been assured of knowing of whom thou hast learned;" not from a novice in theology or in experience, but from a father in the gospel, whose example has long exemplified the purity and excellence of religion before thine eyes: and for this I am now suffering imprisonment, and shall soon seal my testimony with my blood. In the midst of all these things I have held fast my profession, as thou knowest full well, having never soiled my character by any act of meanness, much less of wickedness; and, therefore, thou hast before thee an embodiment of all that is excellent in the gospel of the Son of God,—of its divine power to save from sin, to buoy up the soul in the midst of human infirmities and afflictions, and to fill it with hope in the prospect of death and the judgment-day.

But to excite in him a still stronger determination to run the race set before him, and not to soil his character by any act unbecoming a ruler in the Church of God, the apostle proceeds in verse 15 to remind him of his early religious training under the tuition of his pious mother: "And from a child thou hast known the Holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus." This interesting fact the apostle had more particularly revived in the recollection of Timothy, in chap. i, 5, where the names of his mother Eunice, and of his grandmother Lois, are mentioned with a view, no doubt, to impress upon him the high obligation derived from the vows of his early childhood, to fulfil the holy trust which had been confided to him at a more mature age of his life. "Wherefore," he says, verse 6, "I put thee in remembrance, that thou stir up the gift of God which is in thee by the putting on of my hands." Hence, he proceeds—(verse 14)—"Keep by the Holy Ghost" "that good thing"—namely, the authority to preach the word and to administer the ordinances, as well as to govern the Church as an itinerating evangelist or presiding bishop—"which was committed to thee by the laying on of the hands

of the presbytery," in which I acted as president of the council; keep this sacred deposit inviolably by the power of the Holy Ghost "which dwelleth in us," in me and thee, and all others who have been thus called to the important work of the ministry: "this authority see that thou exercise discreetly, in selecting and ordaining others as thy successors in the work of superintending the Church of God."

In this earnest and solemn manner the apostle pressed upon Timothy the indispensable duty of keeping himself pure—of avoiding everything which would sully the glory of his character as an ambassador of Jesus Christ, that he might maintain the high dignity of his office as a ruler in the Church, and never suffer his hands to be defiled by laying them on heads that could not think, or of consecrating those to the work of the ministry whose lives contradicted their profession.

Now the question arises and presents itself to us with resistless force, Would the apostle have been thus solicitous to preserve the person to whom he was writing in this holy obedience, had he believed that it was a matter of small consequence how he believed and lived, how impure his heart and corrupt his life, if he were only canonically consecrated to his work? It is absolutely certain, therefore, that the modern doctrine of the inviolability of the ministerial or episcopal character, notwithstanding viciousness of life either before or after consecration, finds no support from the apostolic epistles, nor in any other portion of the sacred writings. This monstrous doctrine not only had no place in the mind of the apostle, but is indirectly condemned in express terms in verse 15, where he says: "All they which are in Asia"—that is, those Asiatic Christians which were in Rome at the time of my imprisonment, and who for a season administered to my necessities, seeing me in this disgrace—"be turned away from me, among whom are Phygellus and Hermogenes,"—probably two presbyters well known to Timothy, else the mentioning them thus by name could have been of no manner of use, as he could have derived no specific information from having their names announced; as their names would, under that circumstance, have been unmeaning epithets. These public men, who probably had been once preachers of the gospel, had, by their cowardice in forsaking the apostle in the time of his greatest need, forfeited their right to minister in holy things, and were consequently no longer to be recognised by Timothy as co-labourers in the ministry of reconciliation. Understanding the passage in this light, we may perceive good and substantial reasons why the apostle mentioned their names to Timothy; namely, that he

might be on his guard against their impositions, should they chance to intrude themselves into his company, inasmuch as they had forfeited the character of legitimate ministers, presbyters, or bishops, by their want of fidelity to the apostle in the awful crisis in which he was placed; otherwise there can be no justifiable reason why the apostle should thus announce their names and parade their apostasy in this public manner, and thus contradistinguish them from those Asiatic Christians who had also forsaken him in his perilous condition.

Allowing these views to be correct, and they certainly obtain a high degree of probability from the views above expressed, it follows, of necessity, that a title to minister in holy things depends not only upon antecedent qualifications, but also upon a perseverance in the discharge of every known duty. Those who, like Judas—who lost his apostleship by his base treachery—have vitiated their office by unworthy conduct, are no longer to be considered in the line of succession, however canonically they may have been inducted into the order of presbyters or bishops. Hence our apostle warns Timothy against such cowards as Phygellus and Hermogenes had proved themselves to be, and exhorts him not to imitate their fatal example by being “ashamed of the testimony of our Lord, nor of me his prisoner: but be thou a partaker of the afflictions of the gospel, according to the power of God.” Chap. i, ver. 8.

And that the apostle designed that Timothy should be careful to select suitable men, who should not be easily turned aside from the path of duty by persecution or any other occurrence, whether significant or trifling, in chap. ii, 2, he says: “And the things that thou hast heard of me among many witnesses, the same commit thou to faithful men,”—not to those who, like Phygellus and Hermogenes, prove themselves weak and unfaithful in the hour of danger, and demonstrate their instability by forsaking their old friend and spiritual father merely because he has fallen into the hands of his enemies, who load him with reproach, imprison and condemn him; but select such as “shall be able,” both by precept and example, “to teach others” the way to the kingdom of heaven, though it may lead them through the thorny path of “much tribulation.” Why insist on Timothy’s selecting FAITHFUL men—a word of ominous import, especially considering the time when it was spoken, comprehending every ministerial virtue—if it were a matter of little moment whether their religious and moral character was good or bad, provided only they were regularly consecrated according to a prescribed ritual to their sacred office? This absurd dogma never entered the heart of the apostle Paul. It is fit only for the brains of a madman. The

note of Dr. Adam Clarke on Ezekiel xxv, 23, is worthy of consideration. He says:—

“By the kind providence of God, it appears that he has not permitted any *apostolic succession* to be preserved; lest the members of his Church should seek, in an *uninterrupted succession*, that which must be found in the HEAD alone.”

And in his note on 2 Tim. ii, 2, he has the following remarks:—

“But where is the *uninterrupted apostolic succession*? Who can tell? Probably it does not exist on the face of the world. All the pretensions to it by certain Churches are as stupid as they are idle and futile. He who appeals to this for his authority as a Christian minister, had best sit down till he has made it out; and this will be by the next Greek Thalends.”

Again, on Heb. v, 4, his remarks are still more pointed:—

“It is idle to employ time in proving that there is no such thing as an *uninterrupted succession* of this kind. It does not exist; it never did exist. It is a silly fable invented by ecclesiastical tyrants, and supported by clerical coxcombs.”

We have dwelt the longer upon this topic because this spurious and obsolete dogma has been revived of late, and asserted with all the confidence of infallible certainty; as much so as if the salvation of the world were suspended upon its truth. Indeed, it has been affirmed, with cool deliberation, that there is no well-authenticated ministry, and, of course, no valid ordinances, except they are derived in a regular line of apostolic succession! To those who are familiar with ecclesiastical history—who have read of the bitter rivalry of popes—the hot disputes of bishops contending for supremacy—who are acquainted with the undeniable fact that two, and at one time three, popes reigned at the same time, each claiming infallibility,—and recollect the wickedness by which the greater proportion of them were distinguished,—their venality, their licentiousness, their meanness, all mixed with imbecile ignorance,—such an assertion will appear not barely ridiculous, but blasphemously absurd. It is tantamount to saying that the Holy God, the immaculate Head of the Church, the Lord Jesus Christ, is dependent upon a rotten priesthood—upon polluted bishops—upon perjured prelates—upon a licentious hierarchy—to hand down his ordinances pure and uncorrupt, uncontaminated by any moral pollution, from one generation to another!* What a monstrous suppo-

* In 1044, two popes, namely, *Sylvester III.* and *Gregory VI.*, after many turbulent disputes and mutual anathemas, reigned at the same time, while a third, *Benedict*, who had been deposed, still claimed the pontifical throne. Finally, Henry III. terminated the discord by declaring all the three unworthy of the

sition is this! Were it proved true, the infallible maxim of holy writ would be found a falsehood, namely, that no "fountain can send forth at the same place sweet water and bitter;" and the words of the Master Teacher would be equally void of meaning, "Neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." For, according to this absurd dogma, the stream of succession has continued to flow on regularly through this muddy channel, and yet never mixing with its filth, but maintaining its pristine purity down to the present time! Such a doctrine is both theologically and philosophically absurd.

If this were the only legitimate ministry the Church possessed, what a world should we have! "Darkness would cover the earth, and gross darkness the minds of the people." Is it any wonder that Wiclif, Huss, Jerome, Luther, Zwingli, and a host of others, lifted up their voices in denunciation of this and other absurdities of the Roman Catholic Church? Little did they think, we apprehend, that any of their successors in the Protestant world would revive the same dogma, and claim to themselves the exclusive right of administering the rites of consecration, of baptism, and the Lord's supper.

Exclusive right! Where did they get it? From Rome. Then, by granting this right to them, Rome deprived herself of it, if it be now theirs exclusively. But, if the Roman Catholic Church imparted this right to them, when she excluded them from her communion, as she did for contumacy, heresy, or some other supposed crime, she unquestionably deprived them of all she had granted; for whoever grants a privilege, on certain conditions, whenever these conditions cease to be complied with, has the undoubted right to withdraw the grant. And this was precisely the predicament of all these Protestant reformers who abjured the jurisdiction of the Roman Catholic Church, protested against the power of the pope, and ceased to exercise the functions of their office as Roman Catholic priests or bishops. Hence they forfeited all the rights they derived from this source, and, therefore, the line of connexion between them is broken, and they are left in the dilemma of orphan children, or driven to the necessity of admitting a legitimacy from a divorced marriage.

What an arrogant assumption is this claim of exclusive right! How unworthy of the truly Christian minister, and how opposite

popedom, and invested *Suidger*, Bishop of Bamberg, as the legitimate pope, who took the name of Clement II.—*Mosh.*, vol. ii, p. 156.

Let those who wish to see the truth of the above remarks confirmed, consult *Mosheim* for the ninth, tenth, and eleventh century.

to the doctrine laid down by the apostle in the epistle before us! He says in chap. ii, ver. 1, "Be strong," not in thy outward profession, not in thy external designation to the work of an evangelist, but "in the grace that is in Christ Jesus the Lord." This sentence unfolds the true source of strength to the minister of the sanctuary: whether he be of an inferior or superior order, his soul must be fed continually with the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, that he may possess the vigour necessary for his important work. In verse 6 he says, "The husbandman that laboureth must first be partaker of the fruits." He must not only cultivate the earth, but, if he would have strength to continue his labour, he must participate in the fruits which the cultivated earth produces. So the minister of the Lord Jesus, if he would have spiritual strength to persevere in his work, must not be content in the mere consecration to his office, but he must partake daily of the "hidden manna" of God's love—he must receive continual supplies of that "grace that is in Christ Jesus,"—that is treasured up in him expressly for the spiritual strength of the believing soul. It is, indeed, by a constant partaking of these heavenly fruits, that the minister of the sanctuary is made competent for his work.

In the subsequent part of this chapter the apostle shows what is necessary for Timothy to do, that he may receive the strength essential to his success as a preacher of the gospel and a ruler in the Church of God. After adverting to his own example in "suffering trouble," having been falsely charged as "an evil-doer," (ver. 9,) though his confinement in prison could not bind the word of God, inasmuch as his soul was yet free to range through the prolific field of theological truth, and his pen ready to write his thoughts for the edification of Timothy, he endured "all things for the elect's sake," (ver. 10,)—after recounting these things as an encouragement to his son Timothy, and charging him not to strive about mere words, which could not profit those to whom he spoke, (ver. 14,) he then issues his command with all the solemnity of a dying man: "Study to show thyself approved unto God, a workman that needeth not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth," (ver. 15.) That he might do this effectually, he must "shun profane and vain babblings," a mere repetition of unmeaning words, or an effort to astonish the hearer by flights of human oratory, which may amuse the fancy for the time, but convey no solid instruction to the understanding, much less that divine food to the soul which is essential to its growth and strength. We know that the Grecian and Roman orators were more solicitous to adorn their discourses with the tinsel of human art, with well-constructed sentences, to

deliver them with a nice modulation of the voice, with studied gesticulations of the body, than they were to store them with sober truth; and hence they lost the "substance in the shadow." And as to Jewish rabbins, they were much more attentive to the sifting of words, to tracing out the endless genealogies of their ancestors, than they were to the real meaning of their prophetic Scriptures, and to those historical facts by which the proper lineage of the Lord Jesus Christ was demonstrated, and thus proved to be the true Messiah. To this fact the apostle alludes in verse three of chapter two, in which he reminds Timothy that Jesus Christ was of the seed of David, and therefore was regularly descended from the royal line of Judah, according to the solemn declaration of Jehovah, (Gen. xlix, 10,) in which it was announced that "the sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a lawgiver from between his feet, until Shiloh come." And inasmuch as this Shiloh, the Messiah, the anointed of God, had come in the person of Jesus Christ, who was the veritable Son of David according to the flesh, therefore all the pretences of the Jewish doctors respecting a Messiah that was yet to come, and all the deciphering of their genealogical tables to ascertain that he must be different from Jesus of Nazareth, were but "vain babblings," a mere "strife of words" without any substantial import. Moreover, as this same "seed of David," who had been put to death by an unjust sentence, had actually risen from the dead, (ver. 8,) he had thereby given a visible demonstration that he was the Son of God, and was now seated upon the throne of David, where he should reign forever and ever.

By declaring these truths plainly and pointedly, continually appealing to the prophetic Scriptures for their support, Timothy would be able to go straight forward in the track of truth, not turning aside to dispute either with the Grecian philosophers, whose tinsel might dazzle the minds of superficial observers or the Jewish Rabbins, whose "vain babblings" about their uncertain pedigrees might puzzle the understanding of the simple, unlettered Christian with subtleties which he could not unravel; and thus approve himself unto God a workman that need not be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth—dividing it in such a skilful manner as to give to every one, whether Jew or Gentile, his portion of meat in due season.

As the main object of the apostle was to instruct his son Timothy in the knowledge of truth and of the duties of the high station which he was called to fill as a ruler in the Church, he endeavours to impress upon his mind the necessity of *studying* attentively the great doctrines of Christ, that he might have a com-

prehensive view of the system of redemption and salvation, and be able adequately to defend it against all assailants, whether of Jewish etymologists, who are more solicitous to search out the meaning of words than they are to identify the person of their promised Messiah with one who has already come, who had "done among them those things which none other man ever did," and thus bearing all the characteristics of Him so often foretold by their own prophets, or of the sophistical orators of the Greeks and Romans, who prided themselves on their philosophical attainments, and counted the "preaching of the cross foolishness." This constant study, and this constant exercise of the intellectual faculties, the apostle deemed essential to the increase of his strength: for however holy he might be, and however much his heart might be fed with the grace of God in Christ Jesus, without this constant application of his mental powers, his understanding would become enfeebled, and he would soon exhibit the imbecility of premature old age.

Two things are essential to a useful and vigorous exercise of the intellectual faculties. The first is a good conscience,—"*a conscience void of offence toward God and man.*" This can be obtained and kept only by an unreserved surrender of the whole man to God, and so living by faith in the Son of God as to derive daily food—spiritual food—to the soul. This is the first, the most important, prerequisite for a minister of the Lord Jesus, as without it the soul will soon languish and die; that is, become spiritually separated from communion with God, and of course can put forth no energetic action in the cause of evangelical truth. The second is a continual application of the mind to some useful subject. We say to some *useful* subject. By this we mean a subject suited to the soul's immortal powers. A man may accustom himself to dwell on trivial subjects, until he loses all relish for weighty and sober truths, and his mind will gradually lose its elasticity, and will refuse, from mere incapacity, to follow any course of consecutive reasoning, until, at last, it dwindles into second childhood. The truth of this remark has been verified by many an eminent name. It is said that after M'Knight had finished his great work on the apostolical epistles, his friends urged him to proceed in a similar way with the Acts of the Apostles. This he declined, and gave up all study; and the consequence was, that he gradually sunk away into childhood, and finally lost his intellectual powers. The mind, like the body, needs constant exercise, in order to preserve its mental vigour. A suitable application of the intellectual faculties must be kept up, even in old age,—and that too upon those subjects which are best adapted to its condition.

On the other hand, it is wise to avoid over-taxing the mind. As the body will sink under too much physical labour, so the soul will fail under too much mental exercise, especially if it be long continued. Melancholy instances of this might be mentioned. Among others, in modern times, we may notice Walter Scott and Robert Southey, both of whom no doubt over-taxed themselves on the downhill side of life. To escape the like disasters we must avoid both of these extremes, namely,—a total cessation of mental labour on the one hand, and an over-exertion on the other.

Every man, and especially every minister of the Lord Jesus Christ, if he will duly economize his time—rightly divide it for bodily exercise and mental application—may discharge all his duties as a preacher and pastor, and yet have time enough to study all he ought, whether it be in reading or writing; but he must not devote any part of his time to idleness, to frivolous conversation, nor to the study of those books which do not minister to the knowledge and love of God. That he may do this and preserve his health, whenever, in either reading or writing, he begins to feel a weariness of spirit or lassitude of mind come over him, let him instantly lay down his book or pen, and commence to walk,—and walk, too, in the open air, whether it be hot or cold,—and walk till he perspires freely, if possible; and in his walks let him call on the members of his flock—especially the sick and poor, and the delinquents in duty—speak a word of comfort, pray with them, and then take his departure; and walk thus from house to house until he begins to feel weary: then he will return to his studies with renewed zest; he will feel all his mental energies quickened into new life.

In this way we may suppose the apostle Paul intended that Timothy should employ his time, when he commanded him to study to show himself approved unto God, a workman that need not be ashamed.

Ashamed! What a shame for a minister of the sanctuary to be ignorant of any prominent fact in history, whether civil or ecclesiastical; of any important personage who has been conspicuous in the world—whether in the civil, military, or religious world; of any point in chronology which marks an important epoch in the world's history; of any truth in theology which may serve to illustrate the facts and doctrines of the Bible; of any eminent writer on theological subjects who has shed light upon divine revelation, and more especially upon those truths which relate to experimental and practical religion! Other branches of knowledge he may pursue, as time and inclination may serve, such as philosophy—natural, moral, and mental; geography—so far at least as to have the outlines of the

world's map engraven upon his memory; astronomy, if he have a capacity to understand it; and as much of language, or as many languages, as he can acquire. All these things are comprehended in the works and ways of God; and therefore the more we know of them, the more perfectly shall we be able to illustrate the attributes of the Deity, and to demonstrate his superintending care over the work of his hands.

Near the conclusion of this admirable letter, the author, with great solemnity, adverts to the approach of his expected martyrdom. In chap. iv, 6, he says: "For I am now ready to be offered, and the time of my departure is at hand." It is hardly possible for a person writing under such circumstances—in the near prospect of death, with the cross on which he is to be crucified immediately before his eye, the Judge before whom he is so soon to appear standing, as it were, before him—to be otherwise than serious. These words, therefore, uttered under such circumstances, must have made a solemn and lasting impression upon the mind and heart of Timothy. And lest he should mourn over the remains of his spiritual father after his departure, the apostle reminds him that he had already fought the good fight, that he had finished his course; and so far from looking into the "gaping tomb" with gloomy apprehensions of the future, he comforts himself with the bright prospect of receiving the "crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous Judge, shall give him in that day;" and, as if anticipating the unspeakable pleasure of participating with Timothy and all others who loved or shall love the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity, he adds, "and not to me only, but to all those who love his appearing."

With these words it seems fitting that we should close our remarks upon this highly interesting epistle.

ART. IV.—DAVIDSON'S BIBLICAL CRITICISM.

A Treatise on Biblical Criticism, exhibiting a Systematic View of that Science.

By SAMUEL DAVIDSON, D. D., of the University of Halle, and LL. D. 2 vols., 8vo. Vol. I, the Old Testament; Vol. II, the New Testament. London: 1853.

THE name BIBLICAL CRITICISM, as usually understood, embraces the investigation and discussion of whatever relates to the *form* in which the sacred records have come down to us—including their language, history, style, authenticity, and purity. In popular phraseology, much that belongs to the *meaning* of the Bible has

often been classed under the same name, instead of under that of sacred *Interpretation*. Each of the above subjects, however, properly forms a distinct branch of literature, under the special titles of sacred *Philology*, *Rhetoric*, *Hermeneutics*, et cetera, leaving Biblical Criticism proper to occupy itself solely with the state of the *text* of Scripture, or what is frequently termed the "lower criticism," as lying at the foundation of all the other departments. It is with this that the volumes before us have exclusively to do, and to this we shall therefore confine ourselves in the present article. The object of the science is to ascertain, as nearly as possible, what *words* the inspired authors wrote when they penned the original autographs.

If this, the true design of sacred criticism, had always been steadily and sincerely kept in view, both by the friends and foes of revelation, neither party would ever have entertained such absurd prejudices as have often been expressed against the science by both. The honest Christian, at least, could certainly never have objected to the exercise of any amount of learned labour necessary to arrive at the genuine language of the inspired records, had he properly understood the fact that such studies and examinations constitute the very basis on which the whole truth of his religion rests. Let it once be a matter of uncertainty whether the book which goes by the name of the Bible contains the genuine statements of the Jewish seers and Christian apostles, and that moment our faith falls to the ground. It is painful, therefore, to the liberal and candid mind, to revert to the prejudices and opposition which such inquiries have met with in former times, within the bosom of the Church itself; and it is mortifying to catch now and then from modern Christians an echo of the same narrow sentiments. Even ministers, authors, and editors are occasionally found who openly decry or privately discourage such pursuits, from the mistaken notion that they weaken the popular reverence for the Word of God.* Revelation needs no such

* A striking instance of this illiberal spirit, although not in all respects a parallel case, occurred at the publication of the Latin Vulgate, in the fourth century, which we will give in our author's words. Any one who should undertake a similar revision of the Bible in our own day would meet with even fiercer denunciation:—

"Notwithstanding the timid and cautious procedure of Jerome, the work excited the opposition of many. An excessive and superstitious veneration for the Septuagint, and the *vetus* made from it, prevailed at that time, so that any one who departed from them could not hope to escape animadversion. Calumnies were freely uttered against the laborious translator. He was pronounced a heretic. Detraction and opposition befell him. Even Augustine joined partially

defenders; it seeks no lurking-place; it fears no investigation. Error alone can suffer by an examination of evidence. It is the height of fanatical folly to cling to any system of belief which we are not willing to submit to the most searching test of facts. If the Bible will not bear the closest scrutiny that a fair criticism can apply, then are we free to confess it unworthy of our confidence. On the contrary, it has always triumphed after such an ordeal; and it is these very labours of Biblical critics that have established the substantial and wonderful accuracy of the text of Scripture on a basis of certainty which the cavils of infidels can never hereafter shake.

The materials for such an investigation, so far as the Old Testament is concerned, the first volume of the work before us sums up in the following terms—having prefaced their discussion by several preliminary chapters, not particularly inappropriate, treating somewhat minutely of the nature of the Hebrew language, its characters and vowels, followed by a valuable and extended account of the *history of the text* from the earliest times down to the present. We have, then, in order, as the means for restoring the text:—I. Ancient Versions—II. Parallels, or repeated passages—III. Quotations—IV. Hebrew MSS.—V. Critical conjecture.

Of all the ancient versions of the Old Testament, the Septuagint, or old Greek, holds by far the most conspicuous place. Indeed, it has often been exalted to an authority equal or even superior to that of the Hebrew itself. Dr. Davidson enters somewhat minutely into the question of its origin, and arrives at the conclusion, drawn from an ingenious, but we think not unwarrantable, comparison of circumstances, that it was made by different persons, at different times; the Pentateuch only having been translated at first for the use of

with his accusers, not daring to go against the stream of popular opinion, though he at first hailed the work with joy. He advised Jerome not to proceed with it, telling him of a late occurrence in Africa as a warning to desist. A bishop there had introduced the new version into his Church; but when the people heard another name given to the gourd of Jonah, they were excited, and refused obedience till the old Bible was restored. The new translation was said to be a falsification of the word of God. Its departures from the current Greek version, and from the old Latin version, taken from the Greek, were seized as proofs of the danger accruing from the new work. Accordingly it was reserved for the more correct judgment of posterity to appreciate the merits of Jerome as a translator. His contemporaries condemned, when they ought to have approved and applauded. The numerous passages in which he alludes to the unjust treatment he met with have been collected by Van Ess, and form a melancholy exhibition of the unreasonable, injurious prejudices to which good men are exposed in an evil world."—Vol. i, p. 267.

the Egyptian Jews, probably under the patronage of Ptolemy *Lagi*. The value of its several portions, for critical purposes, is therefore various,—some parts being literally and faithfully rendered, and others so nearly approaching the character of a *paraphrase*, that they are useless as an index to the reading of the Hebrew, even as it was in their own time. That it was ever used for public service in the synagogues of Palestine, the author properly regards as questionable. As to its singular agreement in the main with the Samaritan Pentateuch, after examining the various theories proposed, the author concludes: "As yet no satisfactory solution of the problem has been offered. Perhaps it is impossible." On the whole, however, he thinks that, "in the present state of the question, nothing better can be proposed than that the countries where the Samaritan Pentateuch originated, and the Jewish MSS., as the basis of the Seventy, had been in circulation, were much less favourable to the preservation of a pure text than Palestine, or rather its metropolis;" and that therefore both these suffered similar alterations from like causes—a conclusion with which we coincide.

Unhappily, for purposes of criticism, the text of the Septuagint itself is in a state of hopeless corruption. The very means anciently used, at various times, to correct it, by recensions, editions, &c., have only increased the difficulty, so that now it is impossible to determine, in cases of variation, which was the original and true reading. The slightest comparison of the various printed texts in use will render this at once apparent. Neither is the translation itself altogether to be depended on: it is not literal; it amplifies obscure or elliptical passages; it resolves tropes and metaphors into literal phrases; it accommodates itself to the religious prejudices and views of the Jews; it often errs in the sense, and sometimes omits or leaves untranslated difficult or rare words: instances of each of these peculiarities are given in the volume before us. These faults apply, indeed, less to the Pentateuch than to the other books; but they are everywhere sufficiently apparent to betray the fact, that none of the translators were entirely competent to their task. The author accordingly sums up the merits and defects of the version in the following candid language:—

"Assistance in criticism has doubtless been derived from it; and more will yet be rendered. We do not think that its internal value is commensurate with the reputation it has had. The extravagant praises pronounced upon it will be lessened by the study of its genius and character. It is very far from being a *good*, much less an *excellent* translation; but the reading of it cannot be dispensed with. Its position in the criticism of the Old Testament is conspicuous. Its text *must* be studied by every one engaged in Biblical researches connected with the integrity of the Hebrew records."—P. 194.

There are four other Greek versions extant,—those of Aquila, Theodotion, and Symmachus, and a MS. version now at Venice. Of these, the version of Aquila is far the best for critical purposes, on account of its literalness; the others being very paraphrastic and rambling, that of Symmachus in particular. The version of Aquila was highly prized by the Jews of the early centuries, and that of Theodotion by Christians, the Book of Daniel being taken from the latter to supply the very faulty version of that part in the Septuagint. All these versions appear to have grown out of the contests between the Jews and Christians, and were probably made in the latter part of the second century.

The *Targums*, or Chaldee versions, furnish additional means for correcting the text. The oldest of these have probably been lost, as some appear to have been written at least as early as the time of Christ. The Targum of Onkelos, the most valuable of those extant, is a close translation of the text of the Pentateuch only, in pure diction. The time and place of writing are uncertain. It would be very valuable for critical purposes, but for the fact that it closely follows the Masoretic text, and therefore affords very few various readings. The date and origin of the Targum of Jonathan, which contains the other books of the Old Testament, exclusive of Job, and David's and Solomon's writings, are equally uncertain. His translation is rather an interpretation, running into diffuse explanations and absurd legends. In many places, however, he translates faithfully into good Chaldee; in these parts, therefore, the work is useful to the critic, as it does not so closely follow the Masoretic text as Onkelos. The other Targums on the Pentateuch—those of Pseudo-Jonathan and the Jerusalem Targum—are too late, and too much filled with traditional dissertations and diffuse speculations, to be of any value. Indeed, a closer inspection leads to the probability that the last two are only different editions of the same work. There are various other Targums on parts or the whole of the remaining books of the Old Testament; but they are all so tainted with the faults of the preceding as to be of little, and in most cases of no use to the critic.

Next to the Septuagint, the most important of the ancient versions is the Samaritan Pentateuch. This is different from the Samaritan *version*, being in fact only a transcription of the Hebrew text in Samaritan letters. As it is not, therefore, strictly a version at all, the author does not treat it under this head, but it will be more convenient for our purpose to consider it here. From the well-known fact that the present Samaritan character is the ancient Hebrew—that now called Hebrew being only the later Chaldee—it

has been affirmed by many that the Samaritan Pentateuch is the original, and has always remained in its present form; while it is the present Hebrew that was transcribed in other letters from it. Others maintain that the Samaritan has a much later date, and owes its origin to the feud at the time of the building of the second temple. The work before us enters at considerable length into the discussion of this question, and concludes with a sort of compromise between the above views; that is, (if we have rightly understood its somewhat ambiguous argumentation,) that the Pentateuch had been in existence in the kingdom of Israel before the deportation of the ten tribes, and even survived that period; but shortly after that event, it had so fallen into oblivion, or had perhaps so nearly ceased to be extant there, that it had to be brought afresh from the Jews, in the reign of Josiah, king of Judah. With this view we confess ourselves hardly satisfied. That the ten tribes had the Pentateuch originally, as well as the two other tribes, appears to us to admit scarcely a doubt. Now, although it is not certain that the entire literature of the ten tribes perished with their captivity, yet the immediate and total ignorance of the worship of Jehovah, by those mixed Israelites and heathens who supplied their place, seems to us clearly to imply an absence of the written word in which that worship was prescribed. Certainly nothing could have been more natural than for the priest—who returned from Assyria to teach the people—to carry with him a copy of the law. Yet the copies would not be likely to multiply very rapidly; and it may not have been till the reformation by Josiah that they became at all numerous. The subsequent accession of the regular Jewish high-priest, Manasseh, from Jerusalem to the Samaritans, would greatly increase their multiplication; and in this manner, as we are inclined to think, what is now known as the Samaritan Pentateuch was kept in existence.

The critical value of the Samaritan Pentateuch has been settled by the masterly essay of Gesenius, who has shown that it is of very little value as a means of correcting the Hebrew. This we should naturally expect from the above view of its history. Preserved in a precarious manner, transmitted through a period of great religious ignorance and semi-heathenism, and surrounded by temptations to alteration for sectarian purposes, the event shows that it has suffered greatly, both from accidental and intentional corruptions. Nothing can be more preposterous than the attempt to set it on a level with the Hebrew text for critical uses. This would probably never have been done, but for the desire of corroborating the longer patriarchal chronology of the Septuagint by its means. We have not room to enter upon this question at length; suffice it to say, that those very

dates in which these two texts are thought to be more consistent than the Hebrew, are instances which all the canons of just criticism would condemn as palpable evidence of designed alteration.

The *Peshito*, or old Syriac version, comes next in point of importance. This may probably be assigned to the second century. It affords many valuable readings. The Arabic and Persic versions are of less antiquity and value. The proper Samaritan *version* was made from the Samaritan text: it is faithful, but shares the faults of its original. Its date is uncertain.

Before the time of Jerome, various old Latin translations, probably of detached parts of Scripture, had been made, fragments of which, in a collected form, now pass under the general name of the *Itala*, or *Italic* version. This version had fallen into such a state of corruption, from various causes, that Jerome undertook the task of revising and correcting it. He began with the New Testament. His revised copy of the greater part of the Old Testament was lost, through the carelessness or treachery of a friend to whose care it was intrusted. Undiscouraged by this mishap, he resolutely undertook the task of producing a translation of the Old Testament from the original Hebrew. The result was the *Vulgate*, which has been adopted as of standard authority by the Romish Church. Jerome, on the whole, was tolerably well qualified for his task; but his almost exclusive use of the Masoretic text, and his continual dependence upon his Jewish teachers, render this part of his version little available for the objects of the critic. His work was also too hastily performed, and with too little regard to the modern purposes and laws of criticism. Unfortunately, a habit soon prevailed of using it in connexion with the older Latin version; and copyists generally intermingled the readings of both in the most promiscuous and capricious manner. The result was, that the *Vulgate* itself became so universally corrupt, that it was impossible to discover the true text of Jerome. Various popes attempted to restore it, and several editions were published with the pontifical imprimatur; but this only increased the difficulty. The editors and printers made worse mistakes than the copyists; and subsequent popes found it necessary to revise and even suppress editions published by their predecessors, under the most dreadful anathemas against alteration! Finally, Sixtus V., after exhausting his utmost vigour and patience in vainly attempting to reduce it to accuracy, was compelled to forbid all further critical labours upon the text of the *Vulgate*, lest its authority should be entirely undermined. His successors, however, kept up the farce, and issued other editions with equal pretensions, until at length this *immaculate* text settled into something like a received

form, but with most of its blunders stereotyped in it, with the absurd appendix of a *correctorium* of errata! Probably there has never been a greater burlesque upon typographical correctness and ecclesiastical authority than this same vaunted Vulgate. Still it has its value, even for critical purposes; but it is exceedingly necessary to compare various editions in order to ascertain Jerome's own words.

Under the head of *Parallel Passages* the author arranges various repetitions occurring in the Old Testament,—such as genealogical lists, laws, poems, oracles, sentences, propositions, and proverbs occurring twice,—with regard to which he very properly thinks that great caution is requisite not to meddle with what is right, on the mistaken presumption that the passages were originally alike. A similar rule is good with regard to quotations from the Old Testament in the New. These were usually cited from the Septuagint, and often from memory; so that it would be rash to make many changes in view of them. As to quotations found in the Talmud and Rabbinical writings, little use can be made of them: passages are not always quoted directly, but frequently by way of accommodation. Even this is generally done by memory; and all the citations have been carefully conformed to the Masoretic text, either by the authors originally, or by subsequent copyists.

The last positive or objective means for correcting the text, that the author enumerates, is Hebrew *manuscripts*. These would be entitled to the first rank for this purpose but for one fact, which is a very important one. We allude to the labours of the Masorites, which have reduced all extant MSS. of the Hebrew Scriptures to one general type. The Masoretic system derives its name from the Hebrew Massorah, *tradition*,—a term assigned to those critical investigations which had their germ in the Talmud, and which, after its publication, were extensively pursued by the learned Jews of Palestine, especially at Tiberias. These investigations were partly grammatical, partly exegetical, and partly philological. They grew up by degrees from oral communications handed down from the Rabbis of the first centuries of our era, and reduced to writing in separate dissertations about the sixth century, the mass of miscellaneous remarks and corrections upon the text being epitomized, with sundry scattered annotations, about the eleventh century. This compendium, in an abbreviated form, was usually written in the margin of the MSS.; but with so little care and system in the arrangement, that it soon produced inextricable confusion. The text, however, was generally preserved with scrupulous accuracy, free from interpolation from the Massorah: the object of the latter

was only to point out to the reader preferable readings. From this account it will appear that the term, *Masoretic recension* of the Hebrew text, is improper: the Masorites did not alter the text; they took it as it was, and only noted corrections and suggestions in the margin. Still, the effect was to render the text uniform; and hence, after their labours we find little or no variety of importance in the Hebrew MSS. The copies from which they collected their corrections have perished; and we are therefore left to judge of the value of the various readings contained in the Massorah solely from the estimate put upon them by these Rabbis. This estimate itself is often inconsistent, sometimes contradictory, always empirical; the result therefore is with us exceedingly loose and unsatisfactory. Still, for our own part, we are disposed to feel very grateful to these Masorites for their studious labours and records. They have stereotyped the text, it is true; but they have by that very means preserved it from arbitrary and accidental changes in later times. We see no reason to doubt the general accuracy of their judgment as to the comparative value of various readings, nor to question their honesty in giving us a fair account of them, as extant in their own day. We regard it as very fortunate, nay, providential, that these men have collected and recorded facts, which would probably otherwise never have reached us, except through the doubtful channel of later MSS. We therefore set a higher value upon these Masoretic notes than the author. As to the hackneyed charge that the Masoretic Jews corrupted the text, we like the author's point-blank denial, (p. 69,) and had we room, we would quote it with emphasis.

Modern Hebrew MSS. are accordingly too late and too much alike to afford very much aid in rectifying old errors. The work before us gives a detailed account of several of the most important of them.

The last remaining source of critical emendation is *conjecture*. This must doubtless be used with extreme caution; but it is unreasonable to shut it out altogether. In vindication of it the author uses the following strong language:—

"What shall be said of names, numbers, genealogies, events, recorded so differently that one or other statement of them must be incorrect? Disguise the fact as men may, the received Masoretic text, which is exhibited for the most part in all known MSS., makes writers assert different and contradictory things of the same person or event. There are not a few such phenomena in the books of the Old Testament, whose existence was ignored as long as it could be, or which were explained into agreement by the most arbitrary modes of exposition. But the light of modern criticism has brought them forth to the full day; and there they stand to the dismay of the feeble pietist, who would fain shut his eyes to their existence, or take to the stale shifts which once sufficed to force them into harmony."—P. 376.

Such cases, we believe, are not very numerous, yet we know they exist; and we cannot see how a cautious conjecture can be avoided in their solution. Those who object to this, as an admission of fallibility in the Scriptures, mistake our view, and take themselves an untenable position. We assume that the Scriptures were originally consistent, but that copyists have introduced errors: these we seek to remove by the best means within our power.

From the foregoing statements it will appear, that the materials for Old Testament criticism, on the whole, are meagre and uncertain. This is doubtless the true reason why so few labourers have entered this field, and why there is not now a good critical edition of the Hebrew Scriptures. Among the early fathers, Origen alone seems to have had a correct idea of the task to be performed, and nobly did he address himself to it; but his great critical work has perished, and few of its results survived his own age. From the days of the Masorites—who we think have really done more in this department than all others—various feeble efforts had been made to collect materials for such a work; but it was not till Kennicott and De Rossi published their Hebrew Bibles that anything like a critical apparatus was furnished to the Old Testament. The Bibles of Bomberg and Buxtorff, indeed, were valuable, but these were only digests of past labours; they added no new readings, they brought the results of no fresh collations. Kennicott was the first to do this, and even he had access to comparatively few sources, especially in the way of MSS. Nor did he use thoroughly or judiciously what he had; he collated but partially, and leaned so excessively toward the Alexandrian and Samaritan readings, that his results are of little reliance. His great fault, as Dr. Davidson expresses it, was that “he was not a masterly critic;” he lacked the skill, judgment, and tact, to appreciate and apply properly the resources at his command. The same defects apply in a great degree to De Rossi’s work: neither he nor Kennicott accomplished what was needed for the Old Testament. Since their day but little has been done, and Old Testament criticism remains nearly where they left it. We share in the hearty wish of our author, that some one competent, skilled, and of sufficient leisure, would arise to do the work.

The volume before us closes with an application of the above sources of criticism to the emendation of several of the most important passages. This mode of exemplifying their use, the author thinks preferable to laying down *canons* or specific rules for the critic, which in his opinion are useless or hurtful. There is doubtless much truth in his objection to such canons, that each case of criticism differs in so many points from others, as to require the

application of a particular judgment respecting it; yet we are inclined to think such rules, after all, may have their value, if correctly drawn up on general principles, and employed in a judicious manner. The same arguments that are used to show the inutility of such laws, in regard to criticism, would prove the uselessness of similar ones in interpretation, or even in rhetoric and aesthetics. Canons on any subject are not so much intended to guide the expert as the novice; they are employed rather in testing than in constructing a system of science. We cannot, therefore, think that they ought to be dispensed with in the treatment of a subject so liable to caprice and error as Biblical criticism. Indeed, the author himself, notwithstanding his disclaimer, has felt constrained to present some "hints and cautions on the subject, as the simplest and most correct that have occurred to him." With the most of these we entirely agree; we only wish that they had been made more copious and systematic. There is one of them, however, usually adopted, we are aware, as a sort of axiom among critics, but to which we cannot altogether subscribe; our author states it as follows: "The more difficult reading is generally preferable to the easier one." That is, we suppose, on the ground that a copyist would be more likely to remove a grammatical or exegetical difficulty by a gloss, than to introduce one. This may be true so far as *intentional* alterations are concerned; but on the other hand, we think the rule does not sufficiently provide for the liability to *accidental* errors of transcription, by which a solecism or inconsistency might very naturally occur. If this rule were to be adopted, even "generally," many palpable mistakes would be incapable of restoration to the author's true words. The rule itself, as a rule, strikes us as too paradoxical and unnatural: in particular cases it may, doubtless, hold good; but we think modern critics not unfrequently have been misled by it into readings that are repugnant to common sense.

In the second volume, the author treats of the sources of New Testament criticism, on the same plan as in the former volume he had treated those relating to the Old. It is prefaced in like manner with a brief view of the peculiarities of the diction, and a copious history of the state of the text. In the last, he shows that corruptions extensively prevailed as early as A. D. 127, when Marcion went to Rome with his edition of the New Testament books; and that various efforts were made by the early fathers, especially by Origen, for their restoration to purity. These efforts, however, not being made in concert, nor on any fixed system, availed but little for the purpose. The ancient versions of the New Testament are: (1.) The Peshito, made be-

tween the middle of the second and the middle of the fourth century; it is pure and easy in its language, and of very considerable value to the critic. (2.) The Philoxenian, or later Syriac, made in the year 508, under the direction of Mar Xenayas, Bishop of Mabug, in Syria, apparently for party purposes. It was revised in 616 by Thomas of Harclea, in Palestine. It is more literal than the Peshito, and therefore more useful to the critic, besides containing valuable various readings in the margin. (3.) A Syriac version of some of the Epistles, and the Jerusalem Syriac version of the Gospels; both of later date and less value. (4.) Various Ethiopic and Egyptian versions, of uncertain age and doubtful character. (5.) The Armenian version, made about A. D. 431. This would be of great value, did not, as the author summarily expresses it, "the suspicious circumstances it has passed through, the alterations it has undergone, and the want of ancient MSS. of its text, combine to show that it may be safely dispensed with at the present time." (6.) A Georgian version, supposed to have been made in the sixth century, but corrupt, and abandoned by critics; also two Arabic versions,—one made from the Vulgate, and therefore useless; the other not old or accurate enough to be of any value. (7.) The Gothic version, made by Ulphilas in the fourth century, a famous specimen of which is the *Codex Argenteus*, with letters painted in silver, and gilt initials. It is faithful and skilful, and but little corrupted: it is highly valuable. (8.) The Itala, and Jerome's improvement, called the Vulgate, have been noticed previously; the New Testament of the latter was published A. D. 384; it is best preserved in the *Codex Amiatinus*. The author thus sums up the uses of versions: "It is high time that the number of versions applied to the textual criticism of the New Testament should be reduced. . . . There are several which have encumbered, not promoted, the science. . . . Subtracting these, there remain the Syriac, Latin, Egyptian, Ethiopic, and Gothic."

The chief means of emending the text of the New Testament consists of the ancient manuscripts extant in various libraries and private collections, in different countries. They are most conveniently divided into two classes: the *uncial*, thought to be the oldest, written in capitals, and usually designated by letters, A, B, C, &c.; and the *cursive*, in small letters, designated by numerals, 1, 2, 3, &c. The theory of *recensions*, or distinct types of MSS., resulting from systematic editions at different times, as proposed by Semler, and extensively applied by Griesbach, has now been shown to be groundless. Manuscripts do indeed admit of a sort of general classification, according to their more characteristic readings or place

of origin; but this appears to have been the result of accident rather than design, and the families run into each other too much to warrant any dependence upon this distinction. The author devotes two chapters to the enumeration and description of the most important MSS. known to exist. Several of the uncials are believed to be as old as the fifth century. The following are a few of them: (A.) Codex Alexandrinus, now in the British Museum, defective in several passages, and rather carelessly written; it probably originated in Egypt about the latter part of the fifth century. (B.) Codex Vaticanus, of which there are two: one numbered 209, now in the Vatican Library, deficient in the latter books of the New Testament, (which a later hand has supplied,) carefully written, probably in Egypt, at least as early as the fifth century; the other, numbered 2,066, also in the Vatican, and apparently belonging to the eighth century. (C.) Codex Ephraemi Rescriptus—so called from having been written over with the works of Ephraem the Syrian, at a later date—now in the Royal Library at Paris; it contains fragments of the New Testament, and was apparently written in Egypt during the fifth century. (D.) Codex Bezae, at Cambridge, containing the Gospels and Acts, assigned to Egypt and the sixth century. (D, also.) Codex Cearomontanus, at Paris, containing the Pauline Epistles, and probably belonging to Egypt and the sixth century. The other uncial codices are similarly fragmentary, and belong in general to the eighth and ninth centuries,—one or two portions perhaps are as early as the seventh, and a few as late as the eleventh century. The cursive MSS. are quite numerous, but of later date. The various readings that have been collected out of all the MSS. amount to nearly half a million; but in almost all cases they do not perceptibly affect the meaning or construction: in no instance do they combine to add or remove a single fact or doctrine. The great mass of them contain only orthographical or grammatical peculiarities. Still they are sufficient to prove the absence of collusion among the copyists; and they furnish incontrovertible evidence of the integrity of the New Testament records. This is their great value; and to determine this, and at the same time to settle the true text, is an object well worthy the immense research requisite.

Besides MSS., we have a great number of quotations from the New Testament, in the writings of the early Christian fathers, which all go to evince the true reading in their times, and afford assistance in cases of uncertainty. We have also the force of internal evidence, and the opportunity for critical conjecture; both which should be used with extreme caution and a well-informed judgment in emending the text.

Before proceeding to discuss the critical editions of the New Testament, a few words are proper as to the history of the present *received text*. The first printed edition of the Greek Testament was that contained in the Complutensian Polyglott, completed at the expense of Cardinal Ximenes, in the year 1514, but not *published* until the Pope's sanction was obtained in 1522. The MSS. employed for this purpose, notwithstanding the boast of the editor, have been shown to be modern, and of little critical value. Meanwhile, before this edition appeared, Erasmus published at Basel, in 1516, his first Greek Testament, with a pompous title; but, as it now appears, with no greater critical basis than the Complutensian. He also published other editions, with various changes, in 1519, 1522, 1527, and 1529; but none from any older MSS. than before. The Complutensian and Erasmean texts were the basis of all subsequent editions. Robert Stevens republished sometimes one, sometimes the other, with very little improvement; other editors and publishers did the same. Between 1565 and 1598, however, Theodore Beza published four editions, based upon Stevens's, but with numerous emendations from the Clermont and Cambridge codices, (B and D,) and corrections furnished by a son of Stevens. The text of Beza is *substantially* that from which the English version was made. The printers Elzevir, of Leyden, published their first edition in 1624, closely following the text of Stevens's third edition. Their second edition, published in 1633, 12mo., is that usually known as the *received Greek text*. It was a great improvement upon their first, by being to some extent collated with Beza's; it is the best of all the Elzevir editions. Its editor is unknown. "Few modern editions, however," says Tregelles, "that profess to give the *textus receptus*, really follow throughout the Elzevir text; in places in which the latter differs from the Stephanic, they sometimes follow the latter, and sometimes they differ from both." We have ourselves often been annoyed by this inaccuracy, which the scarcity of the genuine edition of 1633 renders the more perplexing to students. The above history of the *received text*, Griesbach thus sums up in a paragraph, which we translate for the convenience of the reader: "Later editions follow the Elzevir: this was compiled from the editions of Beza and Stevens's third; Beza's was a reprint of the third edition of Stevens, with merely a few capricious changes not based on adequate authority; Stevens's third edition closely follows the fifth of Erasmus, with the exception of a few passages only in the Apocalypse, where it adopts the Complutensian; and Erasmus formed his text—as best he could—out of a very few quite late MSS., in the absence of all critical helps, beyond the interpolated Vulgate and a

few inaccurately edited works of the fathers." This judgment, which the author quotes with approbation, we think too severe; the history may be as stated, but the colour and inferences throw the received text into too unfavourable a light. It cannot be denied that in the process of its construction a considerable number of MSS. were more or less collated—some of them of great value—and a good deal of pains bestowed by several scholars in the task, especially by Beza; accordingly, criticism on the whole has since confirmed its readings in all essential points, but of course with many minute corrections. We think critical editors would still do well to treat it with some degree of deference.

The modern history of New Testament criticism may be said to begin with the publication (at Oxford) of the laborious researches of Dr. John Mill, in his *New Testament* of 1707. Before him, Bryan Walton had published a rich collection of materials in the *London Polyglott*; but Mill's was the first proper critical edition,—as such it deserves great praise, which "its painful accuracy in regard to trifles" should not be suffered to outweigh. Mill, however, did not attempt to *apply* these materials to the emendation of the text; this Bengel was the first to do, with some few additions, in his edition of 1734. Wetstein came next, with an edition in 1751–2, containing the fruits of untiring labour for thirty years. His work, although liable to much criticism, greatly advanced the department of Biblical science, and is still very valuable for philological purposes.

All preceding attempts at the revision of the Greek text, however, were thrown completely into the shade by the labours of Dr. JOHN JAMES GRIESBACH, a name that will ever stand conspicuous in the list of Biblical critics. His first edition of the *New Testament* was published at Halle, in portions, from 1774 to 1777; and contained a digest of all previous various readings, with an extensive collection of new ones, accurately noted and conveniently arranged, with a view to the restoration of the text, which was altered accordingly. Between this time and 1796, when the first volume of his second edition appeared, materials had been collected and published by Matthæi and Birch,—all which, with many new fruits of his studies meanwhile, were incorporated in this new work, on the same plan as the other. A third edition was undertaken by Schulz, containing the results of later researches, of which the first volume, consisting of the Gospels, was published in 1827; the remainder of the *New Testament* did not appear. The great merit of Griesbach lay, not so much in his amount of learned research, as in his tact and judgment in using the materials within his reach. In this respect he

has never had an equal; and it was the possession of these most essential qualities that constituted him a consummate critic. Later labourers have greatly enlarged the area of examination, and of course increased the foundation of a critical judgment; but in our opinion, no critical editor has ever shown so accurate an appreciation of the value of critical authorities, nor so great skill in applying them, as Griesbach. Nor were his researches very limited, nor his amount of authorities so meagre as to affect materially his judgment; he had all the main sources of criticism at his command, and he used with remarkable fidelity and diligence whatever had been collected from them. Especially was he free from those prejudices for a particular class of readings which has misled most critics. An example of this may be seen in his views of the *recensions*; he was so careful and judicious in the application of this system, that although the theory has been exploded, in the form in which he embraced it, yet his opinion of individual authorities is not particularly affected with the later critic; and his classification of codices is, after all, found to be too convenient to be entirely abandoned in its general features. It is because he neither leans unduly toward the uncial MSS. nor the cursive, toward the Alexandrine nor the Constantinopolitan readings, toward the harsher nor the more elegant forms, that he has won the confidence of the mass of students of criticism; and for these reasons we think no subsequent critical editor has been able to supersede him, nor even approach his high position. His opinion cast on the side of a reading continues to give it a weight which overbalances the critical dictum of more than one later editor. Yet his conclusions are not always correct; his materials were frequently defective, and his readings consequently erroneous: in such cases, he would himself have been the first to alter his opinion, as he not unfrequently did in his several editions. Occasionally, also, he appears to have argued inconclusively, and then we do not hesitate to depart from him.

The next great critical work on the New Testament was the edition of Dr. Scholz, the first volume of which appeared at Leipzig, in 1830, and the second in 1836. He made the most extensive travels in preparation for it; and it was a work of immense labour and research. Nevertheless, it disappointed the critical world, and has generally been regarded as a failure. The materials he gathered are large, fresh, and valuable—this is his great merit; but they were inaccurately noted and badly applied—these are his great faults. His design and mode of procedure were correct enough, but he lacked the judgment to carry them out satisfactorily. Hence his *text* was never extensively adopted.

In 1831 Lachmann published a small critical New Testament at Berlin; and in 1842-50 a larger one, with critical authorities added by Buttmann. Both these soon acquired extensive authority in Germany. The emendation of the text proceeds upon peculiar ground: the plan was to follow the authority of MSS. exclusively; but in doing so the editor selected only certain MSS. for his guide, deeming them the most reliable. His object therefore, as he himself admits, was not to furnish a general critical view of various readings, but to confine himself to a particular class, namely, those regarded as the best historically attested ones of the first four centuries. This plan has a certain distinctness about it which is very attractive and plausible; but it has also great defects, for which on the whole we should repudiate it. It is by no means certain that our present oldest copies contain all the oldest readings; later MSS. may have come through purer channels, and be really better authorities. Again; it unfortunately happens, that all the oldest codices extant are of the Egyptian family, and therefore afford only one class of readings. For instance we must, if we follow these, adopt the readings *λήμψεται, εἶπεν, ν* appended before a consonant, &c., which Lachmann actually does; whereas these are evidently mere peculiarities of the Alexandrine dialect, which could never have prevailed elsewhere, nor probably with the inspired writers. Moreover, Lachmann does not always adhere to his own rules; and this further betrays either their inadequacy or his.

The last critical edition that has appeared is that of Tischendorf, which has been published in several editions at Leipzig and Paris. The best is the second Leipzig edition of 1849. This edition proceeds upon the same principles essentially as Lachmann; he therefore in the main approves the same readings; but he has more strictly and faithfully applied his principles, and he has also given a more extensive view of various readings in all the critical authorities. In collecting these he has evinced great diligence and accuracy. His book is by far the most convenient critical edition that has ever appeared; it is at once cheap, portable, reliable, and sufficiently complete. The same objections, however, lie against its text as against that of Lachmann. It also betrays, if we mistake not, the influence of rationalistic prejudices, in the rash excision of such passages as John v. 4. The form of type, punctuation, and mode of abbreviating the critical authorities are peculiar. We doubt whether it will hold a permanent place as a critical manual.

On the whole, therefore, it is evident that the desideratum has not yet been obtained in New Testament criticism. The whole ground of authority has not been thoroughly explored, neither have the results

so far collected been adequately expressed nor justly applied. Another Griesbach is needed to do this. Whoever undertakes the task, must bring to it profound learning, unwearied patience, strict integrity, and large experience. Above all, he must possess a fine critical judgment; that sort of *instinct* that intuitively seizes upon the main points of evidence, and weighs them with unerring skill. No diligence nor acquirements can compensate for the want of this native tact. This is true to some extent in any study, but especially in those of an æsthetical nature; most of all is it true in Biblical criticism, in which nearly all the practical conclusions are based upon a balance of probabilities, or internal evidence. The different qualities above enumerated are thought by Dr. Davidson to be incompatible with each other, or at least hardly to be expected in a single person; but they may certainly coexist in some degree, and if the critic have only the proper acumen, he may supply the other qualities by exercise, or avail himself of them in others. That the work will be ere long performed by some one, we have every reason to believe: critics are labouring hard in various countries to bring together the materials, and they will not leave them unused. The prospectus of a new edition of the New Testament, with extensive critical apparatus, has lately been issued by Dr. S. P. Tregelles, for which he has made large preparations: that it will be a very valuable contribution we cannot doubt; but whether it will meet the want entirely, remains to be seen. The editor's competency we cannot doubt; but, from certain indications, we suspect he will incline to the plan of Lachmann and Tischendorf. Dr. Davidson thus speaks of the forthcoming work: "We look for the completion of his great undertaking with solicitude, hope, and high expectations; knowing that he unites in himself most of the qualities which will insure a critical edition worthy of comparison with any of the continental ones. We believe that his accuracy in making collations, and faithfully recording them, is superior to that evinced by any of the great editors—Mill, Wetstein, Griesbach, Lachmann, or Tischendorf." If his critical judgment and sagacity are equal, the result must be highly satisfactory to the critical public.

The two volumes now before us are calculated to give a healthful impetus to critical studies, and to furnish the student with important hints, as well as valuable information on the subject. So well-digested and full a treatise cannot elsewhere be found. We especially admire the liberal spirit and scholarly tone of the work. We are loth to say anything disparaging of a work which, on the whole, we so heartily welcome; but there are a few points on

which we must remark. In the first place, then, the *title* strikes us as rather ambitious, if not inappropriate. From the foregoing summary, the work will be seen to be rather an historical account of the sources of Biblical criticism, than "a systematic view of that science." By such a title we should have understood a more abstract presentation of the principles of criticism, and less of the outward helps and appliances to it. The work, however, may not be the less useful for this. The title may have had its reason in the author's wish to distinguish it from that of his "Lectures on Biblical Criticism," of which this is an enlargement.

But the most serious defects of the work lie in its style and manner. Dr. Davidson's habitual prolixity renders his books tedious and difficult of perusal. The topics may be appropriate, but, like the Germans, he cannot leave them without exhausting them. All that he says is good matter, and perhaps to the point, but it is too full of detail to sustain the interest of the reader. This is a fault in all the author's works that we have seen. There is sometimes as much skill in knowing what *not* to say, as in knowing *what* to say. As a result of this expansion, the author often shows a sort of indecision in his opinion, in consequence of having discussed opposite views, and pursued the conflicting arguments to such length, that both he and the reader are left in the fog as to the true merits of the case. No doubt his candour, and desire to present the subject fairly, have led him into this; but his usually good judgment does not always avail to extricate him from the labyrinth. A little positiveness is a good stiffener to the mind in passing through "doubtful disputations."

What contributes to this diffuseness is a peculiar mode of construction in the sentences. The ideas are expanded in a series of short clauses, each nearly repeating the meaning of the preceding, and broken into disconnected sentences by full stops. The whole book is thus jerked into fragments, in a way very unpleasant to the reader. We take an instance, almost at random, from vol. i, p. 374:—

"If *theological* conjecture were adopted it would soon open the door to corruption. Unscrupulous partisans would speedily introduce many changes into the Bible. They would give a bias to places, more or less marked in favour of their own creed. The number of passages supposed to need emendation would be increased. Many parts of the Bible would be suspected. The book would become an uncertain rule of faith. It would not be appealed to as a standard capable of settling all disputes in theology. Every one might then believe or disbelieve as best suited his own principles. The prejudices of party or sect would influence the treatment of the sacred records. According to the complexion of creed would be the character of the changes proposed."

Here the same idea substantially is drawn out in ten successive sentences in the space of twelve lines. The whole might have been

expressed by simply adding to the first sentence the following clause,—“for unscrupulous partisans; who would alter the Bible at pleasure according to their creed, until it would become useless as a general rule of faith.”

As a whole, the style and general literary execution of this work is inferior to that of the author's recent “Introduction to the New Testament.” Yet it is a book of so much merit, and of so great value to the Church, that minor blemishes are trifling. We join heartily in the author's prayer that the book “may help the cause of truth in the world, promote the progress of righteousness, and contribute to a better acquaintance with those divine writings which form the basis alike of social order and of personal happiness.” We are inclined to think there would be demand enough for the work in this country to justify the publication of an American edition.

ART. V.—THE ORIGIN OF EVIL AND THE FALL.

[From the German of RINCK, in *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.*]

THE difficulty of explaining the origin of evil from the pure creation, as it proceeds from the hand of God, leads to many untenable assertions. Thomas Aquinas, Beza, Leibnitz, Schleiermacher, Hegel and Rothe, by presupposing evil as fundamental, and its development as necessary, only avoid the difficult explanation of its origin, and in a greater or less degree attach blame to the Creator of the human race. It is as if an individual, to avoid deducing the finite from the infinite, should resort to the hypothesis of an eternal creation, by which the subject is rather obscured than explained.

Leibnitz assumes a metaphysical imperfection of the creation as the source of evil. According to Hegel, sin is a speculative, logical (intelligible) necessity, because without it the good could not realize itself: good had need of evil as a spur to its progressive movement. He regards sin as included in the very conception of humanity. Dr. Rothe (*Ethik*, vol. ii, p. 180) places the essence of sin not merely in self-seeking, but also and mainly in the necessity of matter. The passage through sin, in his opinion, is a metaphysical necessity. He conceives of our first parents not as mature at their creation, but destined to spiritual development; consequently their material part, in the absence of training, must gain the upper hand; and imperceptibly, and without blame, they found themselves, by their development, in sin. Hence evil lies

in the divine world-plan, not merely as something permitted,—it lies unavoidably in the creature, on account of his origin,—in the fact of *his coming into existence* in contradistinction from God: but as creature-evil has been ordained in the plan of the world, so also has its destruction, as it may come to light. Rothe (p. 204) openly declares that the “effort to separate evil from all connexion with the divine causality must ever remain an idle undertaking;” although even he himself, in a measure startled at this result, imagines himself to hold the causation of human sin entirely apart from God. He says: “The divine production of evil is at the same time its absolute destruction. Within the sphere of redemption the necessity of sinning is not entirely removed, but is conceived of as constantly vanishing.”

According to Dr. Julius Müller, (*Lehre Von der Sünde*), on the contrary, sin does not lie in the divine order of the world, but arises through man himself,—through his self-determination, and is not necessary, but evitable. Because he finds himself unable to fix in time the point at which evil begins,—unable to prove and comprehend it, he assumes a self-determination of the transcendental freedom before our individual existence,—a spiritual original evil: sin arose when the embryos of personal being yet lay, as it were, in the womb. Since no one knows anything of this original state, we may imagine many things therein, whose entrance into the sphere of reality we are not able to explain; but it is always perilous to imagine such a condition of our race merely for the purpose of solving a riddle,—especially such an ideal condition in which there must have been still less incitement to evil than in the material existence.

The Mosaic record, in its ancient simplicity, and in agreement with our knowledge of God and of ourselves, appears to explain the difficult question of the origin of evil much better than our philosophers and theosophists, with their dialectical wisdom. The question whether the Bible account of the fall should be taken literally or figuratively does not concern our argument; for should it be taken literally, there lies in the representation in the shell less than in the kernel; and this kernel is in any case a concealed meaning, which is to explain the origin of sin, and on which alone it depends.

God caused the tree of life and the tree of knowledge of good and evil to grow up in the midst of the garden, and commanded man: “Of the tree of knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat; for in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.” This tree of knowledge, as planted by God, is not yet evil, but contains in

itself the *choice between* good and evil,—the innate possibility of sinning, which possibility is bound up with the very conception of a free being, whose liberty is not the divine necessity, but lies outside of it. It is a tree of divine commands and prohibitions,—objectively conceived, the object of knowledge; or, subjectively, the possibility of transgressing the command, the object of free choice. Alongside of this stands the tree of life; and both are united to prove that the mere possibility of evil, which is involved in the creation of man, is not yet anything evil or death-bringing. Only with the realization of the possibility does opposition to the tree of life arise; *i. e.*, the true life is forfeited, and death, curse, and destruction appear in its place. The tree of life which the *living* God had planted for man, and his expressed will not to eat of the tree of knowledge, presuppose the possibility of not transgressing: because God could neither require anything impossible of man, nor involve him inextricably in the meshes of a scheme which would certainly exclude him from the tree of life. The origin of evil from absolute good must forever remain inconceivable; not so with relative good. If we hold fast to this difference, the objection of Rothe will not hold: "The religious-moral perfection of the first parents of our race would exclude all psychological possibility of the fall." But this possibility is explained by the *creation* of man, who, as it were, stands out of God; not holy and perfect like God, and yet not a mere creature like the beast: he is not under and in the law of necessity, but possesses the likeness of God and freedom. The perfection of a creature is not divine, not absolute. The want of such perfection in a creature casts no shadow upon the Creator: if it did, we should be compelled to blame him for becoming a Creator. According to the doctrines of emanation and pantheism, which mix God and the world, the fall cannot be explained; but only according to the doctrines of God and of the creation. When, then, by the creation, God set free beings out of himself, then the possible departure from God was given, and the question, —Wherefore did not God hinder the evil that he foresaw? is entirely inadmissible. God does not prevent evil, because by so doing, contrary to his own will, he would injure and destroy the province of freedom (the divine image.) Thus, our Saviour did not hinder the murderous blows of his enemies, while at the same time he did not will or excuse them. In like manner, God was Lord over the parents of our race, and over the serpent: but if he by his own will restrained his highest power, and left free play-room to free created beings, and still retains the government, he is not therefore destitute of power, but only consistent, and worthy to be adored.

Dare the creature be so bold as to ask the Creator: Wherefore hast thou placed the tree of knowledge in the midst of Paradise, by the side of the tree of life,—wherefore hast thou given me the liberty, whose abuse thou foresawest? Shall the work speak to the master, and say, why hast thou made me thus? Man should rather complain of himself, but give thanks to God that he has endowed him with such prerogatives, and glorify him with soul and body, which are God's. There was no necessity at all to sin; that complaint can only be established on the ground that, as Rothe teaches, evil *inevitably* developed itself. Besides, from the beginning of the world God had provided for the human race, whose fall he foresaw, the most perfect means of grace and gifts, in order to make that injury abundantly good, and to lead back the fallen ones to himself and his kingdom. Indeed, as all evil, so also must the sin of our first parents redound to the praise of the merciful God; because by it was conditioned the mission of the second Adam as the Redeemer of the world. Now is he that is least in the kingdom of heaven greater than the greatest born of woman: for it is not with the gift as with the sin. (Rom. v, 12–15.) Let it therefore be far from us to complain of the Creator, on account of sin which he neither caused nor consented to, and which must only contribute to the glory of his unfathomable grace.

But the *possibility* of the fall without blame to the Creator being admitted, another question arises: Through what untoward incitement did it become a *reality*? Even to this question the Scriptures give a satisfactory answer: it took place through outward prompting,—through evil spiritual influence, which was already existing in creation. Upon the basis of a created but still spiritual existence, the possibility of being moved and poisoned by an influence at enmity with God must be admitted. The inexperience of our first parents, who were not isolated in the new world, corresponded exactly with the subtlety of Satan in the form of a serpent. The kingdom of Satan, as a spiritual power, and the peccability of the first pair, whose pure self-determination was ensnared and obscured through that power, furnish a satisfactory explanation of the fall. The fall itself was certainly a free self-determination, otherwise no blame could attach to it; but not altogether so: both the decision and the guilt were shared by the devil, as the murderer from the beginning: it was a coöperation of human freedom with the temptation of the evil principle himself. The power, however, of the spiritual contact and influence is great, and far stronger than that of the sun upon the planets in the kingdom of nature. The complete expulsion of the evil principle is reserved, according to the

Scriptures, until the last stage of the perfected development of the world,—until the judgment of the world, and the restoration of all things, when even the physical world shall be rescued from the control of him who has the power of the death. Now the power is still allowed to him, and the regular course of the world and history shows us the conflicts of light and darkness.

But according to the Scripture account, the temptation of our first parents was gradual, and the motives to the fall are thus psychologically clear. First of all, the serpent raised a doubt concerning the divine prohibition, and the ruinous consequences of sin: "Yea, hath God said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden?" "Ye shall not surely die." Then he awakened pride, inducing man to overleap his appointed condition to become like God, and to use his freedom arbitrarily, and according to his own pleasure: "God doth know, that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened; and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." After this preparation came the thought that the tree was good for food, pleasant to look upon, and to be desired to make one wise. The sensual desire would now naturally start up; and the woman seduced became the seducer. The powers of the soul were corrupted before the actual sin took place: the faculty of knowledge by doubt and unbelief toward God, the faculty of desire through unbounded striving and proud excess, as the Grecian fable of Prometheus represents it; and finally the faculty of feeling, through sensual longing, which propensity the religion of the Greeks sets forth by Epimetheus and Pandora. Thus did the possibility of the fall, which rests upon the freedom of the creature, pass over into reality under evil outward influences.

The conversation between Eve and the serpent shows how accessible she was; the woman, as the weaker part, is first approached and misled, and not till then the man,—and even then only through her: as also the apostle Paul expresses it, (1 Tim. ii, 14,) the woman was first in the transgression. Dr. Rothe, indeed, (p. 221,) thinks that the assumption of a Satanical temptation does not at all help the difficulty; because that assumption always presupposes a real susceptibility of being tempted, a sinful predisposition, a minimum of sin. But the possibility of being tempted to sin is not yet sin; with Rothe that predisposition is rather something already existing. It is certainly much more worthy of God to conceive of his creatures as pure and good,—they first determining themselves to evil, and the enemy active therein. If even the Son of God could be tempted without injury to his sinlessness, much more the first Adam, whose personality and divine resemblance were specifically

lower. The three temptations penetrated the mind of Jesus from without, according to the three principal divisions of sin. (1 John ii, 16.) He appeared in the likeness of sinful flesh; but while this gave the tempter a handle, it also occasioned his overthrow.

If, in fine, we compare the Scriptural theory, thus understood, with the modern philosophical explanations of the fall, the result will be that the former will be found to contain incomparably more truth and wisdom than the latter; although Rothe (p. 221) is of the opinion that the Biblical account of the fall can no longer be maintained, and that the fall cannot be explained from the Mosaic standpoint. If we desert the oldest record of the human race—instead of making it the starting-point—the attempt to solve the question in dispute will at once be given up; and we place ourselves more or less in opposition to the idea of God, to the conceptions of man and of sin. Only the Bible (and perhaps, agreeing with it, the mythology of antiquity) tells us of a man created in the image of God, in a paradisiacal state of innocence; and, in accordance with this fact, shows how this state was interrupted and perverted into one of guilt. Dr. Julius Müller, on the contrary, although Paradise has still a place in his system, places Adam in it as already a sinner. In the same way Rothe presupposes what he ought to show, since he assumes evil as original and necessary in the development of the world. We cannot see, either according to Müller or Rothe, whence it could properly come into the natural world. Rothe, with his presupposition, is obliged to assume one of two things: either he must dualistically establish an evil principle in matter, and deny the pure creation of God, or he must ascribe the origin of sin, not to the perverted will, but to God himself: in both cases he has a Manichean life-view of sentient beings. Sin with him is not a free act of man, proceeding out of the heart and will; it springs from the overmatching power of material nature subduing his personality with inevitable necessity. (P. 226.) "The origin of evil from pure good must forever remain inconceivable," (p. 222;) thus he establishes an impure material creation. Is anything explained by this means? Whence comes, then, impurity into the material creation before all acts of the will? Is not the question more easily explained by the abuse of freedom, than by metaphysics; more easily through the devil and man, than by the act of the Creator? The fall, according to the doctrine of the Church, says Rothe, (p. 220,) was a blunder in the work of the earthly creation, as it were, at the beginning. In order to avoid this, either an evil principle must have been coöperative in the creation, or else God himself must have ruined his own work at its

commencement. Shall we call this escaping the blunder made at the beginning? Is it not rather increasing it, and carrying it over into the region of the perfect and the holy? The latter of these two opinions, strictly taken, is that of Rothe, since he assumes matter as created by God, and from matter deduces sin. But the positions: Matter was created by God, and—Matter is the opposite of God, and hence the origin of sin, (pp. 194 and 221,) contradict each other. And every appearance, every open or concealed attempt to place the original cause of sin to the account of God, the Almighty Creator, must be rejected at once. It would be much better to let the great problem, which lies outside of our experience, go unsolved, than to prejudice the doctrine of the creation and the honour of God; and thus place ourselves in contradiction with the religious consciousness of evangelical Christendom, which has laid down its just understanding of the Holy Scriptures in the nineteenth article of the Augsburg Confession: "Although Almighty God created and upholds universal nature; yet still the perverted will works sin in all the wicked and despisers of God; for the will of the devil and of all the wicked, is such, that as soon as God hath removed his hand, it hath turned itself from God to evil." But it appears to us to be an entirely inadmissible kind of inference, to make this article, which expressly excludes sin from the divine causality, signify that God ought to be blamed for taking away his hand, and to say that it expresses the inevitableness of sin.

The removal of the hand of God clearly means nothing more than that God exercises no irresistible power in the circle of human freedom and personality. Just here the erroneous conclusions have their concealed seat. Because everything depends on the will of God, even that which is opposed to his will must have been ordained by him; because nothing is impossible with God, they ascribe evil to him also, in order to have a really omnipotent God. But there exists no longer an exclusive and absolute causality of God, so soon as by the actual creation of free beings he has renounced it, and we acknowledge its existence. There is no such thing as irresistible grace, to say nothing of irresistible sin; for the will of the devil is not irresistible, but, in opposition to God, impotent.

The doctrine of the inevitableness of sin wars against holiness—the fundamental conception of the revealed God of both Testaments. As certainly as it is true, (Deut. xxxii, 4,) "The work of God is perfect—a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is he;" as certainly as we pray, "Hallowed be thy name;" so certainly must we repel every intimation that evil could proceed from God, or be ordained or willed by him. This doctrine also wars against the justice

of God; for he who punishes evil cannot produce it. Hence the principle remains firm: "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap." It (i. e., the inevitableness of sin) is not a doctrine corresponding to our religious necessities; for redemption and divine grace would be brought into doubt, if sin were regarded as a blameless and unavoidable weakness of our race.* What is necessary to human nature at one time, must for the same reason always remain so; what has once been established in the world-order cannot indeed be destroyed. Again, this doctrine would raise doubts of the validity of the work of redemption. Where there is no guilt, there is nothing to destroy,—no possibility of repentance for the errors of the past. The doctrine which places the origin of evil in the sphere of necessity, mistakes, finally, the nature of sin as a free moral act, which proceeds from the will of man, and turns his heart away from God; it misunderstands the spiritual and ethical character of sin; it assails as well man's noblest distinction—his personality—as his guilt. Neither men of God, moved by the Holy Ghost, nor those touched and tempted by Satan, are or were automata; but as spiritual essences endowed with the image of God, they coöperate with the one or the other; i. e., with God or Satan. And if they are in the first instance without merit, in the second, according to the testimony of their consciences, they are not without guilt; and even, although the activity of the will, in a state of transport or possession, may be repressed until it disappears, yet in no case is it possible to conceive of the two points, the original condition of innocence, and the fall, in a merely metaphysical way, and without ethical self-activity.

Regarded from this comprehensive point of view, the examination of this question has an important place in dogmatics, and furnishes one among many proofs that the doctrine of the Holy Scriptures is that of the Confession of the evangelical Church, and contains the only true theology and philosophy of divine things; and that every departure from it ends in irreconcilable contradiction.

* Thus the Hermes of Plato, which was found at Tivoli in 1846, had the inscription: "Guilt the result of our own election; God without guilt; every soul immortal: *αἰτία ἐλογέναι θεὸς ἀναίτιος ψυχὴ δὲ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος.*" Comp. Plat. de Republ. x, p. 617, C.; Phædr. p. 245, C. Comp. James i, 13: "Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man."

ART. VI.—ANSELM, OF CANTERBURY.

Saint Anselme de Cantorbéry. Tableau de la Vie Monastique, et de la lutte du Pouvoir Spirituel avec le Pouvoir Temporel au Onzième Siècle. Par M. CHARLES DE REMUSAT, de l'Académie Française. 8vo. Paris, Didier; New-York, Bos-sange.

THIS is a work of a description coming recently much into vogue, if we may judge of the demand from the supply. The idea of the class is, that the leading minds of the several epochs of human history epitomize, in their biographies, the special features of the times. The principle is sound, undoubtedly, as well as modern in its conception; but the *purpose* to which these writers for the most part as yet apply it, is, although interesting, scarcely worthy of its scientific import. The object of the present author, one of the ablest of the number—the learned son of the illustrious Remusat—is given as follows in the second chapter:—

“It will not perhaps be without attraction to represent to ourselves an image of the age of feudal society in which St. Anselm lived; and to penetrate those gloomy monasteries, into which for several centuries fled for refuge the rarest intellects and purest characters of the times. The recital of an ancient past, when it does not sink into an arid chronicle, possesses an interest independent of the importance of the facts retraced. As the smallest vase, as the humblest utensil, when covered over with the rust of time, becomes an object of curiosity in our museums, so do events, however simple, when turned up at the distance of ages, in all their real and naïve character, acquire a singular accession of value, and even a certain charm for those who study history with some imagination, and who practise in its perusal the moral maxim of the ancient writer,—‘not to feel indifferent toward any object which has regard to our common humanity.’”—Pp. 17, 18.

So we see that the author's purpose is merely moral and sentimental. In the reproduction of the past, he designs to gratify the curiosity, or at best to moralize the sentiments of the present: he does not think of *explaining* either, still less of indicating the future. He would, in short, have history, he says, perused with some “imagination.” This word discloses the precise condition of his conception of the sphere of history. With M. de Remusat and his fellow-writers of this monographic class, the highest of sciences lingers still in what we may designate the *belles-lettres* stage; it is regarded as a theme of art, but scarce susceptible of science or system.

No doubt the former of these stages (that of art) must precede, and prepare the way for the stage of science in all things. In the case before us, it is to be noted that the art has reached

that confine at which the purpose passes from amusement or edification into explanation. The chronicle is culled at first for the personal characters alone, and the lawless fancy of the childish ages supplies the rest: the result is the *romance* proper, with its giants, dragons, and magicians. Afterward, the main events as well as characters are reproduced, but in colours less exaggerated, and with fewer arbitrary combinations, and fictitious details, deemed then less interesting than the real: this is the "historical novel," of which Scott is the British type. Last of these historian *artists* come the writers of the class in question, who are content to represent the facts in their full fidelity and particularity; and this, no doubt, because the public mind is now mature enough to find them interesting,—to study them (as M. de Remusat desires) with some "imagination," or, in philosophic language, with a *presentiment of theory*.

Books of this class are therefore evidently on the threshold of the science of history, and are supplying in fact the basis for its full establishment or illustration. It is not therefore of their confinement to this useful province that we complain, but of the strange unconsciousness of most of these writers as to the region which lies beyond them, or, at all events, their strict omission to suggest this outlet from the old routine. Having thus supplied it, for both the purposes of general indication and the occasional criticism of the book before us, as we proceed, our running analysis will now be confined to the author's platform, or point of view. And here our notice must be contracted to the leading personage of the narrative, to the character, career, and writings of Anselm. We must refer to the book itself for the countless episodes of feudal life and monastic manners which make the garniture, the filling-up of the social picture, and on which the intellect—a little languid—of the author loves to dwell with a reactionary affectation of liberality.

ANSELM was born on the Swiss confines of Lombardy, in the year 1033 or 1034. His parents were rich and noble, like those of his episcopal predecessor, Lanfranc, who was also a fellow-countryman of his, having been born at Pavia. Both the nativity and the condition of these two personages are entirely consonant with the distinction which they attained in that rude age and in a foreign country. At that time, Italy was the most forward of European nations in civilization; or, to speak more strictly, was the land where the sacred fire of ancient learning and cultivation—in cooling inward toward the focus—had decayed the least in either brain or blood; and noble blood, at least in ages when nobles only were closely educated, would be also the most retentive of this hereditary capability. This remark may ex-

plain the contrast between the high philosophy of Anselm and the English barbarism of the epoch, which British writers would fain dissemble, by classing habitually in their national literature this earliest oracle of rational religion in the middle ages. As soon could England have then or now produced a centaur or a hippogriff. It was only through her conqueror that she received and rewarded the two Italian scholars, and that, too, when their years were advanced and their reputation established.

Is it not also characteristic, that while Italy supplied the birth, and England the dignities, of both adventurers, their intermediate education should be sought successively in Normandy? Normandy in fact, in those days, was the seat or cynosure of learning. For some hundred and fifty years before—since the conquest under Rollo—those dashing barbarians had bribed the clergy to consolidate their plunder, by the frequent establishment and large endowment of monasteries. But monasteries were the philosophic seminaries of those simple ages,—the aspiration as well as asylum of all who felt a *mental* mission. It was under this high impulse that Lanfranc—at first a lawyer—came, at the age of thirty-seven, to the famous schools of Normandy, and founded some twelve years later a monastery of his own. It was this also that inspired the gentle and still greater Anselm, at an age much greener, to quit his home on the like adventures, and reach the convent of his countryman—a convent of which he soon was to succeed him in the abbacy, as he again did, in later life, in the primacy of Canterbury.

Passing over his monastic sojourn at the Convent of Bec, in Normandy—where he was three years simple monk, fifteen years prior, and fifteen also abbot of the institution—we come at once to his passage to England, and his promotion to the See of Canterbury.

These two events, though not remote in time, were unconnected, it seems, in purpose. It was one of the Norman barons who persuaded Anselm to come over, for the purpose of supervising the foundation of a monastery. But at this juncture the See of Canterbury had been vacant some four years; and the Abbot of Bec, on his arrival, found the public mind disposed, through the preparation of his brother monks, perhaps, to name him successor to Lanfranc. This in our day looks undoubtedly like a contrivance of politicians; yet the supposition would give too much credit for combination to those simple ages, when men were actuated for the most part by present impulses and interests. In fact, the interests had been in this case of a sufficiently common urgency to give the concert the prompt alacrity of spontaneity. The barons wished a

check upon the frantic passions of the king, (the second William, surnamed Rufus,) and they felt it could be found only in his religion, or superstition, and by confronting his despotism with the spiritual terrors of the Church. The Churchmen, as well the regular as secular, wished an archbishop—the one to dignify their order, the other to multiply their benefices; and for the people, the conquered Saxons, it little mattered what they might wish: and besides, in those days their wishes were all in common with those of their spiritual and temporal guides. Moreover, a character such as Anselm's for gentleness and learning was then, as it is at all times, a commendation to the oppressed. Nor are these traits at all unacceptable, on the other hand, to the oppressors, who consider gentleness allied to weakness, and thus no obstacle to their iniquities; while, on the contrary, obsequious talent may supply an instrument for improved modes of plunder. This we think an explanation of the strange reception afforded to Anselm, which M. de Remusat has left his readers to interpret according to fancy.

However, it seems that all parties were for transporting the foreign monk, without delay, into the British primacy—all, at least, except the king; and this exception had, like the opposite dispositions, its sufficient reason. During the vacancy the king had pocketed the immense revenues of the archbishopric, and he much preferred to let things go on as they were. With a shrewdness inspired by avarice or incredulity, he therefore doubted the full sincerity of Anselm's protestations against such honours. When one of his courtiers, perhaps to sound him, remarked one day in conversation: "I know no man of equal holiness to that Abbot of Bec; he loves only God, and desires none of the goods of this world." "No," said the king, smiling, "not even the Archbishopric of Canterbury." "This the least of all," replied the other, "as is well known." "By the holy face of Lucca!" (the habitual oath of William,) "neither he nor any other shall be archbishop, except me."

This resolution was overcome, however, by a method worthy of the times. On occasion of one of the national councils (the prototype of the House of Lords) which were held at Christmas, Easter, and Pentecost, the "lords spiritual and temporal," then the bishops and the barons, in bemoaning the continued widowhood imposed upon their Metropolitan Cathedral, agreed to go forthwith in a body to the king, and ask his leave to offer prayers for an alteration of his resolution! "Pray as much as you like," said he, "but I will do what I please." The suppliants, nothing daunted, proceeded next to Anselm, and implored him to prescribe the proper prayers. With this he complied, after much reluctance, on account of his interest

in the issue. It was presently after these things were gone through, that the conversation above recited between the courtier and the monarch had taken place. No sooner had the latter made the impious answer which closed the dialogue, than he fell into a desperate fit of sickness. During this, which lasted some weeks, dukes, bishops, abbots, and monks, crowded daily to exhort his majesty to save his soul; and, as the means, to pay his debts, to refund the treasures which he had forced from the Churches, and, above all, to restore her liberty and her official to the Church of Canterbury. The dying reprobate refused nothing; he promised all they asked him, and had proxies sent to swear it upon the altars; he gave the bishops the full disposal of both his temporal and spiritual interests, and finally named Anselm Archbishop of Canterbury.

Anselm, who was then in the country, was called immediately before the king: and here the scene must be related, with some slight abridgment, in our author's words. The Archbishop elect refused the honour, whereon the monarch became alarmed at the thought of dying in the possession of a domain of the Church. The courtly bystanders assailed the recusant, by turns, with prayers and with reproaches. Did he want to ruin all things, the king and the kingdom? Was he then insane? Anselm could only turn to a brace of his fellow-monks, and exclaim: "Ah! brothers, why do you not sustain me?" "If it be the will of God," replied one of these, "what can we do to hinder it?" "The king then bade them all to implore him on their knees; but Anselm knelt also, and persisted in his refusal. In fine, the attendants, losing patience, exclaimed, A cross! a cross! Some took him by the hand, others shoved him along; and he was trailed to the bed of the king, who handed him the crosier. But he refused to seize it; and kept his right hand in his bosom, and firmly clenched besides. The bishops, pulling it out by force, and holding the left hand still, essayed to open the fingers with a pressure that made him groan. One of the fingers was at last lifted for a moment, and between it and the thumb was inserted the episcopal cross, while holding one against the other by main force. At sight of this the whole company raised the shout of *Vive l'évêque*, and the clergy intoned aloud the *Te Deum*. Then he was rather carried than conducted into a church, while, pale and trembling, he still endeavoured vainly to resist, and repeated ceaselessly: "What you do is null! what you do is null!" So the "*nolo episcopari*" for once at least was no farce!

Something more than personal modesty or ecclesiastical humility appears, however, to have dictated this pertinacity of abnegation. It is probable that Anselm knew his own character, as well as that of

William Rufus—the former as unfit for action, as averse to strife and brute contention, as it was adapted to meditation and abstract reasoning, and thus inflexible, like all such minds, upon the subject of its principles; the other blunt and brutal, with barbarous passions for its only principles, and powers unlimited save by the precepts of his predecessor. A collision between two such contraries, in any circumstances, must be obvious—since it seems Anselm reckoned nothing on a fatal issue to the king's illness, which he possibly knew to have been produced by the subornation of his cook or physician. But the encounter he must have seen to be inevitable at that juncture, when the pretensions of the Church of Rome to despotise the States of Europe had just concentrated upon the issue of the famous question of Investitures.

The king accordingly, upon recovery, resumed his position upon this subject, and repelled the notion that a foreign power should have directly, or even by deputy, the royal prerogative of giving bishops to *his* dominions. In this he was besides supported by the dying testament of his great father: for great undoubtedly the "Conqueror" of Britain might be styled, at least according to those rude times, and the common usage of the term. The anti-Romish policy, bequeathed by the prudent Normans, has been preserved to us substantially in three fundamental maxims. It may be useful to recall their spirit at a moment when the Protestant world is again invaded by the same usurper, and in a form not really different: "1. No one within the kingdom can, without the order of the king, recognise a Roman pontiff as Apostolic Pope, visit him without the royal authorization, nor receive letters from him without exhibiting them to the king beforehand. 2. A national council convened by the Primate can establish or prohibit nothing, but in conformity with the royal will. 3. No archbishop can, without the same authority—against any of the officers or the barons of the king, who should be charged with a capital crime—pronounce sentence of excommunication, or institute an action, or impose any canonical penalty whatever." Such were the cautious principles implanted by its founder to fence securely the independence of the infant monarchy—principles, moreover, which the wayward character of William Rufus was likely even to exaggerate.

The first, in fact, includes the cardinal question of Investiture. The *form* of expression bears a reference to the great schism throughout Germany and Italy, between the Empire and the Papacy, and which bred at that time a plurality of simultaneous Popes. But in forbidding to his clergy the recognition, without his order, of any Pope as "apostolic," that is, legitimate, the English monarch

of course prohibited, *a multo fortiori*, the valid reception of substantial places, at his own expense, from such unsanctioned sources. And if, besides, he did not make the prohibition in express terms, it was simply because the usurpation had not been pressed within his reign. The ripening sore came to a rupture, but in the hands of his violent successor; and Anselm was the passive instrument of the crisis.

We shall not dwell upon this long contention between the prelate and the monarch; the details may be seen in the English histories of the epoch. It will be pertinent to note, however, that, in consonance with the preceding, the first occasion of declared hostilities was provoked on the part of Anselm. On the return of William Rufus from an expedition against his brother in Normandy, he was informed by his Primate of Canterbury of a purpose of going to Rome to receive the *pallium* from the holy hands of the Pope. Which Pope? asked the king—for there were then two successors immediately to Hildebrand, and apostolically to St. Peter, namely, Clement III. and Urban II. Anselm named the latter; but the king exclaimed with irritation that he had not himself as yet recognised him, and that it was no more his custom than it had been that of his father to allow his bishops to intermeddle in such matters. "As well might you think," he added, "of depriving me of my crown." Anselm remonstrated. "No, no," he rejoined, "fidelity to me is incompatible with obedience to Rome." The prelate then requested that a national council might be called; and if it should decide against him, he would rather wait outside the kingdom until the royal recognition of the real Pope. The king consented, but with the hope of getting rid of this troublesome customer, through the complacency of his lords spiritual and temporal.

The barons, however, hesitated, on the pretext that it was not *their* affair, but in reality because they wished, as above suggested, to have the king restrained.* The bishops for the most part† were, on the contrary, found ready for the sacrifice of a brother dignitary in disgrace; but more especially in case of one whose renown for learning had given them umbrage, and the reversion of whose high position, with its vast possessions, might be hoped by each. Not, however, that these selfish motives do not often yield to the *esprit de corps*, in the peculiar organization of the Romish system. But the spirit of this system, in its full expansion at the time in Italy, had not as yet inspired the British clergy, either Norman or native. The latter were in those days—as well

* Hence the pretext and the purpose of the great rebellion against William.

† Out of twenty, only two adhered to Anselm.

in theology as in geography—the *penitus toto divisos orbe Britannos*. Between them and the cause of Anselm—which was the comprehensive claim of Hildebrand—there could therefore have been no sufficient sympathy, or “solidarity.” And we may add that this double circumstance of deep disparity with those he lived among, and high conformity with the Italians in his theological maturity, affords a compound confirmation of the natal influence above attributed to the social condition of the nation upon the mental calibre of the individual.

The king, unwilling with the division in his council to proceed to extremities, bethought him of another method of bringing Anselm to submission. In the midst of the prolonged session, he sent messengers to Rome and bribed the Pope—the very Urban for whom Anselm had been suffering—with the price of a sum of money, and his recognition as the Vicar of Christ, to have the pallium transmitted to the king himself. Bestowed on Anselm by the royal hands, it would fasten fealty on the restiff prelate; just as Louis Napoleon, the other day, took care to do by some new archbishops, in conformity with the Concordat of his great uncle. The pallium was brought to William, but Anselm would not take it unless deposited upon the altar of the cathedral; just as the first Napoleon would not have his crown from the Papal hands, but had it placed upon the altar of Notre Dame; and as will be, too, we dare predict, the cautious course of his present successor. To this transaction the king assented, no doubt in part from utter weariness, but also because other projects were then engaging his attention, and to which Anselm might be serviceable, as well personally as officially.

In fact, the Pope—the aforesaid Urban—no doubt to show how well his zeal deserved the preference above his rival, which was just declared by the Western powers, had come to France, his native country, to preach in person a new Crusade. The feudal princes, no less barbarous than the selfish herds they swayed, were fired to rivalry in selling their property and shouldering the cross—not to follow Christ in the ways of peace, according to the meaning of his prescription, but to rush into the contrary course of slaughtering their fellow-men. On this occasion the hair-brained Robert passed the revenues of Normandy, during a term of three years, to his brother William for a sum of money. This amount had to be realized, as the secret purpose of the English monarch was to get a foothold in the coveted territory, which he meant to keep in any event; and as it was probable that the treasures of the Churches would be largely drawn upon, it was necessary to enlist the primate's co-

operation, or at least connivance. Anselm gave both, in fact; and how indeed could he well refuse, when the assigned object of the contribution was the prosecution of the cause of Christ?

His complacency in a subsequent case is by no means equally excusable, although no less characteristic of the Christianity of the times. When Henry Beauclerk, the third son of the Conqueror, succeeded William, in the first place by usurping the previous title of his brother Robert, and then by purchasing the resignation of the latter for an annual stipend, that arch intriguer began forthwith to evade the payment of the money stipulated, and made the natural remonstrances provoked by his defalcation the pretext of plundering his simple creditor, moreover, of his principality. This, it is known, he finally accomplished; and, after robbing his own brother as well of Normandy as of England, incarcerating him for life, and *tearing out his eyes*, also manacled and mutilating other nobles—some his near kinsmen, and massacring several thousands of the Norman people—when Henry returned to England, both himself and *such* achievements received the blessings and congratulation of the saintly Anselm. To allow his king to lay a piece of cloth upon his shoulders would have been a sacrilege; to give the sanction of the Church and Heaven to these savage butcheries was a duty! M. de Remusat's solution of this monstrosity is not very profound: "The human mind had not then the assurance of undertaking to judge of all things; and state-reasons have but recently come to be looked upon as not imperative." The sneer is at once shallow and preposterous; for the pretension of the Church, and of Anselm as its organ, was preëminently at that moment "to judge of all things," and especially of state-reasons. But the *principles* on which they judged were the true occasion of the contrast noted. The first of these was, that the sole legitimate criterion of human conduct was its conduciveness, or otherwise, to the revealed ends of the future world; the second, that the propagation and the predominance of the Romish Church, as the only means to these exclusive ends, were of course of similar obligation; and the third, that all wrongful sufferings endured by men on earth—whether directly in the Church's cause, or indirectly through her connivance, and because it might be inconvenient not to lend her sanction or her silence—will be, in consequence, rewarded with ample interest in heaven; and are objects, therefore, *not of pity, nor of resentment, but of rejoicing*. We do not say, however, that these propositions, which explain consistently the conduct of Anselm, were distinctly before the intellect of either the prelate or his Church. When history is written competently, it will cease to seek its motives in the analysis of individ-

uals, instead of *epochs*. The motives, the morality, the Christianity of the eleventh century, then, were technical, theological, and conventional; they were not social, they were not rational, they were not real.

But to return for a moment to the strife of Anselm with William Rufus. The latter, on obtaining the contribution, left for Normandy. The primate, in his absence, and partly instigated by the papal legate, who loitered behind after bringing the pallium, began to meddle with some fresh investitures. The quarrel was of course renewed on the return of the king; and the ultimate result was that Anselm left the kingdom on a visit to Rome. No sooner was he gone than the monarch revoked all his past concessions, resumed himself the primacy and the possessions of the See of Canterbury, and retained them for some years after, till his violent death. His successor thereupon invited Anselm to return, as he, too, wished the consecration of the clergy for his usurpation: but he also wished the prelate to be reinvested by his own hands. Anselm declined, and the old quarrel was on foot again. This time it was more tedious and tergiversative, if possible; for Henry possessed a good deal of the tricky temper of the Church. The battle now went on in large part by texts from Scripture; and the opposite parties remained intrenched in these two antagonistic positions: "Give unto Cæsar," cried the one, "the things that are of Cæsar, but give unto God the things that are God's." "No one can obey two masters," was the equally evangelical, although apparently quite contradictory rejoinder. In fine, however, Anselm left for Rome a second time, and revisited his See of Canterbury some years after, but soon to die.

It is the nature of a war of words that both the combatants should claim the victory. Accordingly the Churchmen pretended then (and do so still) that the question of Investitures triumphed in the hands of Anselm; while it is certain that in practice (however it may be in principle) the privilege continued regularly in the hands of the English monarchs. Not the decision of the point, however, but its import, is our concern.

M. de Remusat is very right in representing this dispute as a contention for supremacy between the spiritual and temporal powers. Each would arrogate exclusively the arbitration of the same subject, the same aggregate of human actions, both political and individual; and a collision between the contrary jurisdictions was therefore inevitable. But the author is much mistaken in thinking that the conflict must be perpetual, and that the present separation of Church and State in certain countries—as, for example, in America and France

—is but a temporary compromise, a state of truce, that will be sure to cease when the Church is able to assert her principle. Ay, no doubt, *in that event*; but to think it normal is the author's error. It marks his notion, as before observed, of the philosophy of history, as still in the oscillatory or the chaotic condition. With the slightest knowledge of a law of progression he could not fail to have concluded otherwise, from even the statements which he makes himself upon the subject. Take for instance the following results of fact, remembering that by "the Church" is meant the Roman Church:—

"The policy of the Church (her predominance) has not succeeded; her power has gone on lessening in all the leading countries, and the progress of the ideas of government, of order, and of legality—the progress of civilization—has been marked by her reverses. The more political governments have passed for being advanced, the more are they emancipated from the spiritual. In proportion as the royal authority, the distribution of equal justice, the regulation of civil life, the direction of education, have been withdrawn from the domination of the clergy, it has been deemed that all these things were on the passage to improvement, and society seemed to show an upward tendency. All this is believed still, in spite of certain ingenious writers, and in spite of some reactions merely transient. Is it that the common instinct of the communities of entire Europe would then have been mistaken for the past four hundred years?"—Pp. 428, 429.

But might not these things, we would ask, in turn, have suggested to the author that the tendency he thus relates involves a necessary destination, which forbids relapsing into constant compromise or even collision with the Church? Yet he also goes still further without perceiving this clew of principle. By vast historical erudition he is led to sketch upon a much larger scale the very *modus operandi* of the progression. Having before noted that in primitive ages the clerical power embraced the State, he proceeds to say of modern times that, on the contrary, the "body politic comprises actually the Church within its bosom; and the temporal power, in its divers forms, is become the instituter and protector of all the guarantees of society." How this has come to pass he goes on to explain:—

"The progress of material labour, the developments of industry and commerce, have not come to us from the spiritual principle; and yet, while bettering men's conditions, they have softened and disciplined morals, and served, moreover, indirectly, to the advancement of the human intellect. The discovery, or rather the propagation of the Roman law, has introduced and accredited in modern societies the maxims and the sentiments of civil order. Hence, for a first effect, the entire destruction or the restriction of the various ecclesiastical jurisdictions. Justice was now inaugurated under its proper name, and apart from the theological tribunals of the clergy; and it is thenceforth that it has seemed to become justice in reality. Also ancient letters—better known and better cultivated—have incited those successive revivals which have marked the progress of intelligence, and prepared the emancipation of the human mind. In this way, by little and little, arose, in presence

of the Church, a political world wherein moral doctrines had come to hold an important place, and where were elevated gradually the mental interests of humanity. The Church continued to call herself the spiritual power, whereas she was no longer such alone, or at least no longer represented more than one idea of the human mind, not the mind in its totality. Thenceforth the only liberty which she defended was her own: she fell into distrust of every other social liberty. She recognised but with regret, she comprehended but imperfectly, the social duties which sprung around her for the first time. With eyes fixed upon the city of God, she disowned the city that arose on earth, and her ancient universality escaped her hands. All things expanded rapidly except her, and she remained unconscious of advancement. She thus unconsciously allowed to grow, outside of her precincts and at her expense, a novel power called the opinion of the world."—Pp. 424, 425.

It would not be possible, perhaps, to trace a closer picture of the truth, in utter ignorance of the philosophy of history. As a bare analysis of evident facts, the passage just quoted therefore yields a confutation of the author's own opinion on the confused provinces of Church and State, and at the same time a confirmation of the suggestions above adventured upon the mediæval notion of theology. As transmitted through Augustine, this was a pure theocracy; not a theocracy like that of the Jews, which was material, or based on the earth, but a moral theocracy—the *moral* phase of the same theocracy—with its pole in the future. Upon the world of the future was therefore founded its moral system. But as society and humanity proceeded in their developments, another system of moral ends began to undermine the former; and has succeeded, in much the manner above exemplified by M. de Remusat, in shoving finally its paralytic predecessor from off the track. The passage of the Christian mind from this mediæval and Romish theory—which placed the interests of heaven in antagonism with those of society—is marked progressively by all those sects denounced as "heretics" and "infidels," until the tendency attained maturity in the great Lutheran Reformation. The meaning of this vast event, then, was the recognition of a new basis for the theology, and of course morality, of the Christian system—a basis of conciliation (in place of the old repugnance) between our happiness and duties here and our spiritual destinies hereafter. And, accordingly, to vindicate this fundamental *change of views*, arose the equally opposite method of interpretation—"private judgment." It is only then the Christianity of Protestantism that has in future to come into collision with the State. But this it cannot do, for the reason just explained, that both the systems are brought to move in either the same or parallel planes. By this, of course, is meant no more than that the Protestants enjoy the glory of having moralized and civilized the old theology: we might also say philosophized it, if the expression was not deemed

equivocal. As to "*the Church*," it is henceforth destitute of any influence upon society, though it may clog the way (to resume our metaphor) among the baggage-lumber of humanity.

Now as Anselm was the organ of this theology, by his office, and by the eminent expression of its projects in his public life, so do we find no less distinctively its impress upon his *writings*,—in the bent of doctrines, the choice of subjects, and even in the order of chronology.

The theory being at that time, we have seen, an absolute theocracy, the *system* of Christianity was a deduction—a synthesis. To deduce all things from the single principle of the Godhead, or his revealed will, and then to harmonize the results in their practical application, there was also need of logic, or dialectics. Dialectics, the Holy Scriptures, and at last the divine attributes, should therefore form the successive subjects of the compositions of our saint-philosopher. Quite accordingly, one of the earliest of his treatises is entitled *De Grammatico*, and makes a strict and even technical application of the rules of logic. That its character is dialectical will be evinced by the mere thesis, which also gave the essay its unconsciously descriptive name: for the question is, Whether a grammarian be a *substance* or a *quality*? Here, in fact, we recognise the "asses' bridge" of the scholastic system, and the probable reason why it is that Anselm has been deemed the founder of the school. And the founder he might be called, but in the sense above explained, of applying logic to the *orthodox* doctrines of theology. Scotus Erigena and others had employed the art already; but it was to sap rather than support the established dogmas of the Church. With Anselm dialectics was the "*servant* of theology."

Accompanying the publication of this logical essay, and, like it, in dialogue, there were three others "*On the Scriptures*." The special topics are characteristic. They are: 1. *On Free-will*; 2. *The Devil's Fall*; 3. *On Truth*. Free-will was the antagonist principle to the omnipotence of the Divine will; the latter being the orthodox doctrine of Anselm. He would therefore encounter early the contradiction of this subtle adversary, which from Scotus to Roscellinus—his own contemporary and his combatant—had grown quite menacing in the disguise of Nominalism. What were Anselm's opinions on the subject of free-will, M. de Remusat—not seeing its import—does not give us the analysis of; but they were as adverse to it, at least, as those of Augustine.

The doctrine taught in the dialogue "*De Casu Diaboli*" is in close connexion, and, in fact, a consequence. He fell, as did Adam

after, through the *freedom* of the will. From this alone we must infer the doctrine to have been reprobated by St. Anselm, among the most rational—meaning rigorously logical—of theologians. The tract “On Truth” is judged to have been written at a later period; and is, at all events, a natural passage from the will of God, as revealed in the Scriptures, to his abstract nature and various attributes,—which are, moreover, according to Anselm, the sum and substance of all truth. Now these are just the subjects (in still strict consonance with our deduction) of the two other principal writings of Anselm, namely, the *Monologium de divinitatis essentia*, and the *Proslogium de Dei existentia*.

In like conformity with this progression the author's method, too, advances from mere technical dialectics to metaphysics. The *Monologium* is a species of ontological induction of the one from the many, and the permanent from the variable, the essential from the accidental, in the manner of the Platonists. Not however, of course, that Anselm could have known the works of Plato; nor was he, it is thought, even acquainted with the Greek language. Some of the doctrines he may have gathered indeed from Jerome, or from Augustine. But M. de Remusat calls in Dionysius the Areopagite—whose mystic writings, full of Platonism, had been long translated by the learned Erigena—to the end of accounting for the strange concurrence between the heathen and the Christian thinker. How utterly unphilosophical, and, so to say, one-sided is this! For unless Plato's system was an *accident*, there is the same amount of reason for insisting that he must have borrowed it himself; and so in turn with his original, and *his* again *ad infinitum*, as for supposing, without other evidence than the mere circumstance of a coincidence, that later writers may not think the same things independently. Had not Anselm a similar intellect and the same universe as Plato? and, we would add, a corresponding epoch of speculation? For the task of Plato was to synthetize unto a supreme term of generality the analytic anarchy of heathenism; and that of Anselm was precisely to do the same for Christianity. It was consequently even *necessary* that the *methods* should have coincided; although the results would of course differ, like the principles.

The difference of results is accordingly characteristic. Take for instance the cardinal question of the origin of evil. While Plato was enabled, by a second coëternal principle, to saddle matter with the blame of suffering and sin, Anselm was led implicitly to hold the Deity—who has made all things out of nothing—of course the author of evil, too, among the rest. He was forced, in con-

sequence, to such conclusions as the following: "That God is a sublime and universal *negation*. That as all being proceeds from Divine Goodness, it follows that evil is *not* a being, and has no real existence in creation; that it is merely a negation, or the absence of good."—P. 484. But to this metaphysical quibble it was of course easy to reply, that the good principle was still *responsible*, in having tolerated the defect, or was *imperfect*, if unable to prevent it,—a dilemma of which either horn ruined alike the author's system. Then, again, it might be asked, What becomes of the "devil and all his angels," if we concede the nonentity of evil? What a comment this upon the logical coherence of the public reason in those ages which deemed Anselm an oracle of orthodoxy!

Not only this, but (with a little unconsciousness, of course) the saint does something worse than proscribing the evil principle, in anticipation of the Universalists. If we mistake not, the following passage involves the rankest pantheism,—that amalgamation of the good principle with entire nature, including evil. Speaking of the Divine nature, "It is," he says, "the essence of the being, the principle of the existence of all things. . . . Without parts, without differences, without accidents, without changes; it might be said in a certain sense to alone exist, for in respect to it the other things which appear to be, have no existence. The unchangeable Spirit is all that is, and it is this without limit, *simpliciter*, *interminabiliter*. It is the perfect and absolute existence. The rest is come from nonentity, and thither returns, if not supported by God: it does not exist by itself. In this sense the Creator alone exists; the things created do not."—Pp. 473, 474. It is plain that these dependent and merely relative existences must be conceived as an emanation from the supreme and substantial essence—must, like the *qualities* of bodies, be in fact identical with the supposed substrata. In short, it is Anselm's "realism," carried also into theology; and theological realism is pantheism. M. de Remusat, with whose opinions we have not often, in the foregoing survey, had the good fortune fully to concur, ascribes in this point the same tendency to the theology of Anselm. He even goes on to trace the progress of the tendency to our own times, according to his notion of the merely personal transmission of ideas. Thus Descartes's famous demonstration of the being and attributes of God is, we are told, but a revival of the argument of Anselm. And then Spinoza, it is very certain, did no more than follow faithfully, into their ultimate conclusions, the Cartesian principles. The successive views of Leibnitz, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, &c., are also next examined upon the subject. And to all who like fine criticism—intelligent, impartial, eru-

dite, and wanting nothing but a better philosophy—the closing chapter will yield a treat.

The foregoing question was treated chiefly by St. Anselm in the *Proslogium*, which is the latest, as it is the maturest, of his works. The special topics of the *Monologium* were the Trinity, the Incarnation, Free-will, Original Sin, and the theory of Grace and Predestination. These questions lie all, we say, at the foundation of the revealed system of Christianity, and stood accordingly in Anselm's way, so to speak, in his progression to the Supreme Unity, which was the vision of his great intellect, because the yearning of his age. Anselm's career, then, in his life of *speculation*, was an exact counterpart, at least in object, to his life of *action*, or of endeavour. The endeavour was to make the Pope an absolute despot on the earth. To prove the Deity a despot also, of metaphysical illimitation, was the endeavour, more or less unconsciously, of all his writings.

This is, perhaps, the most curious of the many conformities which we have noted—although M. de Remusat, who states the proofs of the observation, *ne s'en doute pas*. It might however have, like the others, been conjectured *à priori*. Anselm was a man of genius; and of true genius it is the character to be a unity in conduct and conception: the definition will be complete if we add, the unity must be a universality. This universal unity of genius is homogeneous, because it is a growth from within outward. The herd of minds are formed, on the contrary, from without; they are, therefore, (to take a term from the geologists,) conglomerates; or, as Paley has well expressed it, they are mere "bundles of habits;" which means mentally—of prejudices, passions, and traditions.

In 1843, Professor HASSE, of Bonn, published the first volume of his "*Anselm von Canterbury*," containing the life of Anselm. Following literally the Horatian rule *nonum prematur in annum*, he has just issued the second volume, containing *Die Lehre Anselm's*, (Leipzig, 1852, pp. 663,) which is characterized by Dr. Kling, in the *Studien und Kritiken*, as a *μνῆμα ἐς ἀεί*; combining a most thorough search into the sources, with a clear and sound historical knowledge and judgment, and a just and adequate appreciation of Anselm's theology. We hope, in connexion with Dr. Hasse's work, to give at some future day, a full account of Anselm's system.

ART. VII.—MISCELLANIES.

"Exposition of 1 Corinthians iii, 1-17."

TO THE EDITOR.

THE paper in your July number, by the Rev. B. M. Hall, under the above title, though in many respects valuable, will not as a whole "abide" scrutiny. To Mr. Hall's position, except so much as relates to the metaphor of "God's building," and the inferences he draws from it, I have nothing to object. By this figure God's people are represented as compacted, or builded together, under the idea of a spiritual house, or holy temple. This is *God's building*. He is its originator and proprietor; and it rests on Jesus Christ as its foundation. This, by the grace of God, Paul had laid at Corinth. He had preached Christ there, and thus founded the Church—God's holy temple; he then left it for others to proceed with the building, but with the caution, "Let every man take heed how he buildeth thereupon." What authority has Mr. Hall for saying that *ministers* only are the builders here cautioned—that in that discussion the apostle says not one word of any work or labour performed by any but ministers? Are not ministers as really a part of God's building as the laity? Are not the latter as really, though not as prominently, co-workers with God as the former? This is confessedly true, and for this reason (commentators to the contrary notwithstanding) it must accord with Paul's representation. He says, "If any *man* build on this foundation," while Mr. Hall says, "any minister." Nor can we see why Paul does not mean "precious stones," instead of "valuable stones, such as are fit for building purposes." Are gold and silver any more fit for building purposes than precious stones? and yet they are first named, as if principally used in the building. It is not a common stone-house of which Paul speaks, but a holy temple, the materials of which are represented by things most valuable and precious.

"But what are we to understand by these metaphors?" is the main question. Mr. Hall, consistently enough with his restriction respecting co-workers with God, but not with the scope and design of the apostle, thinks that only *persons* are meant,—that "gold, silver, precious stones" represent real Christians, and "wood, hay, stubble," false professors; and that nothing else is included. A few objections to this view will show its fallacy. 1. It excludes all ministers from "God's building;" that is, from the temple or Church of Christ. They are workmen, and as such no part of the materials of the building. 2. It confines to ministers this whole matter of reward and loss, and at the same time makes it consist only in the satisfaction derived from "turning many to righteousness," and the disappointment and sorrow of seeing converts so spurious or unfaithful as to be "burned up" at last. 3. It holds the minister responsible for the character of his converts; for he only is the subject of reward and loss. 4. While it confines the reward and loss to the minister, and holds him responsible for the character of his converts, it applies the test—the "fire"—to the converts themselves. Hear Mr. Hall: "This house, as a whole, and every builder's part in particular, is to be inspected. The gospel, or the preaching of the gospel, including both public and private teaching, with all the means which a minister uses in the prosecution of his work, are his implements—his *tools*. These are not in this discussion considered as his work. His work

is seen as a result, and as such it will be subjected to the test. To speak metaphorically, the building is designed to be *fire-proof*; and the test must be applied to the materials which compose it, and not to the implements with which the labourers wrought." Here the materials—the converts—are spoken of as if mere inanimate matter, capable of standing the fire, or of being burned up, but in no other sense the subjects of reward or loss; and, indeed, as utterly irresponsible as gold, silver, or precious stones. But the *builder*—the minister—is responsible; is to receive reward, or suffer loss, according as he has erected a fire-proof building or otherwise. Yet this reward or loss is in no sense positive, but merely relative; the increase or diminution of satisfaction arising from the success or failure of his building. 5. Paul's rule is, reward according to labour; Mr. Hall's, according to success. "If any man's work *abide*," &c.; that is, says Mr. Hall, if any minister "turn many to righteousness," and they are saved, he shall receive a reward; and the reverse. But Paul says *every man* shall receive his own reward according to his own *labour*. If he labour as a co-worker with God, and if men are perverse, and will neither hear nor heed; or if, after converts "run well" for a season, they become "weary in well-doing," he is not to lose his reward.

The above sentiments are fairly attributable to Mr. Hall's exposition, but they vary widely from the sense of the text. I will not, however, seek to invalidate one exposition without attempting a better. The Corinthians evidently took wrong views, both of their ministers and of themselves. Of the former they expected too much, while they failed to recognise their own responsibility. In correcting these errors, Paul shows that their ministers, as to any abstract ability, were "nothing,"—that though he planted and Apollos watered, God only gave the increase, while themselves, as to purpose or aim, were "one." Attention is thus turned from the instruments to the great efficient Cause, as a means of healing their schisms. Then, to inculcate a sense of responsibility, he teaches,—you are of the Church, "God's building." Of this Jesus Christ is the foundation, which I have laid. I have preached Christ to you, and of you have founded the Church at Corinth. I now leave it for others to build on this foundation: and every one of you may be a builder—a co-worker with God—may be used as an instrument in rearing this building, and as such may receive a reward according to your labour. Added to this is the caution, "Let every man take heed how he buildeth thereupon," which is enforced, not only by the promise of reward, but also by the admonition, "The fire shall try every man's work, of what sort it is."

"Take heed,"—cease to listen to the perversions of false teachers, and to be split up about your ministers; and be no longer enervated and corrupted by carnal indulgences. On the contrary, believe in Christ, and build your faith and hopes on him as the only sure foundation. Then recognise and cultivate a sense of personal responsibility; co-work with God, and thus seek to do good. You will thus become a spiritual, useful people, instead of what you are—a carnal, divided, feeble people.

The above is the sum of the apostle's caution, which is enforced by the following motives:—1. God, whose is the building, and who employs human instrumentalities in its erection, will own your pious labours, and crown them with "increase," and then give a reward, not according to the increase, but to the labour. Whether men hear or forbear, is with themselves. So, likewise, with genuine converts; if they do not endure to the end, they must answer. *Labour* and reward is yours. Meet your responsibilities in your own proper sphere as a

minister or layman, believe in Christ, and co-work with God,—and beyond this you have no account to render. Your “labour” is to be the measure of your reward, not your success, only so far as your failures are your fault. 2. “Take heed,”—build on Christ, and co-work with God, seek the divine impress, and to meet your responsibilities; and do all in view of a severe scrutiny; for “the fire shall try every man’s work, of what sort it is.” Not only every minister’s, but every man’s; that is, each individual’s work is to be tried. If it does not bear the test; if he has so far lost sight of the only foundation, and of his personal responsibility, as to remain carnal and feeble, a mere “babe in Christ,” when he should have been “strong in the Lord,” “he shall suffer loss.” He is in Christ, and so shall be saved; “yet so as by fire:” like him who barely escapes with his life, while his house and its contents are “burned up.”

The following, among many others that might be cited, are cases in point: A Romanist builds on Christ, and is saved; but is barely rescued from the ruins of that apostate Church. The system to which he subscribed, and his associations, prevent his doing any good, or becoming other than a babe in Christ. All is gone, “burned up,” but simply himself.

Again: a Christian lapses into worldliness, so that his character and life exhibit the lowest Christian model: he falls and rises, sins and repents, but is finally saved; “yet so as by fire.” He not only did no good, but much harm,—was a heavy weight and a stumbling-block,—his life wasted, talents buried, capacities undeveloped, so that he must suffer the loss of all, but his own rescue from the burning flames of merited wrath.

Once more: a man resists the convictions of truth and duty all his life. He neither builds on Christ nor co-works with God, but gives his whole influence to the spread of error and the ruin of souls, but finally believes in Christ, and is saved; “yet so as by fire.” Beyond a bare deliverance, he has neither developed capacity nor title to reward; but time, capabilities, and influence, are all gone—everything “burned up” but himself.

What, then, is represented by “gold, silver, precious stones?” We answer, *Not persons nor doctrines, as such, but the aggregate of Christian character and influence.* If a man builds on Christ, and co-works with God, the result is a renewed heart and an upright life. Without the former, capacity is not developed; and without the latter, no salutary influence is exerted: the former makes future enjoyment possible, and the latter gives title to it. The “works” which issue from a devout, sanctified heart, will “abide,”—will not “burn up,” will receive “reward.” The “increase,” in such case, will be modified by the capabilities, zeal, circumstances, and the extent to which efforts are resisted. But as character and pious labour shall bear the test of the “fire,” so will the reward be measured. So, on the other hand, “wood, hay, stubble,” represent erroneous views, and a consequent weak faith and faltering life. The result is small developments of capacity, and little or no co-labour with God, to entitle to reward. “Loss,” therefore, must be suffered in the same ratio, and that by the burning, searching fire of scrutiny, that will sit in judgment on both heart and life.

G. R. SNYDER.

ART. VIII.—SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

(1.) "*The Life of Alfred the Great*" forms the latest volume of Bohn's Antiquarian Library. (New-York: Bangs, Brother & Co., 13 Park Row.) It is a translation from the German of Dr. R. Pauli, who has gone to the sources of information and mastered them, with true German research. The character of Alfred is one of the most remarkable in all history; and this book affords the best view of it that has yet appeared in English. Appended to the life is given the Anglo-Saxon version of Orosius, commonly attributed to Alfred, with the literal English translation, and an Anglo-Saxon alphabet, glossary, and outline of grammar; so that the book affords a very good manual for beginners in Anglo-Saxon.

(2.) "*The Old House by the River*" (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 1853; 18mo., pp. 318) contains a number of sketches of nature, life, and manners, very beautiful in style and finish. The tone of the work is healthful rather than sentimental; it is pervaded by a fresh and genial feeling of sympathy "for man, and woman, and sun, and moon, and stars throughout the year."

(3.) MESSRS. BLANCHARD & LEA, of Philadelphia, have issued a new edition of "*Physical Geography*, by MARY SOMERVILLE," (12mo., pp. 570.) The work is so well known that it is only necessary for us to say that this edition is taken from the third and last London edition; and that the American editor has made many valuable additions.

(4.) "*Father Gavazzi's Lectures in New-York; also the Life of Father Gavazzi, corrected and authorized by himself.*" (New-York: Dewitt & Davenport; 1853; 12mo., pp. 299.) It might be inferred from the title-page that the lectures contained in this volume are published under the authority of Gavazzi; but he has expressly disclaimed them, as being so imperfect and inaccurate as to present a mere caricature of what he did say. Only the biography was revised by himself; and this may be relied upon as a fair and truthful account of the eventful career of the Italian priest and patriot.

(5.) "*Autobiography of Rev. James B. Finley; or, Pioneer Life in the West*, edited by W. P. STRICKLAND, D. D.," (Cincinnati: Methodist Book Concern; 1853; 12mo., pp. 455,) is a book full of the stirring incident that characterizes every truthful record of American frontier life. It is among the many wonderful phenomena of this country's history, that the man is yet living and labouring, who was himself one of the pioneers in the colonization of the West—now the West no longer; for the region over which Mr.

Finley's graphic narrative carries his delighted readers is now the abode of a vast population, and supplies, of itself, large numbers of adventurous spirits, who go out in search of that ever-receding "West." Mr. Finley's account of his father's adventurous career, as a settler and pastor in Kentucky and Ohio, and of his own life in the woods, has all the interest of romance. He tells his story in a simple and straight-forward style, which carries one inevitably along with the narrative. Besides the history of Mr. Finley's early life, and of his ministry in the Methodist Episcopal Church, the work contains memorials of Asbury, M'Kendree, Young, Finley, (I. P.,) Christie, and of the two Wyandott chiefs, Manuncue and Between-the-logs. The "old chief" tells us at the close of the volume that he has "many reminiscences concerning the Indians that have never yet been published." We trust that he will not abandon the pen until his whole stock is exhausted. We engage to read all the books he may write, and that our children will read them too. At the same time, we hope that he will omit all ill-authenticated or borrowed stories, like those of "Peter Cartwright," and "The Missionary and the Robber," in his present volume.

(6.) "*Class-book of Physiology*," by B. N. COMINGS, M. D., (New-York: D. Appleton & Co.; 1853; 12mo., pp. 270,) is an admirable text-book, for the use of schools and families, on the structure and functions of the organs of the human body, illustrated by comparative reference to those of inferior animals. It is largely illustrated by steel and wood engravings.

(7.) "*The Romance of Abelard and Heloise*," by O. W. WIGHT, (New-York: D. Appleton & Co.; 12mo., pp. 266,) gives a story whose hold upon human interest never flags. It has been told over and over again, in every language, and in almost every form of prose and verse; and yet every new recital of it is listened to with avidity. Mr. Wight's style is too florid and ambitious for a narrative which is so full of all stimulants to human feeling as to need no adventitious aids: such a tale is best told simply.

(8.) "*Narrative of a Journey round the World*," by F. GERSTÆCKER, (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 1853; 12mo., pp. 623,) is a true world-journey, by a man of cosmopolitan sympathies, and fine powers of observation and description. Sailing from Bremen he landed at Rio, sailed thence for Buenos Ayres, crossed the Cordilleras in winter, suffered more than the traveller's usual hardships in Chili, reached San Francisco at the time of its greatest fever of excitement, tried the gold-diggings and failed, sailed for the South-Sea Islands, and luxuriated among them for a while, thence to Australia, and finally to Java, with a vivid description of which island his adventurous story closes. The narrative is somewhat long-winded; but by the incident with which it abounds, the unflinching good-humour of the writer, and the clear

perceptive faculty that everywhere shows itself, its interest is kept up throughout the six hundred pages. It is our duty to say, however, that the writer's moral tone is not always unexceptionable.

(9.) "*The Pedestrian in France and Switzerland*, by GEORGE BARREL, Jr." (New-York: G. P. Putnam & Co.; 1853; 12mo., pp. 312,) is an unpretending account of a foot-journey through by-ways in France into Switzerland. The writer is unskilled in authorcraft; but his book is interesting in spite of its clumsiness, because its track is so far out of the common way as to present many novelties.

(10.) "*Memorials of the English Martyrs*, by the REV. C. B. TAYLOR," (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 1853; 12mo., pp. 395,) describes the chief localities of the English martyrdoms as they were and as they are; and groups narratives and reflections around those memorable spots. Works of this class cannot be too widely multiplied, now that Rome is making so desperate a struggle to regain her former political ascendancy throughout the world; while, at the same time, with a boldness springing either from despair or from assurance, she tells the world that her former bloody maxims are yet in force.

(11.) "*Civil Wars and Monarchy in France in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, by LEOPOLD RANKE." (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 1853; 12mo., pp. 484.) The well-known moderation and judgment of Ranke fit him well for writing the history of a period abounding in strifes of religion as well as of party. The present work is divided into six books, of which the first two treat of the earlier epochs of French history, up to 1550. This part of the work is, in fact, a series of dissertations, and requires for its comprehension a pretty good knowledge of the facts of the history beforehand. The best part of the work, as might be expected from Ranke, is found in the books which treat of the rise and progress of Protestantism in France, in which a large view is taken of that hopeless intermixture of political with religious questions, which hindered the wide diffusion of Protestantism in that country. As a whole, the work is a valuable contribution to political and ecclesiastical history.

(12.) MERE speculations about heaven are entirely worthless, and even worse. But Scriptural inquiries into the future life—its nature, its abodes, its bliss—are among the most delightful and profitable studies to which the Christian mind can apply itself. In this stirring and materialistic age we dwell too little upon these ennobling themes—

. . . . "The world is too much with us;
Getting and spending we lay waste our powers."

We are glad, therefore, to welcome such a book as "*The Heavenly Home*, by Rev. H. HARBAUGH, A. M." (Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston; 1853;

pp. 364.) This volume first states the notions of heavenly happiness that have prevailed among Pagans, showing the natural and traditional yearnings of the race for a better land. The Scripture view of heaven is then set forth with much beauty and clearness, and at the same time in a spirit of earnest reverence. We do not agree with all the author's positions, but heartily commend his book as calculated to stir up Christian souls to better and purer meditations, by fixing their thoughts upon the "many mansions" of their Father's house.

(13.) THE attention of the world has been called to the arrest and punishment of Professor Gervinus, in the Grand-duchy of Baden, for the publication of an historical essay, forming part of a work on which he has been long engaged. It is now published in English, under the title, "*Introduction to the History of the Nineteenth Century.*" (London: H. G. Bohn. New-York: Bangs Brother & Co.: 18mo., pp. 137.) The object of the treatise is to establish and illustrate the true law of historical development, namely, that from oriental despotism down to the states of modern Europe, a regular progress may be perceived from the freedom of *one* alone to that of the *few*, and then of the many. The application of this law shows that the tendencies of the times in every European state are inevitably democratic. *Hinc illæ lachrymæ.* The treatise abounds in large views of history and politics, and we hope it will be widely read in America.

(14.) WE have received the first part (containing Genesis) of MR. BLACKADER'S edition of "*The English Bible.*" (London: R. B. Blackader; small 4to.) It is published on the same plan as the "Chronological New Testament," of which we gave our readers so favourable an account some time since; but with some decided improvements, which make it, in all respects, the best and most convenient edition of the Sacred Word, for daily reading, that we have yet seen. Its main features are the following:—1. The *text* is divided into sections and paragraphs, with appropriate headings, dates, historical memoranda, &c., prefixed to each; 2. The most important *parallel passages* are quoted at length in the margin; 3. The poetical books, and all poetical quotations, are printed in rhythmical form. There is also a brief, condensed *commentary*, containing the substance of the best commentators—especially the German—used, however, with nice discrimination; and putting the reader in possession of the latest discoveries—geographical, historical, or other. The work is beautifully printed, and deserves to be circulated in this country. We advise our readers, who can afford the expense, to import the work through Messrs. Carlton & Phillips.

(15.) "*Writings of Professor B. B. Edwards, with a Memoir*, by Professor E. A. PARK." (Boston: Jewett & Co.; 2 vols., 12mo.) Though this work has been some time published, our copy, by some mishap, has reached us so late that we can only announce it to our readers.

(16.) "*Journal of the Rev. Francis Asbury, Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church.*" (New-York: Carlton & Phillips; 3 vols., 12mo.) In the language of Mr. Hollingsworth, who transcribed most of Bishop Asbury's Journals for the press, "the identity of Bishop Asbury in the commencement, continuance, and the wonderful increase of Methodism in this country, will give a perpetuity of interest in the record here offered, which nothing else can give." The Journals have long been out of print. The edition now offered is far better than the old one: the dates have been carefully collated and rectified, and a careful index to the three volumes is given at the end. In these volumes will be found the beginnings (almost) of the history of Methodism in America; and, as such, their value is incalculable to the Church. But as a record of apostolic zeal and fidelity, of a spirit of self-sacrifice rivalling that of the saints and martyrs of the early Church, of an industry which no toils could weary, of a patience which no privations could exhaust, it is full of interest to every minister of the gospel, and to every Christian. We trust that it will find its way into the library of every minister, and of every family among us, that can afford the low price at which it is furnished.

(17.) "*History of the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century, Vol. V.—The Reformation in England*, by J. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNE." (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers; 12mo., pp. 518.) The unparalleled success of Dr. Merle's previous volumes, containing a history of the Reformation in Germany and Switzerland, was due, not so much to any special value in his labours in the way of originality of research into the sources of history, or, in fact, to originality of any kind, as to the graphic descriptive power of the writer, and the dramatic style of his narrative, combined with a thorough sympathy with the spirit of modern Protestantism, even in its extreme forms. The fifth volume will hardly reach the same popularity. The field is one not so familiar to the writer; and he has not had access to books working up the materials so thoroughly as those which gave him so much assistance in his former volumes. He has, nevertheless, produced a work thus far of great value; and especially of value in the present crisis of Protestantism, both in England and in the United States. It shows anew for this generation that Popery is anything rather than an exclusively spiritual power; and that "it is its very life and soul to pass beyond the boundaries of religion, and to enter into the fields of policy." It shows that the English Reformation was not, as the Papists assert, a political, but a religious transformation; and that the Popedom, "agitated by wholly political interests, broke of itself the chain with which it had so long bound England." On these, and many other accounts, we hope that this fifth volume may be as widely circulated as those which preceded it; in fact, it better deserves circulation.

(18.) THE second and third parts of "*Meyer's Universum*, vol. ii," (New-York: Hermann J. Meyer,) contain views of Passaic Falls, Lake Managua, (in Central America,) the Chapel of Mary of the Snow, (on the Rigi,) the

great Cathedral in Magdeburg, the Genesee Falls, (Rochester,) the Barberigo Palace, (Venice,) the Lake of Lowertz, (in Switzerland,) and of Harper's Ferry, (Virginia.) The letter-press descriptions are by C. A. Dana, Junius Fröbel, and others; and strike us as much better and less pretentious than those of the first volume. Taken as a whole, this is the best series of illustrations for its price (twenty-five cents a number) that has ever appeared in America. The same publisher has commenced a new and beautiful series on a larger scale, entitled "*The United States Illustrated, in Views of City and Country*," which will aim to lay before the American people "faithful and spirited illustrations of what is characteristic in the scenery and memorable in the public buildings of all parts of the country. It is in quarto form, and sold at fifty cents the number, each containing four finely-engraved views. The parts thus far issued contains specimens of really high art, and the letter-press descriptions are excellent. The work is every way worthy of national patronage.

(19.) "*Practical Drawing-Book for Schools and Self-Instruction*, by SIGISMOND SCHUSTER, Professor of Drawing." (New-York: Newman & Ivison; 1853.) This work contains an historical sketch of the art of painting, not of much value. It has great merit, however, in the series of lessons, beginning with simple lines, and geometrical figures, and going on to flowers, landscapes, animals, and ornamental drawings, with clear and useful instructions for imitation. The work is got up in very good style.

(20.) WE do not remember ever to have imagined that a mere "critical notice" in a contemporary journal could give us pain, or excite us to anger; but a notice of "*The Life and Letters of Stephen Olin, D. D.*," (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 2 vols., 12mo.) in the Christian Examiner, of Boston, has done both. The writer speaks of Dr. Olin, and characterizes the biography as follows:—

"We have here an adequate memorial, not of a man great or remarkable in any particular, but of one who had the distinction of goodness, and who deserves the praise of devoted usefulness. The record of his early and of his college life, the sketch of his ministerial labours in different regions of this Union, his journals and letters while abroad, and his services to the literary institution over which he presided, warrant the expressions of regard for him from friends, which are given in these volumes. We remember to have met with him in Italy, while he was struggling, as he did for years, with feeble health, and to have been pleasantly impressed by his sensible remarks on various subjects, and by his unpretending bearing. Such memorials of men who, after all, do the real work of a Christian life more effectively than do those of more shining endowments, are of value in quickening the right spirit, and in showing the way of right effort to all sympathizing readers."

We do not hesitate to say that the man who could write and print a piece of criticism like this should not be trusted to write in the pages of a respectable journal. Either he had read the Life and Works of Dr. Olin, or he had not. If he had read them, what he has written stamps him as an imbecile; if he had not, as carelessly indifferent to a great man's reputation. He probably be-

longs to that clique in and about Boston, which has been aptly called the "Mutual Admiration Society;" and can see no "shining endowments" except as reflected from a Boston looking-glass, or as displayed in attacking the verities of Christianity by diluted doses of borrowed infidelity, published every two months in the "Christian Examiner."

"No place so sacred from such fops is barred,
Nor is Paul's Church more safe than Paul's church-yard;
Nay, fly to altars, there they'll talk you dead;
For fools rush in where angels fear to tread."

We hope to furnish in our next number an extended article on Dr. Olin.

(21.) THE latest product of the "Spiritual" laboratory is a volume of "Discourses from the Spirit-World," (New-York: Partridge & Brittan; pp. 197,) professing to be dictated by STEPHEN OLIN, through Rev. R. P. Wilson, who calls himself a "writing medium." Mr. Wilson tells us that the work was commenced "by the request of the spiritual author," and that "the process of writing was by the influx of the communications while the mind remained in a passive state; and at the same time the hand was controlled to write according to the dictation." Dr. Olin is made to treat of various important topics in this way,—such as the Ministry of Angels, the Kingdom of God in Man, the Origin and End of Evil, Education, Immortality, &c.; and on all of them it appears that his views are greatly changed from what they were while he was upon earth. He no longer believes the Bible to be divinely inspired in any special sense. He formerly held St. Paul to be an inspired apostle; now he speaks of him as "Paul, a distinguished Christian reformer, who flourished in the first century of the Christian era." While on earth, his main theme of preaching was the atoning sacrifice of Christ: now he holds that doctrine to be "revolting" and "cruel." He formerly warned men, with earnestness and tears, of the wrath of God: now he knows that God never was displeased with man. While losing these old beliefs on which his faith rested in this life, as on a rock, he has learned to believe some new things which he then despised. Mesmerism (clairvoyance and all) is a great revelation, though the Bible is not. Moses was very ignorant of physical science; but the author of the "Vestiges of Creation" is a great philosopher.

But Dr. Olin's losses and gains are otherwise illustrated in this book. While among men he wrote clear good English; now he does not observe the rules of grammar, and he uses words that would formerly have disgusted his refined taste. He speaks of the "resurrected" form of the human body, and of "happifying" consequences, with a most serene forgetfulness of the language he once could use so well. He confounds "shall" and "will" continually: but the confusion does not seem to trouble him. He tells us that man may be considered "chemically," or "magnetically," or "electrically." His taste, too, has been equally debased since he entered the "second sphere." He abounds in elegant commonplaces—formerly his abhorrence,—such as "expanding suns," (!) "shoreless oceans," and innumerable "gems." He tells

us to "inhale sublimities," as if sublimities were the laughing-gas. He informs us that "the sphere of science to the contemplative mind is an ever-increasing ocean of imperishable gems, whose beauties shine with an increasing brilliancy." He gives the following lines (and many more of the same sort) as poetry:—

"Where, from the highest summit, he descries
The distant town, the mountain range, the valley's
Varying course, the river's leaping tide;
And, further on, the distant spire of some
Devoted shrine and hallow'd place, and from
The whole review drinks inspiration and supreme delight."

Now it is a grave question for Mr. Wilson, and the spiritualists generally, to answer, If Dr. Olin's taste and cultivation have degenerated so sadly while he has only entered the second sphere, what *will* it be when he has reached the twelfth?

(22.) "*An Essay on the Pastoral Office, as Exemplified in the Economy of the Methodist Episcopal Church*, by Rev. J. H. WYTHES, M. D." (New-York: Carlton & Phillips, 1853; 18mo., pp. 109.) This treatise is designed to present a brief and summary view of the polity of the Church, so far as the pastoral office is concerned. The fundamental position of the work is that the pastoral office is not a matter of expediency, and that its nature and extent are not to be determined by conventional arrangement, but by divine authority. It is then shown that the office is not temporal, but spiritual; that it is not a priesthood, but an office of instruction and admonition; involving, however, in order to conserve the society of Christian people, the authority to administer the sacraments and to exercise discipline. The guards and limitations of this authority are then set forth as equally of divine appointment:—

"The rights of the membership, therefore, require that they shall be permitted to recognise the divine call of each individual pastor; that every reasonable facility shall be afforded for the trial and expulsion of unworthy ministers; and that the membership themselves shall be permitted, in some way, to judge of the fitness of the cases to which Church censures, rebukes, &c., are to be applied."

It is then shown that these limitations form part of the organic law of Methodism, affording ample security against ministerial encroachments:—

"As it is, the government of the Methodist Episcopal Church exhibits the most admirably contrived system of checks and balances of power ever seen in an ecclesiastical community. While a divinely-instituted ministry is recognised, and allowed the exercise of its legitimate functions, the rights of the membership of the Church are acknowledged and preserved. The Methodist people, on the one hand, while anxious to preserve a system which guards against human weakness, or the usurpation of power, have been ready to receive their ministers as the ambassadors of Christ; on the other hand, all that the Methodist itinerancy have ever asked, and all that they desire as ministers of God, is an untrammelled administration of the word of Christ in the pulpit, and such reasonable facilities for pastoral advice and instruction as are consistent with the itinerancy of their ministrations."

Dr. Wythes then proceeds to explain and vindicate the two chief peculiarities of Methodism, viz., Episcopacy and Itinerancy; and to set forth the Presiding Eldership and Class-meetings as necessary accompaniments of the itinerant system. The topics thus far named are treated in the first six chapters of the work. In the seventh, the Conferences are treated of as essentially *pastoral* bodies, with functions and duties strictly limited to pastoral ends. Under this view, of course, the author finds no place for lay-delegation: "If the authority of the General Conference be thus strictly *pastoral*, it ought certainly to be confined to those whom the Church has consented to receive as their divinely-commissioned pastors; and the desire of the laity (which has been expressed in some parts of the Church) to be admitted to a share in its counsels and authority, is a desire to assume the functions of the pastorate without sharing its toils, and without even the claim of a divine commission." A brief chapter on Pastoral Support closes this compact little treatise, which we commend (without endorsing all its positions) as worthy of general circulation among our people. It contains a great amount of valuable matter in a very small space.

(23.) "*The Boyhood of Great Men*," (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 18mo., pp. 385,) gives brief sketches of the early days of a number of men of eminence in the different walks of life—poets, painters, orators, editors, &c. It is well executed, and admirably adapted to stimulate young readers to industry. The characters are generally well-chosen; though we miss among the "classes" from which the selections are made the greatest of all, viz., the inventors and discoverers. The day of the "industrial classes" is rapidly approaching; and books will not omit them much longer.

(24.) "*Episcopal Methodism, as it was and is*, by the Rev. P. D. GORRIE." (Auburn: Derby & Miller; 12mo., pp. 354.) This volume is divided into four books, of which the first gives a sketch of the origin of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and of its history down to 1850. Book II. treats of the doctrines of the Church, following the order of the Twenty-five Articles; and giving, besides, a statement of the doctrines of the Witness of the Spirit, Justification, Possibility of Falling from Grace, and Eternal Punishment, as held by the Church. Book III. gives a full and thorough exposition of the Polity of the Church; and the fourth book affords a large and valuable collection of ecclesiastical statistics. This well-conceived and well-executed treatise, with Porter's Compendium of Methodism, furnishes almost everything that can be desired on the subject.

(25.) WE rejoice to see a growing tendency among our able ministers toward writing for the times. To prepare a good book of practical religion or biography is the *next* thing to preaching with the living voice; and the annals of Methodism furnish abundant material for this species of writing, large as our stock of books of this class already is. "*The Wesley Offering*, or

Wesley and his Times, by Rev. D. HOLMES, A. M., (Auburn: Derby & Miller; 1853; 12mo., pp. 308,) comes immediately after Professor Larrabee's "Wesley and his Coadjutors," and covers, to a considerable extent, the same ground; but so ample is the field, and so great the difference between the two writers, as to their mode of treating the subject, that the reader may go through the two books in succession without wearying of the topic or its treatment. Mr. Holmes's volume "does not claim to be a biography, in the full sense of that word, nor yet a detailed history of the Wesleyan Reformation, but is rather a collection of incidents in the life and labours of the Wesleys, and of the sort of religion promoted by them." It may be characterized as a series of thoughtful essays on the rise of Methodism, and its adaptation to the times, illustrated by well-wrought descriptions and narrations. We commend it to general notice. A hundred such volumes in the hands of our Tract Society would tell upon the coming generation.

(26.) "*A Manual of Biblical Literature*, by W. P. STRICKLAND, D. D." (New-York: Carlton & Phillips; 1853; 12mo., pp. 404.) This carefully prepared compilation is intended to furnish an elementary treatise on the topics properly belonging to that branch of theological study called Biblical Literature. Prefixed to the work is an introduction by the Rev. Charles Elliott, D. D., who remarks, that notwithstanding the number of copious treatises on the subject, a work was still needed "for private students, and literary men in general—the design of which would be to present, in one regularly-arranged view, the leading principles of all those topics which are necessary to the proper and systematic study of the Bible. The present volume is of such a character. The author has drawn his materials from the very best sources, on the different subjects of which he treats. On inspecting the table of contents it will be seen, that after showing the importance of the study of the Bible, the author brings to view the leading topics of Biblical Literature—such as Biblical Philology, Criticism, Interpretation, Analysis, Archæology, History, Ethnography, Geography, and Chronology. Of course, in embracing so vast a field of Biblical research, the work must be elementary. It is, however, sufficiently copious to give a full and clear knowledge of the essential principles embraced in the various topics connected with the study of the Bible. It is particularly adapted to all under-graduates in the ministry, and private theological students, as well as to the advanced classes in Sunday Schools, and to High Schools, Seminaries, and Colleges." The work is divided into nine parts, treating severally of Biblical Philology, Biblical Criticism, Biblical Exegesis, Biblical Analysis, Biblical Archæology, Biblical Ethnography, Biblical History, Biblical Chronology, and Biblical Geography. This enumeration will suffice to show the extent of the range of topics embraced in this volume. Of course they are treated summarily: but the very design of the author was to prepare a compendious *manual*, and he has succeeded excellently. The work is well adapted, not merely for the use of candidates for the ministry, and for Sunday Schools, but for general circulation in Christian families.

(27.) THE volume issue of the Methodist Tract Society is rapidly going on. The last that has appeared on our table is "*Memoirs of a Useful Man*," (New-York: Carlton & Phillips; 18mo., pp. 200,) containing a record of the life and Christian labours of Roger Miller, the founder of Ragged Schools, whose career, though beginning in the most humble way, affords, as the Introduction declares, one of the most extraordinary examples of Christian devotion and usefulness which the history of the modern Church records. In the London City Mission he found a field, in the full sense of the word, requiring missionary zeal and self-denial to a very large extent. The history of his personal as well as his more public career is full of interest; and the work will stand next to Father Reeves among the new publications of the Tract Society.

(28.) "*Startling Questions*," (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers; 1853; 18mo., pp. 370,) is the title of a series of practical religious lectures, by Rev. J. C. Ryle, whose pungent treatise, entitled "*Living or Dead*," we noticed some time ago. It puts such questions as, "Are you an heir?—shall you be saved?" &c.—with great earnestness, in a very pointed style. Mr. Ryle is a believer in what is called the Second Advent.

(29.) THE old Puritan divines were severe searchers of conscience. They sought, in their own phrase, to "bring their hearers to their own iniquity;" and this not merely when those hearers were supposed to be "sons of Belial," but also when they were "professors,"—to use another Puritan term. One of the most pungent of their practical writings has lately been reproduced by Messrs. R. Carter & Brothers, entitled "*A Gospel Glass*, by LEWIS STUCKLEY," (12mo., pp. 306.) Its design is to set forth and "push home the miscarriages of professors;" and it is indeed a mirror of all that are careless, or at ease in Zion. Its quaint language adds to its point; and in spite of the differences of the times, it may do good now as it did in 1658.

(30.) "*The Rum Plague*," from the German of Zschokke, (New-York: John S. Taylor; 1853,) is a story written twenty years ago, illustrating the evil of intemperance. It is just as applicable now as ever.

(31.) It is singular that the best treatise on the English constitution—in fact, the only treatise proper on the subject—should have been written by a foreigner. A new and very neat edition of "*The Constitution of England: or an Account of the English Government, in which it is compared both with the Republican Form of Government and the other Monarchies of Europe*," by J. L. DELOLME," (New-York: Bangs, Brother & Co.,) has just been issued as a volume of Bohn's Standard Library. It is edited by Mr. Macgregor, who gives a brief biography of Delolme, and adds a number of illustrative notes.

Though the work is not profound, it is yet, as we have said, almost the only disquisition of the kind within reach, and is worthy of a place in every library.

(32.) THE last volume of Mr. Bohn's "Classical Library" that has reached us, is "*Diogenes Laertius*," (literally translated by C. D. Yonge,) whose History of the Philosophers is the source of most of our knowledge of the career of Greek philosophy. Bohn's series are kept constantly on hand by Bangs, Brother & Co., 13 Park Row, New-York.

(33.) "*Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon, being the Results of a Second Expedition*, by AUSTEN H. LAYARD." (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 1853; 8vo.) This second report of Mr. Layard's abounds, quite as much as the first, in that species of interest which we look for in a book of travels, while it has far more of antiquarian value. It does much more also for the illustration of the Bible; in fact, some of its contributions to that end are among the most valuable of recent times. The work is got up in excellent style, and is sold at a very low price. An extended review is in preparation, and will probably appear in our next number.

(34.) "*Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon, being the Results of a Second Expedition*, by AUSTEN H. LAYARD; *abridged from the larger work*." (New-York: G. P. Putnam & Co.; 1853; 12mo., pp. 549.) The work of abridging (never an easy thing to do well) has been excellently done in this case. The more important and interesting parts of the work are retained in the author's own language; the omitted parts consisting mainly of minute details of description, tables of characters, &c. Everything illustrative of the Bible has been carefully retained. For those who cannot afford to purchase the larger work, this abridgment will be an admirable substitute.

(35.) "*The Lamp and the Lantern*, by JAMES HAMILTON, D. D.," (New-York: Carter & Brothers; 18mo., pp. 184,) contains a series of eloquent lectures and essays, mostly hortatory, in Dr. Hamilton's best vein, on subjects connected with the reading and propagation of the Bible.

(36.) WE noticed some time since, with commendation, DR. JOHN BROWN'S Expository Discourses on the sayings of our Lord. He must write very rapidly, for we have now another octavo volume from him—"The Sufferings and Glories of the Messiah." (New-York: Carter & Brothers; 1853; 8vo., pp. 352.) But though the book may have been rapidly written, it has been long studied—the preface says, at intervals, for thirty years. It contains an exposition of the eighteenth Psalm, and of Isaiah lii, 13–liii, 12. Dr. Brown takes the Psalm to be exclusively Messianic, and builds upon it a view of the person

and work of the Messiah—very true, very edifying, and very rich in instruction. Nevertheless, we cannot think it successful as an *exposition*, because we cannot agree wholly with his fundamental view of the character of the Psalm. The exposition of Isaiah pleases us far better. As a whole, the work is a valuable contribution to the hortatory exposition and application of Scripture, and deserves a place in the minister's library.

(37.) MESSRS. CARTER & BROTHERS (New-York) have reprinted the "*History of the Westminster Assembly of Divines*, by REV. W. M. HETHERINGTON." (12mo., pp. 311.) It is a compact and elaborate work, prepared after a careful study of the sources of information; and is as impartial as could be expected from one who, to use his own language, does not hesitate to acknowledge that he feels deeply and warmly interested in everything that relates to Presbyterian principles and character. The book is published in a neat but cheap form, and should be read by every student of theology.

(38.) "*Water from the Well-Spring for the Sabbath Hours of Afflicted Believers*, by REV. E. H. BICKERSTETH," (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers; 1853; 18mo., pp. 254,) consists of a series of Sabbath meditations on select passages of Scripture, originally written by Mr. Bickersteth for the comfort and edification of his invalid sister. They are well adapted, by their brevity and tenderness, to the sick-chamber.

(39.) "*The Difficulties of Infidelity*, by GEORGE STANLEY FABER," (New-York: Wm. Gowans; 1853; 12mo., pp. 216,) is a work which has done excellent service in its day. It has long been scarce; and Mr. Gowans has done a very acceptable thing in reprinting it in the beautiful form in which it now lies before us. Appended to the work are Robert Hall's great sermon on "*Modern Infidelity*," and a copious list of books on the evidences of revealed religion—both valuable additions.

(40.) "*A Memorial of Horatio Greenough*, by H. T. TUCKERMAN," (New-York: G. P. Putnam & Co; 12mo., pp. 245,) contains a brief memoir of Greenough, a number of selections from his manuscripts, and several tributes to his genius, by various hands. The memoir breathes not only a genial sympathy with art, but the higher sympathy of humanity. It is itself a beautiful work of art. The selections reveal Greenough's genius as more versatile than we had supposed, and show that he had, indeed, "larger gifts than belong exclusively to the practical artist." Had he lived, he would have done much, with his large endowments and his high and varied culture, energized by a strong public spirit, and employed with fearless independence, to form what is most sadly lacking in America, a taste for genuine art. As it is, we can only mourn over his large plans and high aspirations for the public good,—all unrealized.

(41.) THE seventh and last volume of Professor Shedd's edition of "*Coleridge's Works*" (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 12mo., pp. 702) is before us. An extended article on the work is now in type, and will appear in our next number. In the mean time we have to express our extreme surprise and regret that an edition, in many respects so excellent, and professing to be *complete*, should be sent into the world without an index.

(42.) FOR breeders of poultry who wish to know the best breeds, as well as the best methods of managing fowls, there is no better or more compact work than "*Miner's Domestic Poultry Book*." (Rochester: G. W. Fisher, 1853; 12mo., pp. 256.) It is the only book we have seen that gives a full account of the celebrated Brahma Pootra, or Burrampooter fowls—the largest, and in all respects the best breed that has yet appeared in this country.

(43.) "*Summerfield; or, Life on a Farm*," (Auburn: Derby & Miller; 12mo., pp. 246,) is a very pretty set of sketches of the ordinary and extraordinary incidents of American rural and forest life—strung on a thread of narration pleasant enough to keep up the interest of youthful readers.

(44.) "*History of the Mormons, or Latter-Day Saints*," (Auburn: Derby & Miller; 12mo., pp. 399,) is a reprint of an English work prepared by a reporter for the London Morning Chronicle. It contains a good deal of information about the Mormons, but lacks discrimination and thorough acquaintance with the subject. As proof of this we may state the simple fact, that the writer leaves it as an open question whether Mormonism tolerates polygamy or not!

(45.) "*Phaethon; or, Loose Thoughts for Loose Thinkers*," by Rev. CHARLES KINGSLEY." (Cambridge, 1852; pp. 100.) The author of *Alton Locke* will find readers for anything he may write; it is therefore vastly important that what he writes should be good. There has been much outcry about his Socialism. It appears that many good, conservative people think that any sympathy for popular sufferings—whether of white or black mankind—or any scheme for bettering the fortunes of the Pariahs of the race, must argue a man half an infidel. The present work will vindicate Mr. Kingsley's orthodoxy amply, and will testify that if he be a socialist, there can be such a thing as a Christian Socialist.

Phaethon is a dialogue after the manner of the Socratic. An American philosopher (!) visits England, gets an introduction to an English family of rank, flatters himself and them on his entrance into the "inner hearth-life of the English landed aristocracy," and doses them with Emersonian transcendentalism, *usque ad nauseam*. Never before had the respectabilities of Herefordshire been invaded by so "rampantly heterodox a spiritual guerrilla." He despises the Catholic creeds, condemns all ages but "our glorious nine-

teenth century," and holds in still deeper contempt all in that glorious century who dare to believe there is "any ascertained truth independent of the private fancy and opinion of Professor Windrush and his circle of elect souls." He professes to believe in physical science, and argues that Christianity is in a fair way to be crushed by that science; but his spiritualism is more materialistic than his physics. His notion seems to be,—

"—that it is the spiritual world which is governed by physical laws, and the physical by spiritual ones; that while men and women are merely the puppets of cerebrations and mentations, and attractions and repulsions, it is the trees, and stones, and gases, who have the wills and the energies, and the faiths, and the virtues, and the personalities." ○ ○ ○ ○ "He talks of God in terms which, every one of them, involves what we call the essential properties of matter—space, time, passability, motion; setting forth phrenology and mesmerism as the great organs of education, even of the regeneration of mankind; apologizing for the earlier ravings of the Poughkeepsie seer, and considering his later electro-pantheist farragos as great utterances: while, whenever he talks of nature, he shows the most credulous craving after everything which we, the countrymen of Bacon, have been taught to consider unscientific—Homœopathy, Electro-biology, Loves of the Plants *à la* Darwin, Vestiges of Creation, Vegetarianisms, Teetotalisms—never mind what, provided it is unaccredited or condemned by regularly educated men of science."

The author remarks on these ravings and their tendencies in language which many of our American youth, who stare in admiring wonderment at the bold balloonings of Professor Windrushes, would do well to heed:—

"This contempt for that which has been already discovered—this carelessness about induction from the normal phenomena, coupled with this hankering after theories built upon exceptional ones—this craving for 'signs and wonders,' which is the sure accompaniment of a dying faith in God, and in nature as God's work—are symptoms which make me tremble for the fate of physical as well as of spiritual science, both in America and in the Americanists here at home. As the professor talked on, I could not help thinking of the Neo-Platonists of Alexandria, and their exactly similar course,—downward from a spiritualism of notions and emotions, which in every term confessed its own materialism, to the fearful discovery that consciousness does not reveal God, not even matter, but only its own existence; and then onward, in desperate search after something external wherein to trust, toward theurgic fetish worship, and the secret virtues of gems, and flowers, and stars; and, last of all, to the lowest depth of bowing statues and winking pictures. The sixth century saw that career, Templeton; the nineteenth may see it reenacted, with only these differences, that the nature-worship which seems coming will be all the more crushing and slavish, because we know so much better how vast and glorious nature is; and that the superstitious will be more clumsy and foolish in proportion as our Saxon brain is less acute and discursive, and our education less severely scientific, than those of the old Greeks."

It is not to be supposed that Professor Windrush passes in Herefordshire for a fair example of the American people:—

"God forbid that so unpractical a talker should be a sample of the most practical people upon earth. The Americans have their engineers, their geographers, their astronomers, their scientific chemists; few, indeed, but such as bid fair to rival those of any nation upon earth. But these, like other true workers, hold their tongues and do their business."

"And they have a few indigenous authors too: you must have read the 'Biglow Papers,' and the 'Fable for Critics,' and last, but not least, 'Uncle Tom's Cabin?'"

"Yes; and I have had far less fear for Americans since I read that book; for

it showed me that there was right healthy power, artistic as well as intellectual, among them even now,—ready, when their present borrowed peacock's feathers have fallen off, to come forth and prove that the Yankee Eagle is a right gallant bird, if he will but trust to his own natural plumage."

The "new" philosophers of England and America—the Emersons and Parkers, *et id omne genus*, on this side the water, and the Newmans, Gregs, &c., on the other side—are well hit off in the following paragraphs:—

"The knot of hapless men, who, unable from some defect or morbidity to help on the real movement of their nation, are fain to get their bread with tongue and pen, by retailing to 'silly women,' 'ever learning and never coming to the knowledge of the truth,' second-hand German eclecticism, now exploded even in the country where they arose, and the very froth and scum of the Medea's caldron, in which the *disjecta membra* of old Calvinism are pitifully seething."

"Ah! It has been always the plan, you know, in England, as well as in America, courteously to avoid taking up a German theory till the Germans had quite done with it, and thrown it away for something new. But what are we to say of those who are trying to introduce into England these very Americanized Germanisms, as the only teaching which can suit the needs of the old world?"

"We will, if we are in a vulgar humour, apply to them a certain old proverb about teaching one's grandmother a certain simple operation on the egg of the domestic fowl; but we will no less take shame to ourselves, as sons of Alma Mater, that such nonsense can get even a day's hearing, either among the daughters of Manchester manufacturers, or among London working-men."

The main topic of the book is furnished by the theory started by Professor Windrush, that "*if a man does but believe a thing, he has a right to speak it and act on it, right or wrong.*" Alcibiades and Phaethon, walking into the Pnyx early in the morning, find Socrates there, with his face to the east, in prayer. They touch him on the shoulder before he becomes aware of their presence. They soon enter into a discussion arising—

"From something," said Alcibiades, "which Protagoras said in his lecture yesterday—How truth was what each man troweth, or believeth to be true. 'So that,' he said, 'one thing is true to me, if I believe it true, and another opposite thing to you, if you believe that opposite. For,' continued he, 'there is an objective and a subjective truth; the former, doubtless, one and absolute, and contained in the nature of each thing; but the other manifold and relative, varying with the faculties of each perceiver thereof.' But as each man's faculties, he said, were different from his neighbour's, and all more or less imperfect, it was impossible that the absolute objective truth of anything could be seen by any mortal, but only some partial approximation, and, as it were, sketch of it, according as the object was represented with more or less refraction on the mirror of his subjectivity. And, therefore, as the true inquirer deals only with the possible, and lets the impossible go, it was the business of the wise man, shunning the search after absolute truth as an impious attempt of the Titans to scale Olympus, to busy himself humbly and practically with subjective truth, and with those methods—rhetoric, for instance—by which he can make the subjective opinions of others either similar to his own, or leaving them as they are—for it may be very often unnecessary to change them—useful to his own ends."

The scope of the dialogue can be well apprehended from this passage, and from a single quotation more:—

SOCRATES. "But tell me now, Alcibiades; did the opinion of Protagoras altogether please you?"

ALCIBIADES. "Why not? Is it not certain that two equally honest men may differ in their opinions on the same matter?"

S. "Undeniable."

A. "But if each is equally sincere in speaking what he believes, is not each equally moved by the spirit of truth?"

S. "You seem to have been lately initiated, and that not at Eleusis merely, nor in the Cabiria, but rather in some Persian or Babylonian mysteries, when you discourse thus of spirits. But you, Phaethon," (turning to me,) "how did you like the periods of Protagoras?"

"Do not ask me, Socrates," said I, "for indeed we have fought a weary battle together ever since sundown last night; and all that I had to say I learned from you."

S. "Let us see, then. Alcibiades distinguishes, he says, between objective fact and subjective opinion?"

A. "Of course I do."

S. "But not, I presume, between objective truth and subjective truth, whereof Protagoras spoke?"

A. "What trap are you laying now? I distinguish between them, also, of course."

S. "Tell me, then, dear youth, of your indulgence, what they are; for I am shamefully ignorant on the matter."

A. "Why, do they not call a thing objectively true, when it is true absolutely in itself; but subjectively true, when it is true in the belief of a particular person?"

S. "—Though not necessarily true objectively, that is, absolutely and in itself?"

A. "No."

S. "But possibly true so?"

A. "Of course."

S. "Now, tell me—a thing is objectively true, is it not, when it is a fact as it is?"

A. "Yes."

S. "And when it is a fact as it is not, it is objectively false; for such a fact would not be true absolutely, and in itself, would it?"

A. "Of course not."

S. "Such a fact would be, therefore, no fact, and nothing."

A. "Why so?"

S. "Because, if a thing exists, it can only exist as it is, not as it is not; at least, my opinion inclines that way."

"Certainly not," said I; "why do you haggle so, Alcibiades?"

S. "Fair and softly, Phaethon! How do you know that he is not fighting for wife and child, and the altars of his gods? But if he will agree with you and me, he will confess that a thing which is objectively false does not exist at all, and is nothing."

A. "I suppose it is necessary to do so. But I know whither you are struggling."

S. "To this, dear youth, that, therefore, if a thing subjectively true be also objectively false, it does not exist, and is nothing."

"It is so," said I.

S. "Let us, then, let nothing go its own way, while we go on ours with that which is only objectively true, lest coming to a river over which it is subjectively true to us that there is a bridge, and trying to walk over that work of our own mind, but no one's hands, the bridge prove to be objectively false, and we, walking over the bank into the water, be set free from that which is subjective on the further bank of Styx."

Then I, laughing, "This hardly coincides, Alcibiades, with Protagoras's opinion, that subjective truth was alone useful."

"But rather proves," said Socrates, "that undiluted draughts of it are of a hurtful and poisonous nature, and require to be tempered with somewhat of objective truth, before it is safe to use them; at least, in the case of bridges."

We should be glad to continue our quotations, and to unfold the whole tenor of this beautiful and instructive dialogue; but we hope it will be republished in this country, that our readers may get it for themselves.

(46.) "*The Right Way; or, Practical Lectures on the Decalogue*, by J. T. CRANE, A. M., of the New-Jersey Conference." (New-York: Carlton & Phillips, 1853; 12mo., pp. 277.) As Mr. Crane remarks in his preface to this excellent volume, it is singular that while the *necessity* for a clear understanding of the law is acknowledged, "so little has been done to disseminate popular expositions of it." The present work is a contribution to this duty of the Church. It is designed as a brief explanation of the Decalogue, "for the use of those not familiar with libraries, and especially for the young," as the author modestly states. But it is fitted for the use of all classes of readers. The introduction treats simply, but in a clear and satisfactory way, of the nature of virtue and of the ground of moral obligation. We cannot quite agree with the author that the holiness of God consists in the fact that all the divine affections and acts are benevolent. It is true that God's holiness is LOVE; but it is love, not simply or chiefly as healing and beneficent, but as going forth to destroy and punish *evil*. Mr. Crane holds to the doctrine that conscience is a moral faculty, and urges the duty (1) of cultivating it; (2) of directing it; (3) of obeying it. We quote the discussion of the second of these, as an illustration of the clear and forcible style in which the book is written:—

"Rousseau apostrophizes conscience as a 'divine instinct, immortal and heavenly voice, sure guide of a being ignorant and limited, but intelligent and free; infallible judge of good and evil.' But in what human breast is such a conscience to be found? The existence of an innate infallible conscience can be demonstrated neither by the present experience nor the past history of our fallen race. Children, whose training has been neglected, are as ignorant of ethics as of natural science. Even the strongest advocates of the infallibility of the inborn moral sense, when their attention is drawn to some intricate question in casuistry, have recourse, not to their 'divine instinct,' but to acknowledged rules, and to their ordinary powers of reasoning and comparing; and the more judicious and reliable the Christian becomes, the more carefully does he disregard unaccountable impulses, and seek to conform his life to the revealed standard of duty.

"It is evident that there may be strong convictions of obligation, and strong desires to obey, where there are but confused and even totally incorrect views of the will of the lawgiver. The obedient son, who goes with cheerful step to labour in the vineyard, may mistake some noxious weed for the grape of Eshecol. Saul, breathing threatenings and slaughter against the saints, 'lived in all good conscience before God,' as well as when he laid down his life and won a martyr's crown at Rome. The follower of Confucius, offering sacrifice at the tomb of his ancestors; the Tartar, attaching his paper prayer to the windmill; the Hindu devotee, casting himself down before the murderous wheels of his idol's car, may all feel an approving emotion. Conscientiousness may help on the follies of the heathen, as well as the prayers, and praises, and good works of the Christian. The sense of obligation may be active and tender, and yet be so left in the dark as even to prompt to the wrong. It sounds a warning against sin, it demands that the supposed right be done, but does not inspire knowledge. If confused in his notions of duty, even the sincere follower of Christ may go astray in his ignorance, and thus his usefulness and his spiritual progress are obstructed, if not totally destroyed. Revelation, direct or traditional, is the only sure guide. If we turn away our eyes from its bright rays, we grope in uncertain twilight, or are lost in midnight darkness. Passion, appetite, interest, prejudice, may wrest judgment and darken counsel. The true standard, the law of right, and our only infallible guide, is God's word. The heathen may possess fragments of traditionary truth, but 'we have a more sure word of prophecy, whereunto ye do well that ye take heed, as unto a light that shineth in a dark place.' Conscience and revealed morality are correlative, as light and the optic nerve are created for each other.

"Every one then to whom the word of God is given is bound in reason and in conscience to 'search the Scriptures,' asking wisdom of Him who giveth to all men liberally and upbraideth not. He thus shall tread the noblest field of knowledge open to human investigation. Recourse should be had to every available means to gain clear ideas of what Jehovah demands. Reading, reflection, prayer, the advice of the pious and the judicious, may all be employed with advantage. The divine law must be studied diligently, perseveringly, and with sincere and eager desires to learn the whole truth, till its golden precepts are graven upon the memory, and its pure spirit fills the heart.

"Nothing is more common among men than perverted and defective conscientiousness. The ignorant Papist, who, apparently without any compunctious visitings, can drink to intoxication, fight, lie, and profane the Sabbath, is overwhelmed with horror at the idea of eating flesh on Friday; and if he has even tasted, is haunted by keen remorse till penance and priestly pardon have lulled his conscience to rest. But every branch of the Christian Church is shorn of a part of its strength, by the fact that some of its members cannot be made to see that to practise certain things which they neglect, and to abstain from certain others to which they are given, is a Christian duty. From the errors of early training, from personal peculiarities, or from the force of appetite, passion, and prejudice, they find it well-nigh impossible to reason correctly when certain moral questions are brought to the bar of judgment. Nay, the easily-besetting sin may be complacently exalted into a cardinal virtue—or, at the worst, the accidental excess of a virtue. A defect in temper or habit may hang like a millstone about the neck of a man, and he, nevertheless, be so infatuated as to pride himself upon it, and count it his strength. At the same time, he will reason very justly respecting the errors and defects of others; and the magnitude of the beam in his own eye does not prevent his detecting the smallest mote in his brother's. How common it is to see men in extreme distress about the sins of other people, while they bestow hardly a glance upon their own! A very tender conscience may be palsied on one side, and be totally blind in one eye. What we would denounce as avarice in another, in ourselves we defend and approve as prudence; that which in another we would style stubbornness and passion, we call, in ourselves, due firmness and generous spirit: and every moral deformity which we condemn and hate in others, we baptize by a very smooth name, when we detect its presence in ourselves.

"Again, men are acute in detecting, and severe in condemning, those sins to which they themselves are not given. The passionate man, forgetful of his fierce anger and its guilt, is zealous in his efforts to reform his neighbour, whom he suspects of being covetous. The volatile professor, whose endless levities render his sincerity questionable, lashes the more sober Christian for his gloomy repulsive countenance; while the sour ascetic frets even at the cheerfulness of youth, as if it were the worst of sins. The one who is careless in his business rails at the man who is careless in his language; and the one who is very slow to give his money to good objects, sees his brother's sin of pride in all its horrors; while the officious, censorious brother, by his unsparing reproofs, and ungenerous insinuations, keeps the whole Church in angry ferment, and atones for his own deficiency in spiritual things by calling attention to the spiritual defects of the rest. Thus it goes, through the whole round of peculiarity and circumstances, and each

'Compounds for sin he is inclined to
By damning those he has no mind to.'

"This tendency to a one-sided conscience makes it the duty of every man to scan closely his opinions upon moral subjects, and see whether any error has been introduced by circumstances. Happy is he who has been able to escape the entanglements of passion and prejudice, and who, at all times, sees every sin in its deformity, and every virtue in its true beauty and glory."

We should be glad to give further extracts, but our limits forbid. We must content ourselves with commending the work as the best hortatory exposition of the Decalogue extant among us; and we earnestly hope that it will be widely read by our ministers and people.

(46.) "*The Right Way; or, Practical Lectures on the Decalogue*, by J. T. CRANE, A. M., of the New-Jersey Conference." (New-York: Carlton & Phillips, 1853; 12mo., pp. 277.) As Mr. Crane remarks in his preface to this excellent volume, it is singular that while the *necessity* for a clear understanding of the law is acknowledged, "so little has been done to disseminate popular expositions of it." The present work is a contribution to this duty of the Church. It is designed as a brief explanation of the Decalogue, "for the use of those not familiar with libraries, and especially for the young," as the author modestly states. But it is fitted for the use of all classes of readers. The introduction treats simply, but in a clear and satisfactory way, of the nature of virtue and of the ground of moral obligation. We cannot quite agree with the author that the holiness of God consists in the fact that all the divine affections and acts are benevolent. It is true that God's holiness is LOVE; but it is love, not simply or chiefly as healing and beneficent, but as going forth to destroy and punish *evil*. Mr. Crane holds to the doctrine that conscience is a moral faculty, and urges the duty (1) of cultivating it; (2) of directing it; (3) of obeying it. We quote the discussion of the second of these, as an illustration of the clear and forcible style in which the book is written:—

"Rousseau apostrophizes conscience as a 'divine instinct, immortal and heavenly voice, sure guide of a being ignorant and limited, but intelligent and free; infallible judge of good and evil.' But in what human breast is such a conscience to be found? The existence of an innate infallible conscience can be demonstrated neither by the present experience nor the past history of our fallen race. Children, whose training has been neglected, are as ignorant of ethics as of natural science. Even the strongest advocates of the infallibility of the inborn moral sense, when their attention is drawn to some intricate question in casuistry, have recourse, not to their 'divine instinct,' but to acknowledged rules, and to their ordinary powers of reasoning and comparing; and the more judicious and reliable the Christian becomes, the more carefully does he disregard unaccountable impulses, and seek to conform his life to the revealed standard of duty.

"It is evident that there may be strong convictions of obligation, and strong desires to obey, where there are but confused and even totally incorrect views of the will of the lawgiver. The obedient son, who goes with cheerful step to labour in the vineyard, may mistake some noxious weed for the grape of Eshcol. Saul, breathing threatenings and slaughter against the saints, 'lived in all good conscience before God,' as well as when he laid down his life and won a martyr's crown at Rome. The follower of Confucius, offering sacrifice at the tomb of his ancestors; the Tartar, attaching his paper prayer to the windmill; the Hindu devotee, casting himself down before the murderous wheels of his idol's car, may all feel an approving emotion. Conscientiousness may help on the follies of the heathen, as well as the prayers, and praises, and good works of the Christian. The sense of obligation may be active and tender, and yet be so left in the dark as even to prompt to the wrong. It sounds a warning against sin, it demands that the supposed right be done, but does not inspire knowledge. If confused in his notions of duty, even the sincere follower of Christ may go astray in his ignorance, and thus his usefulness and his spiritual progress are obstructed, if not totally destroyed. Revelation, direct or traditional, is the only sure guide. If we turn away our eyes from its bright rays, we grope in uncertain twilight, or are lost in midnight darkness. Passion, appetite, interest, prejudice, may wrest judgment and darken counsel. The true standard, the law of right, and our only infallible guide, is God's word. The heathen may possess fragments of traditionary truth, but 'we have a more sure word of prophecy, whereunto ye do well that ye take heed, as unto a light that shineth in a dark place.' Conscience and revealed morality are correlative, as light and the optic nerve are created for each other.

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"Again, men are acute in detecting, and severe in condemning, those sins to which they themselves are not given. The passionate man, forgetful of his fierce anger and its guilt, is zealous in his efforts to reform his neighbour, whom he suspects of being covetous. The volatile professor, whose endless levities render his sincerity questionable, lashes the more sober Christian for his gloomy repulsive countenance; while the sour ascetic frets even at the cheerfulness of youth, as if it were the worst of sins. The one who is careless in his business rails at the man who is careless in his language; and the one who is very slow to give his money to good objects, sees his brother's sin of pride in all its horrors; while the officious, censorious brother, by his unsparing reproofs, and ungenerous insinuations, keeps the whole Church in angry ferment, and atones for his own deficiency in spiritual things by calling attention to the spiritual defects of the rest. Thus it goes, through the whole round of peculiarity and circumstances, and each

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We should be glad to give further extracts, but our limits forbid. We must content ourselves with commending the work as the best hortatory exposition of the Decalogue extant among us; and we earnestly hope that it will be widely read by our ministers and people.

(47.) "*The Cloister Life of the Emperor Charles the Fifth*, by WILLIAM STIRLING," (Boston: Crosby, Nichols & Co.; 1853; 12mo., pp. 322,) is a book which has had quite a run in England, and is reprinted now from the second London edition. It gives a very different notion of the way of life adopted by the royal recluse from that which we derive from Robertson's graceful pages. The subject is so interesting that we hope to return to it again at some length.

(48.) "*Notes on the Gospels, Critical and Explanatory*, by M. W. JACOBUS, Professor of Biblical Literature in the Western Theological Seminary." (New-York: R. Carter & Brothers; 1853; 2 vols., 12mo.) In many respects this commentary is an advance on all that have preceded it, in adaptation to the wants of Sunday Schools,—especially of those which use the questions of the American Sunday-School Union. It takes up the Union Question Book, and gives notes with reference to them; not, however, confining the commentary to them. A Harmony of the Gospels is incorporated with the notes.

(49.) "*A New Greek Harmony of the Four Gospels*, by WM. STROUD, M. D." (London: S. Bagster & Sons; 1853; 4to., pp. 384.) This ample and elaborate work combines both a synopsis and a diatessaron of the Gospels, prepared on a plan presenting some striking novelties. The Greek text has been revised, and the authorities for all alterations are given in the foot-notes. A copious preliminary treatise treats of the nature of Gospel Harmonies; of the character of the Four Gospels, as furnishing the materials of a harmonized narrative; of the principles and rules adopted in the present Harmony; and of the character of the Harmony itself. A number of chronological and other tables of great value are appended. The work reached us too late for the careful examination required for a thorough notice in this number: we shall, however, treat it more at length in our next.

(50.) "*The Lives of the Popes, from A. D. 100 to A. D. 1853*." (New-York: Carlton & Phillips; 1853; 12mo., pp. 566.) This neat and portable volume contains the whole matter of four small volumes, originally published under the same title by the Religious Tract Society of London. There is no work extant to our knowledge that covers the same ground. It gives in compendious form the history of the Papacy from its very beginnings, down to the pontificate of Pius IX.—a kind of information which the American people stand much in need of just now. The work is written in a strongly Protestant spirit. It would be very useful as a book of reference, if supplied with a chronological table and an index.

(51.) "*Lights of the World; or, Illustrations of Character drawn from the Records of Christian Life*, by the REV. JOHN STOUGHTON." (New-York: Carlton & Phillips; 1853; 12mo., pp. 305.) The aim of this work is to

exhibit the various phases of the Christian life as illustrated in the real characters of holy men. It contains a number of sketches of eminent men,—not, indeed, complete biographies, or even “full-length portraits of their spiritual excellence;” but each set forth in narrative and description, for the purpose of illustrating some single element of vital godliness. Thus William Tyndale is taken as the embodiment of “labour and patience;” Leighton, of “the peacefulness of faith;” Baxter, of “earnest decision;” and Fletcher, of “intense devotion.” The book contains twelve such spiritual biographies. Its style is easy, sometimes eloquent, and always agreeable. The work is adapted to the times, and should be widely circulated.

(52.) “*Family and Social Melodies*, by W. C. HOYT,” (New-York: Carlton & Phillips; 8vo., pp. 224.) contains an excellent collection of hymns and tunes, especially adapted to family and social worship. The want of such a work, as an aid especially to family devotion, has long been felt—the collections for congregational use not being suited to the purpose. The hymns are taken mostly from the standard Hymn Book of the Church, though selections are given from a variety of other sources. “The tunes in this work are for the most part plain and familiar airs, suitable especially for family and social singing. A large number of them are Chorals. They have been selected from the best composers of olden and modern times. Together they present a great variety of metres, and form a most choice collection of music. For the convenience of those who use the Piano, Melodeon, Seraphine, or Organ, in their family devotions, and are not professional players, the *Trebles* are written on one staff.” Both in its matter and its form, we think this work meets precisely one of the Church’s urgent needs. Family worship is incomplete without sacred song; and we trust this little book will cause many a family altar, heretofore silent, to become vocal with the praise of God “in psalms and hymns.”

(53.) “*Philosophy and Practice of Faith*, by LEWIS P. OLDS.” (New-York: Carlton & Phillips; 12mo., pp. 353.) This book belongs to a class that has been rare of late years. It is a calm, thoughtful, yet uncontroversial survey of a great Christian doctrine in its bearings upon theology in general, and upon the Christian life in practice. The writer thus states his object in the preface: “It would perhaps be difficult to mention a subject in any department of knowledge remaining untouched; but were we required to name one upon which such elaboration had not been practised, we should readily say that of faith. Not that it is a novel subject, for it is one of the oldest; nor because it has not been a theme of constant allusion—for who listens to a discourse without hearing it mentioned?—but that it has been too little discussed by *itself*, and therefore left to suffer by making it but the secondary matter under consideration. Hence there is no subject about which, when called upon, men cannot give more definite and satisfactory replies; the knowledge respecting it appearing detached and incomplete, and requiring reflection to shape into system the ideas entertained. It appears as a skeleton to the fancy, awaiting

some homogeneous matter to fill up the vacancies and make the body complete. It is to fill up this picture of the mind, in part, that the present volume has been designed; and while in this view of its purpose the work needs no apologist—the fact, as suggested, being admissible by every one giving the subject a moment's reflection—the *manner* in which the task has been performed must be submitted to the most charitable consideration of the reader." The work is divided into two parts, of which the first treats of the nature, source, and growth of faith; the second part illustrates faith as *exercised* in different ages, and under the various circumstances of human life. The book is one that cannot be characterized in a mere notice: we can only afford room for a single specimen of the author's style, and of his mode of treating the subject Under the title "Increase and Diminution of Faith," he remarks:—

"The bird learns to fly fearlessly by means of the pupilage of short and easy circles around its nest: the eagle that perches upon the dizzy height, or soars along the verge of the storm-cloud, at first plumed his delicate wing with trembling. The confidence at first wanting in these efforts was supplied by example and encouragement. Trial begat new energy and purpose, new strength of wing and heart, and the designs were daily matured.

"It is the beaming eye, extended hand, and inspiring voice, that enables the child to take yet another tottering step—the process repeated, that gives firmness and assurance to the tread, and finally enables him to sally forth with all the buoyancy of manhood.

"It is ascertained that by use the muscles of the body have their size and strength increased. The arm that lifts the hammer at the forge, or swings the axe among the sturdy trees, will have more vigour than that of the student. Not only so, but the limbs mostly used increase in strength to the diminution in vigour of such as are comparatively idle.

"It is from similar causes that the organs of the mind derive strength and activity from exercise, and suffer a consequent diminution from disuse. So that while one mind develops astonishing vigour, another is only of ordinary strength, or dwarfed into distressing ignorance. The affections of the mind are governed by similar laws of growth or decay, and when brought into constant play become vigorous, whilst others, neglected, are weakened or destroyed.

"Now as the child has its energies increased by the confidence inspired by earnest and devoted teaching, so the mind of man goes on from strength to strength by reason of encouragement to action. The poet fancies he hears the troubadour chanting his lay to the anxious ear of beauty, and invokes anew the aid of his muse. The sculptor and painter imagine they see their living image in the niche and fane of proudest temples, and they continue their toils with renewed courage. The soldier dreams of embracing his far-absent wife and children, in view of his cottage home, and his affections grow stronger than ever, while he wakes to war with the tear in his eye.

"There is a confidence inspired from associating with our fellow-men. This is of every-day occurrence. He who never deceives is never doubted. The faithful friend of life is a source of constant and abiding trust. How much more is confidence in divine things enlarged by the daily observation of the course of nature, and the spiritual discernment of the mysteries of religion. The sun rises, and the eye beholds him go down in glory behind the western hills with a belief that he will rise again. The last rose of summer is plucked, and fades, with the persuasion that returning spring will again beautify the earth with the queen of flowers. The heart pines for tranquillity and peace, the Spirit soothes it with the balm of grace, and when sorrow returns, the heart flies to God for comfort again. Like as confidence is increased between man and man, the mind is linked to God in unyielding trust. And as the realization of promise after promise is enjoyed, the belief in the mercy and power of God is enlarged. By exercising faith in God, we therefore become more able and prone to believe. Though a law of being, it can never become a moral necessity for man to put

confidence in man; not because of innate suspicion that he may prove false, but that faith is voluntary and coercive; and though it may increase till apparently nothing can shake it, yet it is possible to withdraw it. But in the unchangeable promises of God there is a surer trust than anything earthly deserves, and the soul reposes with peculiar confidence in them; yet the belief is voluntary, and may by disobedience be destroyed. Were earthly friendship or love to God involuntary emotions, the one could never be broken nor the other fail. But it being otherwise, effort is needed to maintain both.

"By the exercise of an emotion it becomes easier to exercise it again, and by disuse the power to use it is diminished. This admitted, there is cause for confidence with the pious, as every effort at obedience but the better fits them for duty. So considering the traveller to eternity as making each act of faith and obedience a remove in the direction of heaven, and at the same time a like remove from destruction, the pilgrimage of the pious becomes exciting and hopeful, or harrowing and doubtful. The last step *must* be taken that effects deliverance or ruin. All have their faces Zionward, or are hastening toward destruction. Each of us is now at some point in this way to life or death!"

We hope that this thoughtful and discriminating book may find many readers.

(54.) "*A Theodicy; or, Vindication of the Divine Glory, as Manifested in the Constitution and Government of the Moral World.* By ALBERT TAYLOR BLEDSOE, Professor of Mathematics and Astronomy in the University of Mississippi." (New-York: Carlton & Phillips; 1853; 8vo., pp. 365.) A mere notice can do no justice to a work so important and valuable as this. The title reveals the greatness of the author's undertaking—nothing less than a reëxamination of the problem which has baffled both metaphysics and theology for ages. We can only now indicate the author's outline. The introduction treats of the *possibility* of a Theodicy, showing that the failure of Plato, Leibnitz, and others, is not properly a ground of despair; and that the attempt is justified by what we know of the moral universe and of the nature of the human mind. The work is, then, divided into two parts, of which the FIRST shows that "the existence of *moral* evil is consistent with the holiness of God." This topic is treated in seven chapters, whose titles are as follows: "Chap. I. The scheme of necessity denies that man is responsible for the existence of sin; Chap. II. The scheme of necessity makes God the author of sin; Chap. III. The scheme of necessity denies the reality of moral distinctions; Chap. IV. The moral world not constituted according to the scheme of necessity; Chap. V. The relation between the human will and the divine agency; Chap. VI. The existence of moral evil, or sin, reconciled with the holiness of God; Chap. VII. Objections considered."

The SECOND PART shows that "the existence of *natural* evil, or suffering, is consistent with the goodness of God." This is treated in five chapters, as follows: "Chap. I. God desires and seeks the salvation of all men; Chap. II. Natural evil, or suffering, and especially the suffering of infants, reconciled with the goodness of God; Chap. III. The sufferings of Christ reconciled with the goodness of God; Chap. IV. The eternal punishment of the wicked reconciled with the goodness of God; Chap. V. The dispensation of the divine favours reconciled with the goodness of God." The author gives, in conclusion, a summary view of the principles and advantages of the whole system.

FOURTH SERIES, VOL. V.—39

Mr. Bledsoe writes clearly and well. His style is more *popular* than has been usual in discussions of this sort, so that his book, while it will necessarily draw the attention of the deepest thinkers, is yet adapted to the perusal of all cultivated readers. We shall return to it again, for a fuller examination, as soon as possible.

(55.) "*Handbuch des Methodismus*, von LUDWIG S. JACOBY." (Bremen: 1853; 12mo., pp. 388.) This work, prepared by our excellent missionary superintendent at Bremen, is designed to furnish the German nations of Europe with a better and more accurate knowledge of Methodism than has heretofore been diffused among them. It is divided into four parts: first, a brief history of Methodism from the beginning up to the present time, (pp. 1-198;) second, an account of the doctrines of the Church, (pp. 199-294;) third, the Church government of Methodism, (pp. 295-354;) fourth, the peculiar usages of Methodism, (pp. 356-388.) It is precisely such a compendium as is needed in Germany; and we should think it admirably adapted, also, for circulation among the Germans in this country. The work is not a translation, but is conscientiously and skilfully prepared from the original sources. We rejoice to see our system set forth before the scholars and Christians of Germany in a book so clear, sensible, and judicious.

(56.) Of the following serials, sermons, &c., we regret that we can give nothing more than the titles:—

Catalogue of White-Water College, Centreville, Indiana, 1852-3.

Catalogue of Ohio University, 1852-3.

Anniversary Address before the Union Missionary Society, in the University of Michigan, delivered at Ann Arbor, June 26th, 1853, by Professor E. O. Haven.

Catalogue of Danville Seminary, 1852-3.

Anniversary Address of the Freehold Young Ladies' Seminary, by Robert Davidson, D. D.

Catalogue of the Albion Female Institute and Western Seminary, 1852-3.

Catalogue of Rock-River Seminary, Mount Morris, Ill., 1852-3.

Circular of Genesee Model School for Boys, Lima, New-York.

First Annual Report of the New-York Young Men's Christian Association, presented May 16, 1853.

First Annual Report of the People's Washing and Bathing Association, 1853.

Thirty-Seventh Anniversary Address of the American Bible Society.

Thirty-First Report of the American Baptist Home Mission Society.

Ecclesiastical Opposition to the Bible: a Serial Sermon. By Thomas H. Stockton.

Thirty-Third Annual Report of the Mercantile Library Association of Boston, 1853.

The Cross of Christ. By Davis W. Clark, D. D.

Letters respecting the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, and the American Tract Society. By W. Jay.

ART. IX.—INTELLIGENCE.

Theological and Religious.

EUROPEAN.

We have received the second part of Reuss's "*Geschichte der Heiligen Schriften Neuen Testaments*," (Braunschweig, 1853, 8vo., pp. 586,) completing the work. This second edition is brought down to the latest period, and affords the best compendium of the history of the literature of the New Testament of which we are aware. Like all other German books, it is most deficient in that part which treats of the works of English and American writers, of whom the author frankly confesses his ignorance.

"*Die Auslegung des Vaterunsers*, von G. C. R. MATTHÆI," (Göttingen: 1853; 8vo., pp. 162,) is an interpretation of the Lord's Prayer, offered as an illustration and application of what the author calls the "highest principle of New Testament hermeneutics." According to his view, there never has been a satisfactory exegesis of the New Testament, and never can be, without the application of this principle; which is the interpreting Christ's word according to Christ's own self-consciousness, 1. As to God—Father—Son and Spirit; 2. As to Revelation, the Messiah, and the Future Life. A critique is afforded of the various interpretations of the Lord's Prayer, given by the allegorical, the rationalistic, and the supernatural interpreters, and each is shown to be defective. Certainly we have found no German writer of late years so straightforward, clear, and trenchant. Matthæi is a moderate Hegelian, we believe—at least we should infer so from this acute book.

A NEW volume of "*Theological Essays*," (London, 1 vol., 8vo.,) by Professor Maurice, has just appeared. Its contents are as follows: 1. On Charity; 2. On Sin; 3. On the Evil Spirit; 4. On the Sense of Righteousness in Men, and their Discovery of a Redeemer; 5. On the Son of God; 6. On the Incarnation; 7. On the Atonement; 8. On the Resurrection of the Son of God from Death, the Grave, and Hell; 9. On Justification by Faith; 10. On Regeneration; 11. On the Ascension of Christ; 12. On the Judgment-Day; 13. On Inspiration; 14. On the Personality and Teaching of the Holy Spirit; 15. On the

Unity of the Church; 16. On the Trinity in Unity; Conclusion, on Eternal Life and Eternal Death.

DORNER's "*Lehre von der Person Christi*," though incomplete, is the most thorough and learned treatise on the doctrine of the Person of Christ that has yet appeared in any language. We are glad to see another volume announced as ready in Berlin, containing the history of the doctrine of the Trinity from the fifth century up to the time of the Reformation. The concluding volume of the work is promised before January, 1854.

We have received the first number of Herzog's "*Real-Encyclopædie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*," (Stuttgart, 1853, 8vo.) The work is intended to form a complete cyclopædia of the sciences connected with theology, and has among the names of its collaborators a number of the most eminent men in Germany, namely, Ullmann, Tholuck, Umbreit, Hagenbach, Gieseler, Müller, and others. It is to appear in monthly parts, ten to form a volume, and the whole work to be completed in about ten volumes royal 8vo. The part before us contains eighty pages, and extends down to the word *Abraxas*.

THE election of a new *General of the Jesuits* is matter of interest to the entire ecclesiastical world. The late General Roothan was perhaps the ablest head the Society was ever ruled by. Endowed with a mind of singular acuteness, he was a man also of great acquirements and skill: and the recent revival of Jesuitism in all lands is due mainly to his distinguished genius and industry. It is said that during the later years of his life he was not only General of his Order, but *de facto* Pope. It was also Roothan who authorized, presided over, and conducted to a successful issue, a scheme for adapting the course of studies in Jesuit schools to the actual requirements of the age, proceeding in the spirit of Dr. Wiseman's book on the connexion between science and religion. In other words, it was he who guided Jesuitism into its present position of educational power, and made it

possible for the successors of the men who imprisoned Galileo to exhibit themselves as teachers and advocates of modern science. The new General is PETER BECKS, a Belgian, and the third of that nation who has been counted among the successors of Ignatius. He is said to have (exoterically) as strong an admiration for saintish fables as Father Newman, and quite able to nourish the infatuated youth of this generation who go over to Rome to satisfy their morbid appetite. He can give them legend and falsification to their heart's content. He was born February 8th, 1795, and entered into the Order October 29, 1819. He subsequently filled the Rectorate of the Seminary at Löwen, and afterward the government of the Order in the Province of Austria. According to the *New-York Tribune*, "his character, his talents, his tried discretion in the most delicate emergencies, are a guarantee that he will prove a worthy successor to the distinguished Father Rootham. He was elected with great unanimity by the General Congregation, and his accession to office is hailed by the Society of Jesuits as giving promise of the richest fruits for the benefit of their Order." The same account states that the General Congregation which made the election was the twenty-second since the establishment of the Order, and consisted of fifty-two members—fifteen from the department of Italy, with the provinces of Rome, Naples, Sicily, Turin and Venice,—nine from France, including the provinces of Paris, Lyons, and Toulouse,—twenty from the department of Germany, with the provinces of Germany, England, Austria, Belgium, Galicia, Holland and Maryland, and three from Spain. The number was completed by the addition of Father Pierling, the Vicar General, and one assistant from each department. The solemnities are opened by the celebration of mass by the vicar, after which the whole company of members of the Order present, with a crucifix borne before them, and singing the *Veni Creator*, walk in procession to the hall designated by the vicar, which, after the members have entered, is closed and guarded by some of the members selected for the purpose. The electors fast on bread and water, and are not allowed to leave the hall until the choice is decided. One of the members, appointed by the congregation, admonishes them in a Latin discourse, to keep a single eye to the glory of God and the benefit of their Order in making the choice. Each member then

receives a card, on which he writes, in a disguised hand, the name of his candidate, adding his signature in a way that it shall not be read by those who count the ballots. After all the members have prepared their votes and returned to their seats, the vicar, the private secretary, and the assistant, take the following oath to make true declaration of the votes: "I call God to witness, from whom nothing is concealed, that I will truly receive and declare the votes, and will perform my duty with pure purpose. I also swear, in the view of the Divine Majesty and of the whole Order, that I will admit no one who has not a right to be admitted, and I will exclude no one who ought not to be excluded." The private secretary then turns to the vicar, with the words, "My father, give your vote in the name of Jesus Christ." The vicar rises, kneels before the crucifix, makes the sign of the cross, and takes the oath which is inscribed on the back of each ballot. I take Jesus Christ, who is Eternal Wisdom, to witness that I choose for the General-in-Chief of the Society of Jesus, him whom I regard as the fittest for the office." Then rising, he deposits his vote in the urn, showing it to the assistant. He then salutes the crucifix, returns to his seat, and says to the secretary, the assistant, and the members generally, "Let each now give his vote in order." The provincials sit on the right, the other members on the left, according to the date of their admission into the Order. When the members, in accordance with their oath, have all given their votes, the secretary takes them from the urn, counts them aloud, and hands them one after the other to the vicar, who examines them and reads them aloud, or causes the secretary to read them, giving only the name of the candidate, and concealing that of the voter. After all the votes are thus announced, if any one has more than half, he is elected. Otherwise, they proceed to a new balloting, which may be repeated four or five times, but after the fifth trial it is optional to continue the balloting, or to enter into a compromise. In the last case, electors are chosen from each department by an absolute majority, who elect the General by a simple plurality, being limited, however, to candidates who have received at least three votes on the former trials. The choice being determined, the vicar announces it, unless it has fallen upon himself, and in that case it is declared by the secretary, who makes out the decree, which receives

the seal of the Society. The whole company of the fathers, the vicar first, then the secretary, pay their respects to the new General, kneeling and kissing his hand. If the choice has fallen on a person out of the congregation, but present in the city, the assembly do not leave the hall until they have called him into their presence and paid him their fealty. If he is at the distance of eight or ten days' journey, he is sent for, the congregation suspending their labours until his arrival. It is not permitted to decline the choice. After the act of obedience, the father who has charge of the keys of the hall, announces that the election is completed, the ballots are burned, and the congregation return in procession to the church, singing the "*Benedictus Dominus*," when a *Te Deum* is performed, and the usual prayer said to the Holy Trinity and the Virgin. The election of Father Becks took place at Rome on the 2d of July. The following votes were cast:—

Very Rev. Father Becks	35
Very Rev. Father Pierling, Vicar-General	10
The celebrated Father Ravignon, Deputy of the Province of Paris	4
Rev. Father Rubillon, Assistant of France	1
Rev. Father Patrizi, Delegate of Rome	1
Rev. Father Ferrari	1

THE thirty-seventh volume of the "Library of the Fathers," (published by J. H. Parker, London,) contains the translation of St. Augustine on the Psalms, Vol. V.

TAUCHNITZ, of Leipzig, has just published "*Canones et Decreta Concilii Tridentini ex Editione Romana A. MDCCCXXXIV Repetiti*. Accedunt S. Congr. Card. Conc. Trid. Interpretum Declarationes Ac Resolutiones ex Ipso Declarationum Thesaurio Bullario Romano et Benedicti XIV. S. P. Operibus et Constitutiones Pontificie Recentiores ad jus Commune Spectantes E Bullario Romano Selectæ. Assumpto Socio FRIDERICO SCHULTE, J. U. D. Edidit ÆMILIUS LUDOVICUS RICHTER, J. U. D. Et In Lit. Univ. Berol. Prof. Publ. Ord." The work is published in imperial 8vo., and costs, in this country, about \$4 50.

If it be true, as a recent earnest and well-informed writer remarks, that the GREEK CHURCH is eventually destined, chiefly through the power of Russia, "to regain the whole of the Græco-Eastern Empire, and even to cover Asia, and extend to the uttermost shores of the East-

ern and Southern Ocean," the present character and condition of that Church becomes matter of the gravest interest. Great attention has been paid to the subject of late, and the following works are among its fruits, namely:—"Dissertations on Subjects Relating to the 'Orthodox' or 'Eastern-Catholic' Communion. By W. Palmer, M. A., Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. 1 vol., 8vo.:—History of the Holy Eastern Church. By the Rev. J. M. Neale, M. A. General Introduction. I. Its Geography. II. Its Ecclesiology. III. Its Liturgies, &c. In two large volumes, demy 8vo.:—Appendix to the Introduction to the Holy Eastern Church: containing a List of all the Sees in the Holy Eastern Church, with the Names of the Possessors as they existed in 1848. Translated from the original Russ, with Notes. By the same Author:—The History of the Patriarchate of Alexandria, from its Foundation, A. D. 44, to the death of Hierotheus, 1846. By the same Author. 2 vols., demy 8vo.:—The Doctrine of the Russian Church, being the Primer or Spelling Book, the Shorter and Larger Catechisms, and a Treatise on the Duty of Parish Priests. Translated from the Slavonic-Russian Originals, by the Rev. R. W. Blackmore, M. A., formerly Chaplain in Cronstadt. Demy 8vo.:—A Harmony of Anglican Doctrine, with the Doctrine of the Catholic and Apostolic Church of the East, which may serve as an Appendix to the volume entitled, 'The Doctrine of the Russian Church,' recently published by the same Author. Demy 8vo.:—A History of the Church of Russia. By A. N. Mouravieff, Chamberlain to His Majesty, and Under-Procurator of the Most Holy governing Synod, St. Petersburg, translated by the same Author. Devotions Enjoined by the Holy Eastern Church, (pamphlet.)"

"*Lehrbuch der Katechetik, zugleich eine Apologie des Katechetischen Lehrverfahrens*, von G. I. PLATO, Professor zu Leipzig." (Leipzig, 1853, 12mo., pp. 367.) This book is a repertory of valuable information on the subject of catechization, arranged in a clear and scientific order.

A BRIEF treatise, exhibiting a parallel view of the theological systems of Romanism and Protestantism, is a desideratum in the English language. A valuable manual, in German, lies before us, entitled "*Das Bekenntniß der Evangelischen Kirche in seinem Verhältniß zu dem der Römischen und Griechischen*, von Dr. A. HAHN, Professor zu Breslau." (Leipzig,

1853, 8vo., pp. 192.) Dr. Hahn is a very careful writer, temperate in his feelings, and moderate in his language. After a brief introduction, defining the true Church, Dr. Hahn compares the doctrines of the three Churches, (drawn from the standard formulas of each,) first, with regard to the Object of Religious Worship; second, with regard to the doctrines of Sin and Salvation; third, with regard to the Means of Grace, (including the Word of God and the Sacraments;) fourth, with regard to the Future State. We should like to see a work prepared on such a basis for English readers.

Among the new theological works recently announced in Great Britain are the following:—

Dissertation on the Origin and Connection of the Gospels; with a Synopsis of the Parallel Passages in the Original and Authorized Version, and Critical Notes. By James Smith, Esq., Author of the "Voyage and Shipwreck of St. Paul." 8vo. :—The Warburton Lectures of 1849–1853. By the Rev. E. B. Elliott, M. A. 8vo. :—The Jesuits; an Historical Sketch. By the Rev. E. W. Grinfield, M. A. Fcp. 8vo. :—Israel in Egypt. Illustrations of the Book of Genesis, from Egyptian Monuments. Crown 8vo., with engravings:—An Exposition of the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Galatians, by Professor John Brown, of Edinburgh. Large 8vo. :—The Sufferings and Glories of the Messiah, signified beforehand to David and Isaiah: an Exposition of Psalm xviii, and Isaiah iii, 13; liii, 12. By Professor John Brown, of Edinburgh. 8vo. :—The Third Part of the Ecclesiastical History of John, Bishop of Ephesus, (the Syriac Text,) now first edited by William Cureton, M. A., F. R. S., Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen. 1 vol., 4to. :—The Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist. By Archdeacon Wilberforce. Demy 8vo.

Among the new works in theology and kindred topics, recently announced on the continent of Europe, are the following:—

Bernstein, G. H., Das heilige Evangelium des Johannes. Syriac in Harklensischer Uebersetzung. Mit syrischem titel und vignette. Leipzig: 8vo.

Chalybäus, H. M., Philosophie und Christenthum. Ein Beitrag zur Begründung der Religions-Philosophie. Kiel, 8vo., pp. 188.

Ewald, H., Geschichte des Volkes Israel bis Christus. Zweite Ausgabe. 2 Bd. A. u. d. T.: Geschichte Moses

und der Gottherrschaft in Israel. Göttingen: 8vo., pp. 566.

Meyer, E. J., Ueber das Verhältniss Jesu und seiner Jünger zum alttestamentlichen Gesetz. Magdeburg: 8vo., pp. 137.

Nägelsbach, Dr. C. W. E., der Gottmensch. Die Grundidee der Offenbarung in ihrer Einheit und geschichtlichen Entwicklung dargestellt. 1 Bd. Der Mensch der Natur. Nurnberg: 8vo., pp. 452.

Reuss, E., Die Geschichte der heiligen Schriften neuen Testaments. Zweite durchaus ungearbeitete und stark vermehrte Ausgabe. II. Abth. S. Braunschweig: pp. 266–586.

Der Gottesdienst der Alten Kirche. Ein Vortrag von H. Abecken. 8vo. Berlin.

Die Gesellschaft Jesu, ihr Zweck, ihre Satzungen, Geschichte, Aufgabe und Stellung in der Gegenwart von F. J. Buss. In Zwei Abtheilungen. I. Abtheilung: Weltgeschichtliche Vorbereitungen, Stiftung und Satzungen der Gesellschaft Jesu. 8vo. (viii pp. and pp. 1–640.) Mainz. The second part (pp. 641–end) will be issued shortly. The author of this history of the Jesuits, though not avowedly belonging to the society, appears to embrace the Roman views.

Concordantiarum SS. Scripturæ Manuale, editio in commodissimum ordinem disposita et cum ipso textu sacro de verbo ad verbum sexies collata de Raze, de Lachaud et Flandrin. 8vo. (viii and 751 pp.) Paderborn.

Corpus Reformatorum. Post C. G. Bretschneiderum ed. H. E. Bindseil. Vol. XIX. Et. s. t.: Ph. Melancthonis opera quae supersunt omnia vol. XIX. 4to. Braunschweig.

Neue Untersuchung Ueber Entstehung und Anlage der kanonischen Evangelien von Prof. Dr. F. Delitzsch. 1. Thl.: Das Matthäus-Evangelium. 8vo. (112 pp.) Leipzig.

Compendium Ethicæ Christianæ Catholicae. In usum lectionum academiarum. Ed. Prof. Dr. B. Dieckhoff. Fasc. II. Continens ex ethica speciali tractatus de religione interna et externa. 8vo. (vi pp. and pp. 149–264.) Paderborn.

Geschichte des Volkes Israel Bis Christus von H. Ewald. 2te Ausg. 2ter Band; a. u. d. T.: Geschichte Moses und der Gottherrschaft in Israel. 2te Ausgabe. 8vo. (ix and 566 pp.) Göttingen.

Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte von Dr. J. C. L. Gieseler. 3ter Bd. 2te Abth. 2. Thl. 8vo. (vi pp. and pp. 481-722.) Bonn.

Vita Jesu Christi A Paulo Apostolo Adumbrata. Commentatio a E. W. Kolthoff. 8vo. (55 pp.) Hafniæ, 1852.

Das Johanneische Evangelium nach seiner Eigenthümlichkeit geschildert und erklärt von Ch. E. Luthardt. 2te Abth. 8vo. Nürnberg.

Commentarius Criticus in N. T. quo loca graviora et difficiliora lectionis dubiae accurate recensentur et explicantur Dr. J. G. Reiche. Tom. I. Epistolas Pauli ad Romanos et ad Corinthios datas continens. 4to. (vi and 409 pp.) Göttingen.

Die Christliche Religion von Dr. J. Scheinert. 1ster Bd. 8vo. (iv and 479 pp.) Königsberg.

WE continue our summaries of the contents of the principal foreign theological journals:—

THE "*Theologische Studien und Kritiken*," for July, 1853, (Hamburgh,) contains the following articles: 1. Confession and Union, by Professor Schöberlein, of Heidelberg, showing the difficulties and arguing the possibilities of union among the different branches of the Church; 2. An Inquiry into the question whether Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Medo-Persian monarchy, was identical with the Cyrus of Daniel, by Schulz, of Berlin; 3. A Homiletical Essay on the proper place of the exordium—whether before or after the text—of the sermon; 4. Review of Göbel's "*Geschichte des Christlichen Lebens in der rheinisch-westphälischen Kirche*," by Wachtler; 5. Re-

view of Meyer's "*Blätter für höhere Wahrheit*," by Hamberger.

Christian Remembrancer, for July:—I. Recent Metaphysics: II. Miss Yonge's Novels: III. Palmer's Dissertations: IV. The Cloister-Life of the Emperor Charles the Fifth: V. Alford's Greek Testament, Vol. II.: VI. Modern Poetry: VII. Church Penitentiary Association: VIII. *Spicilegium Solesmense*.

Journal of Sacred Literature, for July:—I. The Rivers of Damascus: II. Armenian Translation of Eusebius: III. On the Samaritan Pentateuch: IV. The Sinaitic Inscriptions: V. Collation of the Gospels: VI. The Nestorians: VII. Syriac Metrical Literature: VIII. The Meaning of Scriptural Silence: IX. On the "Running" of St. Paul.

Eclectic Review, for July:—I. The Reformation in England: II. Angling Literature: III. Popery—Its Genius and Policy: IV. Woodward's History of Wales: V. The Law of Mortmain: VI. The Art-Student in Munich: VII. Church Rates—Recent Parliamentary Debate: VIII. India—Its Government and Prospects. For August:—I. On Specimens of Natural History: II. The Kingdoms of Central Africa: III. The History of Trial by Jury: IV. Russell's Tour in Ceylon and India: V. Chesterton's Autobiography: VI. Stroud's Greek Harmony of the Four Gospels: VII. The Grenville Correspondence: VIII. The Turkish Question.

Prospective Review, (London,) for July:—I. Parker's Sermons on Religion: II. Religious Fiction: III. Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy: IV. Music in its Relations to Public Worship: V. Shakespeare.

Classical and Miscellaneous.

EUROPEAN.

LETTERS ON RECENT EUROPEAN LITERATURE

LETTER I.

PARIS, May 1, 1853.

As my arrangements are not yet complete for the prompt receipt of foreign works, I must confine myself, on this occasion, to the French. And here, as permanently, those alone will be selected for analysis which can commend themselves by some advancement of the previous limits of their several subjects, or by a

special adaptation to the wants or wishes of American readers.

The first work to which I call your attention is a treatise on "*Climates and the Influence exercised by wooded and non-wooded soils*," &c. (*Des Climats et de l'Influence qu'exercent les sols Boisés et non Boisés. Par M. Bequerel, de l'Académie des Sciences et de l'Institut de France.* Paris: Firmin Didot Frères. New-York: Hector Bossange, 134 Pearl-street. Quebec: Bunde-street.) This is a book that falls fully under our second category of selection.

It treats of a subject that comes home peculiarly to the business and bosoms of American citizens, who have to cultivate a forest continent, and need to mitigate a violent climate. The author's plan is briefly indicated in the preface: "I will set before the reader's eyes," he says, "historical documents the most authentic as to the state of the primeval forests on the surface of the globe, as to the changes they have undergone from the waste of war and of civilization, and also what they are at the present day. I will present him, in the next place, while discussing their real value, the observations that have been made at divers epochs of the past, and by the aid of which it has been sought to demonstrate a change or permanence of climate in cleared countries which had been formerly wooded. In the third place, this exposition and this discussion will be preceded by an elementary treatise on climates, to the end of indicating the numerous causes which exert an influence in their constitution, and to show the nature of the changes wrought in them by clearance and cultivation."

Thus the scheme is, we see, abundantly comprehensive; while these departments are, all three, treated with great thoroughness. For instance, the division of elementary climatology commences, in this function, with the beginning: "The earth had an igneous origin, as witness the flatness at the poles, the increase of heat below the surface of invariable temperature, the thermal springs and volcanic phenomena. It must have passed successively from the gaseous to the liquid state; and its periphery, to a certain depth, from the liquid state into the solid. The gaseous matter not liquefiable composed about it an aerial atmosphere. From the solid crust, consisting of granites, porphyries, serpentines, were formed by attrition the primitive soils. The secondary soils were formed from sedimentary deposits. When the temperature fell low enough to leave the water liquid on the earth's surface, the streams began to rush along the crevices and the declivities resulting from the operation of the earth's cooling, wrought ravines among the rocks, and rolled the *debris* at the bottom, where were formed the first deposits of this second order. These deposits, at first level, then inclined to the horizon in consequence of new upheavals and overlappings, were composed of boulders of sand, of chalky clay, with little or no limestone, which appeared not, in

any abundance, until later. The action of the water was so far but *mechanical*. It operated also, however, *physically* and even *chemically* in the composition of the various sedimental series." The mode of operation is followed regularly by the author, until it ends with the last formations of the *inorganic* earth.

"But this," he says, "was not sufficient for the birth of vegetation. There was still necessary the detritus also of *organic* matter, or ammoniacal or azotized principles. These indeed might have been formed by electric discharges in the atmosphere. As to the organic matter, it could be furnished only by organized bodies. But how then has the vital principle made its appearance upon the earth? Science remains mute at this question: for if all the substances composing the earth and the organized bodies upon its surface should come to fall back into their elements, through some great catastrophe, as an excess of heat, and then a process of gradual cooling were to succeed, the inorganic compounds would be all re-formed by the agency of their affinities; while *we do not see* how the germs of animals or plants could reappear. We must needs then admit the existence of a creative power, which has been manifested at certain epochs of the world's history, and which acts now in preserving the present species, not in forming new ones. Let us describe, then, only what takes place as vegetation overruns the earth as soon as the germs are transported thither by an unknown cause." P. 15. Yet this unknown cause, of which haughty science is thus compelled to confess its ignorance, is made familiar to our plainest readers by the light of religion.

The author sketches next the rise of the successive series of vegetation; from which he passes to the various soils, and thence in turn to the climates. Having laid down this grand speculative or scientific basis, he then proceeds to the attestations both of history and statistics. And in this consists the special value of the work. In the theoretic portion I find nothing quite original; but for utility, abundance, and the latest scientific accuracy, I believe its mass of *facts* without a rival on the subject. In fact, the writer is here esteemed the first authority in that department. The work (which is in one volume) is enhanced further by two fine maps; the one indicative of the oceanic currents over the whole globe, the other descriptive of the meteorology of France.

I am next to introduce to you a little volume upon Anthropology. (*De l'Homme et des Races humaines. Par Henry Holland, Docteur en Médecine et Docteur en Sciences, Professeur d'Histoire Naturelle à l'Académie de Neuchâtel. Paris: Labé, Libraire de la Faculté de Médecine. Hector Bossange, New-York, 134 Pearl-street.*) I do so the more freely, that the fervid author is a vehement advocate for both the unity and the divinity assigned our species by the Holy Scriptures. But he has also another merit more original than this. He thinks "the natural history of man requires a previous appreciation of the system of entire nature of which he forms an integral part." This preliminary requisite he furnishes accordingly in a very able and intelligent introduction. But is the notion quite consistent with his invectives against "Pantheism," of which this aggregate embodiment of man with nature is the vulgar principle? But not to judge from a mere expression, take the following statement from the introduction. He is speaking of the universal progression of nature:—

"This progression, which commences at the same point in all organisms, which proceeds through analogous phases in those of the same kingdom or the same type, which, in fine, from one being to another, varies chiefly in its superior and definitive term—this progression, what does it show us? An active cause, a force, appropriating to itself the formless matter which is supplied it, wrapping itself therein, not as if with a fixed envelop, but as with an organic medium which it elaborates and renews by an intimate and continuous movement of modification, manifesting it above all as an organizing force, then as a sensible being, in fine, as an intelligent soul, until it rises, conscious of itself, from the perception of particular phenomena to the conception of universal ideas. Thus is constituted that individuality, real, concrete, and living, called man. It is thus at first, and in the harmonic wholeness of his attributes, that we will study him, successively placing him in juxtaposition with other creatures and with his fellows." Pp. 4, 5.

At the same time that this passage serves to indicate the author's plan, it goes to show, I think, that he is treading on the utmost verge of materialism. The only doubt that can be entertained of his thus falling flatly into inconsistency, could turn merely on some mystic meaning of his organizing or active "force." Upon this, we see, he is not

explicit above. But some pages after, there occurs a passage which unveils a little this occult cause, though the explanation was incidental, and no doubt unconscious. He is treating still of the progressive series of being throughout the universe:—

"What is indicated to us by this strict, constant, and universal dependence among all the phenomena of the physical world? That they are all resolvable into one general fact, and that they proceed from one and the same cause; in a word, that one common force is diffused throughout entire nature, and sets all its operations at work. Such is also the implied conclusion of modern physicists when, in their most accredited theory, instead of imponderable fluids, which pluralized the sources of physical phenomena, they substitute the doctrine which explains all those phenomena by the diversified vibrations of an ethereal fluid diffused throughout all space and penetrating all bodies." P. 21.

Here, then, are all phenomena resolved into "vibration," motion.

At the same time I must say, the author protests expressly, over and over, that the human intellect or soul is *sui generis*. But here precisely is the contradiction whereby his treatise is best described. The book in truth is an amalgam, so to say, of Pritchard with Lamarck. The author, as a physiologist, could not deny the law of development, but thought of reconciling it with the antagonistic theory. The result is, however, none the worse for this common oversight, as it presents a clever survey of both the systems in convenient contrast.

This theory of Development is quite the order of the age. It is the subject, more directly, of still another publication, which bears the title of "*Profession of Faith of the Nineteenth Century.*" (*Profession de Foi du Dix Neuvième Siècle. Par Eugene Pelletan. Paris: Pagnerre. Hector Bossange, New-York, 134 Pearl-street.*) The author is one of the editors of the democratic *Siècle*, perhaps the ablest and most attically-written journal of Paris; for radicalism is not inseparable from vulgarity and crudity, as you might naturally think from some of its organs in America.

And as the journal, so the book in point of elegance of style. But, *en revanche*, the composition savours also of the journalist. It is the product of a general knowledge of the odds and ends

of all things thrown together, as alone materials acquired in this way can ever be. To hide this looseness, like Carlyle and Emerson, the author wraps it in a mist of sentiment, and casts, moreover, the exposition in a sort of melo-dramatic form. A recluse student, whom he encountered in an old hotel of Paris, is made the oracle of the new faith. This personage (a fresh edition of the *Vicaire Soreau*) is made to narrate how he passed from religion to scepticism and thence to science; and having sketched this merely personal and mental evolution, he launches back into primeval chaos, and traces upward the law of progression, until he reaches the final term of creation in the human intellect. "Life," says he, "was in the marrow of this the latest genesis but a vast metempsychosis, persevering, from form to form, from energy to energy, from aggregation to vegetation, from vegetation to sensibility, from sensibility to instinct, from instinct to intelligence—a final type which it had not hitherto attained: it was but a restless ascension toward a supreme incarnation; an infinite subordination of different functions exerted by a diversity of creatures, and destined to end in a superior being and a superior function of sovereignty." P. 49.

This extract also shows the tone and tenor of the writer to be Carlyleish, as I described it—that is, rhapsodical. It is but just, however, to remark, that the comparison is merely relative: M. Pelletan, in point of science, is the same to Carlyle or to Emerson as Paris is to London or to Boston. His conception of the law of progress has at least a head and tail to it, and these are linked, however loosely, by an intermediate series. Whereas his Anglo-Saxon analogues, so far as I have seen their lucubrations, give their effusions neither head nor tail, nor above all, *body*, nor even bones.

The *head*, however, of the present essay is very evidently monstrous. In the first place, individual man is made the supreme term of the cosmical series, while the development is also stated to have passed beyond him in its upward course. And then, again, these higher stages the incongruous writer points out expressly in the divers mechanical and other constructions of the civilized intellect. It must follow, then, that a machine would be a *higher* creation than a man!

From this vision of society in its future and its fair side, pass we now to some publications on its actualities and its

realities. One of those entitled, "*On the Causes of Social Misery, both Moral and Physical, and the Means of providing them a Remedy*," (*Etudes sur les Causes de la Misère tant Moral que Physique et sur les Moyens d'y porter Remède. Par A. E. Cherbuliez, Docteur en Droit, Professeur de Sciences politiques à l'Académie de Genève, &c. Paris: Guillouin et Cie. Hector Bos-sange, New-York.*) is a little work of great sagacity, suggestiveness, and good sense. It is quite worthy of both the calling and the country of the writer—of that Geneva which is the Scotland of the continent. It has, moreover, that first condition of every serious publication—a systematic coördination of its materials. The general order of the writer's ideas may be briefly analyzed as follows:—"Man has two tendencies, instinctive, indestructible, which take, in the state of society, the names of Liberty, and Equality. The social order compresses these tendencies by industrial labour and unequal ranks, which are two consequences of the institution of property. It therefore necessitates a coercive power, which employs the force of all, to guarantee the rights assigned to each. But this must be impossible, save in so far as the minds of all, or at least of the majority, concur with that guarantee; in other words, so far as the masses recognise as a *moral* authority that which constitutes the order of the State. Now history tells us that this moral authority, throughout its ages of greatest power, appeared in the form of certain organic groups, such as those of family, of landed property, of confraternities, of corporations, &c. The French and similar revolutions having broken up these combinations, the resulting individualism spread the plague of physical and moral misery. The remedy is to reconstitute them on the same principle, but on a larger basis—to construct a new synthesis for the popular mind. This cannot be done by law, which is a vague abstraction of the general will; whereas, to act upon men *morally*, the agent must be real and concrete. This direct and individual agency the author denominates *patronage*, and deems preventive of all the misery that is not naturally necessary. Its means of action would be charity, education, influence."

Of the power or the possibility of such a system I shall say nothing, save that, if ever realized, it will not be by express purpose. As presented by this writer, it is evidently a return to the clanship or

the clientage of primitive times. Not, however, that this is really an objection to its occurrence; it is rather the contrary, but with the diffusion of a new principle.

No, that is not the remedy, says another physician of the body social, and who finds the specific for "pauperism" in *Economy*:—*L'Economie ou Remède du Paupérisme. Par M. L. Mézières. Paris: Renouard et Cie. New-York: Hector Bossange.* The composition of this book is also different from the preceding. It savours of the pamphlet or the newspaper. Entirely without system, it has no doubt a large collection of wise saws and modern instances about economy. But to make it meritorious or even excusable to reproduce them, they should be fused into some fresher forms, or founded on some deeper principle. I therefore notice the book at all only from a proper deference to the French Academy, which has, the cover tells us, "crowned" it with its prize or praise. I dare conjecture that this decision has, in some degree, depended on the virulent conservatism of the writer, and the constant fire which, as himself a property-holder, he keeps up against the hated Socialists. To me, however, this deprives the book of dignity as well as system.

At all events the publication might be mentioned, as an additional sign of the attention engrossed at present by this all-important question, throughout the countries of civilized Europe, and foremost of them in France.

But here is still another portly volume on the subject, and also "crowned," it should be added, by the same Academy:—*Etudes Historiques sur l'Influence de la Charité durant les premiers siècles Chrétiens, et considérations sur son rôle dans les sociétés modernes. Par E. Chastel. Ouvrage couronné en 1852, par l'Académie Française. Paris: Capelle. New-York: Hector Bossange.*

The compliment in this case is undoubtedly well merited. It would be hard, I think, to name a work upon the social influences of Christianity so free, on the one hand, from cant or rant, and on the other from rationalism. The author, without being, or perhaps meaning to be, profound, is, from his fine historic spirit, quite a classic in composition: and, for the subject, its rich variety may be imagined from the mere theme, which, as proposed for competition by the French Academy, runs thus: "What influence did charity exercise upon the

Roman empire? What institutions did it found there? With what new spirit did it interpenetrate it? What remedies did it apply to alleviate its evils?"

This group of questions, it is manifest, involve the fairest eulogy that has ever been written on the Christian religion. And such, in my opinion, is the simple statement of historic facts in this learned essay: "To collect from the original documents of the early ages of Christianity all the facts of any import which regard the influences of charity—to rise to the general spirit that presided over their occurrence—to render an exact account of their effects upon the Roman world"—such is the essential object of the author in his own words. None of mine need now be added to commend the result to your readers. To clergymen especially the work must seem invaluable. To students of history, also, it sheds a needed and steady light upon an aspect of the Roman empire not set sufficiently before in view. In fine, for the philosopher, it teems with matter for reflection. In the mass of misery which it exhibits as overwhelming the Roman people, and which in our day is perhaps utterly beyond the compass of imagination, the profane reasoner must recognise, that if the Christian system had not been revealed, the recuperative force of nature must have invented its boundless charities—or else society (a thing impossible) must have perished.

Now to works that view society, not on its side of misery, but that of money—a thing which most believe its best cure, and which some hold to be its worst cause. A treatise, in two volumes, has just appeared upon this subject, entitled, "*Money, Credit, and Taxation*," (*De la Monnaie, du Crédit et de l'Impôt. Par Gustave du Puy-node. Paris: Guillaumin et Cie. New-York: Hector Bossange.*) The ambitious scope of the author's project will be perhaps conceived from the following strictures on the most celebrated of his predecessors, French and English:—"Money, credit, and taxation are the subjects I propose to treat of, and they are also the least known subjects of political economy, especially in France. For some years back, it is true, there have been publications, some quite remarkable, which have enlightened us upon the function of moneys and the services of banks; but in regard to public credit, and particularly taxation, we French are still immersed in complete ignorance. The English economists, too, who have

gone the deepest into these matters, are far themselves from having treated them with entire satisfaction. Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, Parnell, Buchanan, M'Culloch, Mill, have made them the subject of special works which evince great knowledge, and often genius. But to what system have they attached themselves, from what principle have they set out, to what end do they direct their labours? They are utterly destitute of any aggregate plan; and if we find in their works researches often ingenious and profound in the point of view of present and practical interest, never, or almost never, do they seem to take their views from either theory or equity and right regarded in their pure essence." Pref., pp. 5, 6.

This criticism on the English is no doubt just and characteristic; but the alleged ignorance of the French writers appears to be at least exaggerated. At all events the hardy critic incurs a large responsibility. How fully he has redeemed it I cannot undertake to say with confidence, having gone as yet but cursorily through the wilderness of his materials. My impression is, however, that the chief distinction of the work lies in being a repertory of the most correct and complete knowledge on the various questions connected with monetary, mercantile, and fiscal institutions. It adds, moreover, to the actual state of such institutions the world over, a succinct sketch of their historic origin and subsequent vicissitudes. In fine, the author's reliability in point of science would seem to me presumable from the following sentence alone: "The two ideas," says he, "which form the basis and the object of this book are *freedom of credit and direct taxation*." Pref., p. 8.

I find also lying before me, of the same genus, an *Essay on the Ultimate Consequences of the Gold of California and Australia*. The author is M. de Zegoborski, a Counsellor of State of his Russian Majesty. The book betrays its country, though presented in the French language—being indeed industrious, but rather heavy and common-place.

The book I next present supplies a gradual relaxation from the technicalities of money-making, by a touch of its romance:—*Jacques Cœur et Charles VII., ou la France au XV. siècle. Etude historique, de, Par M. Pierre Clement, auteur de l'Histoire de la vie et de l'administration de Colbert*. Paris: Guilmoin et Cie. New-York: Hector Bossange. The hero, Jacques Cœur, was a sort of Yankee of the

fifteenth century, who made and lost repeated fortunes with a facility that then seemed magical, and the vicissitudes of whose wild life were no less prodigious than his possessions. Born in the country town of Bourges, of humble parents, he rose, by his own exertions, and at an early age of life, to be real controller and principal master of the entire commerce of the French kingdom, and to be patron, then banker, and at last minister, of the French king. But the wealth that caused his rapid rise, brought upon him often a ruin as rapid—not merely confiscating his possessions, but also menacing his life. Again, however, he escapes, and emerges soon to his former affluence, through struggles that would pass for fiction much more easily than for reality, if due attention were not bestowed upon the genius of the times.

It is this genius of the age, in fact, that gives its highest interest to the book—an age the most prolific of wild adventures all over Europe, and the most glorious for solid achievements in France. The king, of whom our hero had been such a mainstay, was Charles VII., who, after thirty years of warfare, expelled the English from the continent, and also founded the institution of standing armies. In these transactions the boundless wealth and patriotic liberality of Jacques Cœur bore a quite essential part; and so he is made, by no forced construction, to serve the purpose of a central figure, about which to group the French history of the epoch. And in his history, amid a multitude of personages the most singular, we also find a full-length portrait of the immortal Joan of Arc. The work besides has an introduction on the moneys of the Middle Ages, with some engravings appertaining to the same. The two finely-printed volumes blend utility and curiosity, to an extent and in a manner quite original.

We are come at length to a work on literature, pure literature:—*Tableau de la Littérature du Nord au Moyen Age, en Allemagne et en Angleterre, en Scandinavie et en Slavonic. Par F. G. Eichhoff, Professeur de la Faculté des Lettres de Lyon*. Paris: Didier, Libraire-Éditeur. New-York: Hector Bossange. It is that of a period and a region of peculiar interest in America, the literature of the four countries from which its miscellaneous people derive almost exclusively their origin and inspiration, and this literature at an epoch which makes it most longed for, because least known.

The scheme of Professor Eichhoff is outlined in the following terms. After sketching the transformations of the ancient world to the date in question, and noting the leading features of these times, he confines himself to the development of but one point in the vast perspective: "My sole aim has been to bring together whatever relates to the manners, idioms, and primitive creeds of that robust Germanic race, of which the influence has transformed Europe, and given birth, by a happy contrast, from the fifth to the fifteenth century, to fruits so various and so invaluable. Classical by taste as well as profound conviction, a warm admirer of Homer and of Virgil, full of respect for the noble models which have been bequeathed us by antiquity, I shall not sacrifice their glory, after the prejudices of our day, to the caprices of uncultivated genius, to the exciting but barbarous idols which were incensed by the northern nations. But I will also say, and seek to prove, that the ancient literature, like ancient society, exhausted by its labours and its successes, had stood in need of a violent crisis whereby to temper anew its vigour; that the deadly strife between the north and south, which proved so desolating in its first effects, has in its final results been both salutary and prolific, and that it is the union of these two contraries, combined and crossed in a thousand forms, as they rolled along the revolution of ages, that has given origin, in Italy, in Spain, in Germany and England, but above all in France, the intellectual centre of Europe, to those lights of the new civilization which are now irradiating the entire globe." Pp. 9, 10. Such is the pregnant theory and ample project of the author. I have not space of course to speak of the execution of such a work. As some guarantee, however, I may mention that his pen had been already practised upon kindred subjects, both historical and philological.

The name of John Bodin, and his immortal writings, require no "bush." *J. Bodin et son Temps—Tableau des theories politiques et des idées économiques au seizième siècle. Par Henry Baudrillart, Professeur au Collège de France. Paris: Guillaumin et Cie. New-York: Hector Bossange.* And yet it is remarkable that the present editor has deemed it requisite to bring to the support of both a historic survey of the "times." This indeed is getting common with the French writers of the day. A bare biography is deemed no longer a thing to occupy a serious writer, however celebra-

ted or significant the personage. There is, moreover, a dawning sentiment, if not as yet a distinct conception, that even such personages are a *fragment* of both their country and their age, and that the latter must be therefore studied in conjunction with the former. This correlation is the mother-principle of the new order of historical writing, which at last is touching on its fundamental installation. It had been seized, indeed, some three centuries since by the great subject of these remarks, who was the first to consider in politics the influence of *climate and of race*. But he saw it only in the large aggregates called nations; and even in these he saw it so imperfectly as to attempt, in contradiction, to determine, like his predecessors, a certain *absolute republic*, which should be the "best" for all ages, all races, all countries. It was accordingly, by mere correction of this logical inconsistency, that his great countryman and pupil has also made an epoch. For Montesquieu applied the climatory principle to constitutions—that is to say, instead of absolutely, viewed them *relatively*. This, however, is his main title to the strangely presumptuous motto of *prolem sine matre creatam*. But the slow progression has been labouring downward from Montesquieu to the present day, when we see this notion of *relativity* extending to epochs, to individuals.

But to return to the book before me; its general character is briefly this. It commences with an able survey of the various theories or systems, political and economical, of the sixteenth century, as properly preparatory to appreciation of Bodin's writings. A second part relates his life, describes the character of all his works, and translates, for the first time, I think, his essay on "Historical Method." The third part gives an analysis and commentary on the treatise *De Republica*.

Here is another work, of which the author and the subject are both still surer of winning American attention: I mean the *History of the People*, by Augustin Thierry; (*Essai sur l'Histoire de la Formation et des Progres du Tiers-état. Par Augustin Thierry. Paris: Furu et Cie. New-York: Hector Bossange.* Without a rival in the two essentials of arrangement and expression, the illustrious painter of the Anglo-Norman Conquest would attract your public upon any theme. But when he traces the most continuous and complete series of evolutions, from extreme serfdom up to ex-

trema freedom, which the popular classes have as yet achieved, no doubt the result must be more than interesting to the only nation upon the earth which has been founded through the like triumphs, and consists exclusively of the same classes.

M. Thierry gives a much larger than the usual amplitude to the *Tiers-état*. He extends the name to the entire nation, less the clergy and the nobility, and thus of course embraces what we call in English the middle class. In this way he is enabled to claim the glory for the *people* of producing almost all the greatest intellects of French history. For example, in the so-called Augustan age of Louis XIV., there were but three in the entire galaxy of noble origin, namely, Fenelon, Laroche-faucault, and Madame de Sevigné. The rest were all plebeians, to wit: Corneille, Pascal, Molière, Racine, La Fontaine, Boileau, Bossuet, Bourdaloue, Flechier, Massillon, La Bruyère, Arnaud, Nicole, Domat. In short, this volume is the strongest vindication of, and noblest tribute that has hitherto been paid to, the oppressed portion of humanity.

I give the last position to a religious publication:—*Saint Paul et Sénèque, Recherches sur les rapports du Philosophe avec l'Apôtre, et sur l'Infiltration du Christianisme naissant à travers le Paganisme. Par A. Fleury.* Paris: Librairie Philosophique de Ladrange. New-York: Hector Bossange. Its object is to prove the stoic Seneca not only to have been a Christian, but moreover to have been made a convert by an alleged intercourse with St. Paul. The work is valuable, as well as curious, for its immense hoard of learning. But the argument is as invalid as the retort that has been made to it, that Christianity is a merely modified continuation of Stoicism.

O.

A LARGE undertaking is commenced in a work entitled "*Geschichte des Heidenthums, in Beziehung auf Religion, Wissen, Kunst, Sittlichkeit und Staatsleben, von Dr. A. WUTKE*," (Breslau, 1853,) of which the first part, containing 356 pages, 8vo., lies before us. This part gives what the author calls the "first steps of the history of humanity," in a survey of the ethico-political history of the Huns, the Mongols, the Mexicans, and the Peruvians. The plan is a vast and comprehensive one.

THE "*Museum of Classical Antiquities*," (London, T. Richards,) for April and May, 1853, contains a copious disserta-

tion "On the True Site of Calvary," with a restored plan of the ancient city of Jerusalem. We regret to see, from the publisher's announcement, that this excellent journal is not patronized as it should be. We call the attention of the scholars of our country to the work, and urge them to sustain it.

MESSRS. Garrigue & Christern (4 Astor House, New-York) have commenced the issue of a "*Monthly Bulletin of German Literature*," in a form very convenient for use. It will not be a mere list of books published, but a classified report of new publications, with brief statements of their contents and value, and extracts from the leading literary journals, in order to afford as "precise characteristics of new books as are compatible with their recent appearance." Omitting entirely the vast amount of merely local literature constantly issuing from the press in Germany, it will give more minute information about all works of interest to scholars than can be afforded by miscellaneous catalogues.

We have received the supplementary volume of Engelmann's "*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Classicorum et Græcorum et Latinorum*," (Leipzig, 1853, 8vo., pp. 120.) It contains an alphabetical list of all editions and translations of the Greek and Latin Classics that have appeared in Germany between the years 1847 and 1852. The former volume extended from 1700 to 1847; and the two, taken together, form the best manual of classical bibliography in compact form now extant.

AMONG the new works in classical and general literature, recently published on the continent of Europe, are the following:—

Das Theseion und der Tempel des Ares in Athen. Eine archäologisch-topographische Abhandlung von Ludw. Ross. Mit einem Plane des Marktes. Halle, 1852: 8vo., pp. 88.

Alciphronis Rhetoris Epistolæ. Recensuit, cum Bergleri integris, Meinekii, Wagneri, aliorum selectis suisque annotationibus edidit, indices adiecit E. E. Seiler. Lipsiæ, 1853: 8vo., pp. 500.

Akademische Vorlesungen über indische Literaturgeschichte. Gehalten im Wintersemester 1851-52, von Dr. Alb. Weber. Berlin: 8vo., pp. 290.

Avesta, die heiligen Schriften der Parsen. Aus dem Grundtexte übersetzt, mit steter Rücksicht auf die Traditionen von

Dr. Friedr. Spiegel, Prof. zu Erlangen. 1 Bd. Der Verdidad. Leipzig, 1852: 8vo., pp. 303.

We continue our summaries of the contents of the principal foreign journals of general literature:—

Westminster Review, for July:—I. John Knox: II. Over-Legislation: III. Pedigree and Heraldry: IV. Sects and Secular Education: V. Young Criminals: VI. The Life of Moore: VII. India and its Finance: VIII. Balzac and his Writings: IX. The Turkish Empire: X, XI, XII, XIII. Contemporary Literature of England, America, Germany, and France.

Edinburgh Review, for July:—I. The Austrian Court in the Eighteenth Century: II. The Nations of India and their Manners: III. Lord Grey's Colonial Administration: IV. Relations of England with China: V. Lives of the Devreux Earls of Essex: VI. Popular Education in the United States: VII. Quarantine, Small Pox, and Yellow Fever: VIII. Larpent's Journal in Spain: IX. The French Navy.

London Quarterly Review, for July:—I. Annals of Ireland—by the Four Masters: II. Baron Haxthausen's Notes on Russia: III. Writings of Professor Owen—Generalizations of Comparative Anatomy: IV. Shepherd on Ecclesiastical Forgeries: V. Autobiography of Signor Ruffini: VI. Count Fiquelmont on the Palmerston Policy: VII. The Oxford Commission: VIII. Memoirs of Thomas Moore.

British Quarterly, (London,) for August:—I. French History for 1853: II. Critical Editions of the Greek Testament: III. Electricity and Magnetism: IV. The Crusades as described by Crusaders: V. Hypatia; or, New Foes with an Old Face: VI. The Alleged Successes of Romanism: VII. Present Relations of Employer and Employed: VIII. Horace: IX. Russia and Turkey: X. Our Epilogue on Affairs and Books.

North British Review, (Edinburgh,) for August:—I. Theories of Poetry and a New Poet—Dallas's Poetics and Smith's Poems: II. Our Colonial Empire and our Colonial Policy: III. Dr. Henry Marshall and Military Hygiene: IV. The Text of Scripture: V. Free and Slave Labour: VI. The Early Christian Life and Literature of Syria: VII. The Grenville Papers

and Junius: VIII. Germany in its Relations to France and Russia: IX. The New India Bill.

Revue des Deux Mondes, (Paris,) for May:—I. Nuances de la Vie Mondaine, par M. Octave Feuillet: II. La Monarchie de 1830, Dernière Partie, par M. Louis De Carné: III. Un Moine Philosophe du Onzième Siècle (Saint Anselme de Cantorbéry, de M. Ch. De Remusat,) par M. Emile Saisset: IV. Souvenirs D'Une Station Dans les Mers de L'Indochine, par M. E. Jurien de la Gravière: V. Beaumarchais, Sa Vie, Ses Ecrits et Son Temps, D'Après des Papiers de Famille Inédits, par M. Louis De Loménie: VI. Promenade en Amérique; Philadelphie, par M. J. J. Ampère: VII. Chronique de la Quinzaine. For June:—I. L'Art Français Au Dix-Septième Siècle, par M. Victor Cousin: II. Le Roman Social en Angleterre: III. La Télégraphie Electrique, Ses Développemens en France, en Angleterre, en Amérique et sur le Continent Européen, par M. Babinet: IV. Du Drame Moderne, par M. Edgar Quinet: V. Papiers D'Etat,—Louis XIV. et Guillaume III. Leurs Négociations Secrètes pour la Succession D'Espagne, D'Après le Recueil de Leurs Lettres Publié en Angleterre, par M. Louis de Viel-Castel: VI. Promenade en Amérique.—viii, Washington, le Congrès et les Partis Politiques, par M. J. J. Ampère: VII. Beaumarchais, Sa Vie, Ses Ecrits et Son Temps, D'Après des Papiers de Famille Inédits, par M. Louis De Loménie: VIII. Chronique de la Quinzaine, Histoire Politique et Littéraire. For July:—I. Souvenirs D'Une Station Dans Les Mers de L'Indochine, par M. E. Jurien de la Gravière: II. La Hollande Sous Deux Règnes, Souvenirs Historiques Sur Le Roi Louis et Guillaume I., par M. Vivien: III. La Dernière Bohémienne, Deuxième Partie, par Mme. Ch. Reybaud: IV. Un Hiver en Corse, Récits de Chasse et Scènes de la Vie Des Maquis, par M. Charles Reynaud: V. Du Mouvement Poétique en Angleterre depuis Shelley, par M. Arthur Dudley: VI. San Francisco A Ripa, par M. De Stendhal: VII. Les Protestans Français en Europe, Recherches Nouvelles de M. Weiss Sur L'Histoire des Réfugiés Depuis la Révocation de L'Edit de Nantes, par M. Ch. Louandre: VIII. Chronique de la Quinzaine.

AMERICAN.

We continue our summaries of the contents of American Theological Journals:—

Southern Presbyterian Review, (Columbia,

S. C.) for July:—I. The Principles of Moral and Political Economy: II. Orthodoxy in New-England: III. The Necessity

and Importance of Controversy: IV. The Philosophy of Life: V. The Relation of Justice to Benevolence in the Conduct of Society: VI. The Secondary and Collateral Influences of the Sacred Scriptures: VII. The Final Destiny of our Globe.

Christian Review, (New-York,) for July:—I. Christian Supernaturalism: II. Schools in the Turkish Empire: III. Hope for our Country: IV. The King and the Preacher: V. Scripture Facts and Illustrations, collected during a Journey in Palestine, by Professor Hackett: VI. Hippolytus, and his Age: VII. The Catholics and the School Question.

New-York Quarterly, for July:—I. Cuban Question: II. John Randolph: III. Music a Language: IV. Marie Stuart: V. Recent Progress of the Sciences of Astronomy and Physics: VI. The late Sylvester Judd.

Bibliotheca Sacra, (Andover,) for July:—I. Characteristics, Duties, and Culture of Woman: II. Lucian and Christianity: III. The Relation of the Grecian to Christian Ethics: IV. The Religion of Geology: V. On the Use of the Preposition *εἰς* in Romans v, 18: VI. From Antipatris to Emmaus: VII. The Law of Remorse and the Law of Repentance; or, the Passage from Natural to Revealed Religion: VIII. The Certainty of Success in Preaching: IX. Bretschneider's View of the Theology of Schleiermacher.

North-American Review, (Boston,) for July:—I. Recent English Poetry: II. Political Philosophy: III. The Eclipse of Faith: IV. Sparks's Correspondence of the Revolution: V. Recent Social Theories: VI. France, England, and America: VII. Modern Saints, Catholic and Heretic: VIII. The Life of St. Paul: IX. Thackeray, as a Novelist: X. The Writings of B. B. Edwards: XI. Schoolcraft on the Indian Tribes.

Christian Examiner, (Boston,) for July:—I. Spiritual Mechanics: II. Religion, Civilization, and Social State of the Japanese: III. Poetry: IV. The Errors and Superstitions of the Church of Rome: V. The Character of Archbishop Cranmer: VI. Heresy in Andover Seminary: VII. The Doctrine of Regeneration: VIII. Crusades: IX. Professor Farrar.

Brownson's Quarterly, (Boston,) for July:—I. The Spiritual Order Supreme: II. Mother Seton and St. Josephs: III. Philosophical Studies on Christianity: IV. Wallis's Spain: V. The Fathers of the Desert.

Free-Will Baptist Quarterly, for July:—I. Biblical Criticism: II. The Herodian

Family: III. Science and Revealed Religion: IV. Lectures—Their Position and Influence: V. Minister and Pulpit: VI. Names of the Soul: VII. Biblical Theology: VIII. Immigration.

Theological and Literary Journal, (New-York,) for July:—I. Dr. G. P. Smith on the Geological Theory: II. The Rev. Albert Barnes's Notes on Revelation xx, 4-6: III. The Princeton Review on Millenarianism: IV. The Distastefulness of Christianity: V. English Universities: VI. Dr. Nevins's Pantheistic and Development Theories.

Mercersburg Quarterly Review, (Mercersburg, Pa.,) for July:—I. The Strong Character: II. The Communion of Saints: III. Paracelsus and his Influence on Christianity and Medicine: IV. The Island of Aëgina: V. Franklin and Marshall College: VI. Rationalistic Poetry: VII. Reflections on the History of Civil Liberty.

Universalist Quarterly, (Boston,) for July:—I. Historical Sketch of Interpretations of 1 Peter iii, 18-20, and iv, 6: II. Character and its Predicates: III. The Ministry: IV. Agencies in Salvation.

Biblical Repertory, (Princeton,) for July:—I. Idea of the Church: II. Boardman's Bible in the Counting-House: III. Journal and Letters of Rev. Henry Martyn, B. D.: IV. Theology in Germany: V. Proceedings of the last General Assembly.

Southern Quarterly Review, (Charleston,) for July:—I. State of Parties and the Country: II. College and University Education in America: III. Aborigines Races of America: IV. Secondary Combats of the Mexican War: V. Trench on Proverbs: VI. The Iroquois Bourbon: VII. The Student—Love of Study: VIII. Stowe's Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin.

New-Englander, (New-Haven,) for August:—I. Abbott's Napoleon: II. Is the Soul Immortal?: III. Redemption as Related to the Fall of the Angels: IV. Reforms in Austria, under Joseph II.: V. Life and Character of Professor B. B. Edwards: VI. Corruption of the Lord's Supper into the Mass: VII. Dr. Grant and the Mountain Nestorians: VIII. Layard's Discoveries.

Presbyterian Quarterly Review, (Philad.,) for September:—I. Thoughts on Theology: II. The "Presbyterian Magazine" and the "Spirit of American Presbyterianism": III. Historical Development of the Doctrine of the Atonement: IV. Chillingworth: V. The General Assembly: VI. Dr. Skinner's Translation of Vinet's Pastoral Theology.

INDEX.

Abbott, (Rev. Benjamin,) early preaching of.....	Page 9	Asia, inhabited by seven races....	Page 45
Abelard, his position in philosophy 345-354		—, number of languages and dialects of.....	51
Action, motives of human.....	13	—, number of the population of, to which the Church has access....	47
Adam and Eve, paradisiacal state of....	269	—, proportion of missionaries to population in.....	55
Age, character of the present.....	427	—, recent improvements in ocean navigation furnish new facilities for the evangelization of....	49
Alford's Greek Testament.....	318	—, religions and languages of.....	46
America, Chateaubriand's writings on.....	108	—, science and literature of, barren and shallow.....	53
—, influence of, on the political world.....	435	—, social condition in, corrupt and barbaric.....	54
American Christians, duties of.....	441	—, superficial area, general divisions, and population of.....	44
—, patriots, duties of.....	440	—, superstitions of, becoming effete....	49
Amos, traces of Pentateuch in.....	79	—, wholly possessed by heathenism in various forms.....	52
Anachronisms, seeming, of the Pentateuch considered.....	92	Athanasius on the Christian festivals..	155
Analogies and analogical reasoning.....	220	Athens during the youth of Socrates 375-377	
—, etymological.....	227		
—, of the "Vestiges of Civilization," fanciful.....	224	Bacon, Francis.....	351, 489
Annihilation of the wicked after the general judgment, held by Dr. M'Culloh.....	276	—, influence of his labours.....	494
Anselm, of Canterbury.....	479, 576	—, the, of the Nineteenth Century..	489
—, birth of.....	577	—, conditions which must be satisfied by any philosopher who may claim to be the.....	496
—, education of.....	578	Baconian reform, characteristics of:—	
—, inconsistency of.....	584	1. Universality of, 490; 2. Manner in which undertaken, 491;	
—, made Archbishop.....	580	3. Christian spirit of the, 494;	
—, quarrel between, and Henry.....	585	4. Dependence of, on previous forms of philosophy.....	495
—, quarrel between, and William II.....	581	—, conditions of any new reform that can take rank with the.....	496
—, theology of.....	588	—, narrowed and dwarfed by the successors of its founder.....	508
Apostles, the, emulated by early Methodist preachers.....	14	Barnes's Commentary on the Revelation.....	138
Apostolic succession.....	542	Baumgarten on the Acts.....	315
Architecture, church, in the United States.....	280	Becks (Peter) General of the Jesuits..	620
Aristotle.....	342	Becquerel's Des Climats et de l'Influence qu' exercent les sols Boisés et non Boisés.....	623
—, comprehensiveness of his philosophy.....	509	Bible, circulation of the.....	439
—, his intellect, philosophy, and labours in behalf of logic.....	343	Biblical criticism.....	549
—, his writings imbued with a religious spirit.....	344	—, the design of.....	550
Atkins, Works of Dr. James.....	472	Bibliotheca Philologica.....	486
Atwood, M. Agnes.....	203	Biography-writing.....	364
—, Marie Angélique.....	193	Blackader's Chronological New Testament.....	317
Asbury, Journal of Rev. Francis.....	599	Bledsoe's Theodicy.....	617
Asia, absence of rising sects.....	49	Bodin et son Temps.....	629
—, as a mission field, openings, encouragements, difficulties, and wants of.....	47	Bohemia, tendencies to reformation in, treated by Neander.....	104
—, climate of.....	53	Bohn's Classical Library.....	135, 305
—, European colonies and possessions in.....	50		
—, existence of ancient, though corrupt, forms of Christianity in, a promising indication.....	48		
—, extent of territory and population of.....	51		

- "Book-revelation" Page 172
 Boone, Daniel..... 364, 367-372
 Brace's Home-Life in Germany..... 469
 Brodhead's History of New-York..... 466
 Brown's Sufferings and Glories of the
 Messiah..... 606
 Calvinistic view of original sin..... 271
 Cannon's Lectures on Pastoral Theology 470
 Catechism of the M. E. Church..... 476
 Chalmers, Memoir of the Life and Writ-
 ings of..... 141, 469
 Characteristics of the Baconian reform 490
 Chastel's Etudes Historiques sur l'Influ-
 ence de la Charité, &c..... 627
 Chateaubriand, a picture in the Louvre 107
 —, his enthusiasm, and romantic
 traits of character..... 112
 —, his nationality, and Gallic ego-
 tism..... 121
 —, his political career..... 114
 —, his reminiscences of travel..... 113
 —, his style..... 120
 —, his writings on America..... 108
 —, intense personal identity pre-
 served throughout his writings,
 and constituting them an auto-
 biography of..... 108-111
 —, practical character of his author-
 ship..... 117
 Cherbuliez's Causes de la Misère tant
 Moral que Physique..... 626
 Christ, Dr. McCulloh's view of divinity
 of..... 272-275
 Christian character, the times call for
 a higher type of..... 442
 — Examiner and Dr. Olin..... 600
 Christianity and mysticism..... 161
 —, Lectures on the Evidences of..... 312
 Christians, duties of American..... 441
 Church architecture in the United
 States..... 280
 — Catechisms of the M. E..... 476
 —, constitution of the primitive..... 277
 —, difficulties in the way of..... 51
 —, duty of, with respect to Asia 44, 48, 57
 —, encouragements for the..... 50
 —, government, principles of..... 147
 —, hereditary wrongs and tradition-
 al errors of..... 130
 —, influence which the, may exert
 upon reforms..... 130
 —, ministerial education in the M. E. 464
 —, most of Asia open to the..... 47
 —, of England, abuses in..... 157, 478
 —, sixth volume of Neander's history
 of the..... 108
 —, Tract Society of the M. E..... 485
 Circulation of the Bible..... 439
 Circumstantial testimony the only sure
 demonstration of the credibility
 of the Scriptures..... 316
 Civilization defined..... 405
 —, the heathen and mediæval, of Ire-
 land..... 404
 —, Vestiges of. (See *Vestiges*.)
 Clark's Theological Library..... 318, 479
 Clemens Alexandrinus, Reinkens on... 155
 Clement's Jacques Cœur et Charles VII. 629
 Climate of Asia..... Page 53
 Coleridge, (S. T.,) complete works of... 313
 Commentary, Barnes's, on the New
 Testament..... 138
 Comte's ambition and failure..... 507
 — claims tested..... 497
 — exclusion of logic and metaphys-
 ics from his speculations..... 505
 — philosophy..... 513
 — philosophy not universal..... 510
 — relations to Bacon..... 510
 — standard of morality..... 501
 Conscience, a good, necessary to a use-
 ful and vigorous exercise of the
 intellectual faculties..... 547
 Constitution of the primitive Church... 277
 Conybeare and Howson's Life and Epis-
 tles of St. Paul..... 316
 Credibility, historic, involved in the
 theory of Strauss..... 184
 — of the Christian writers..... 259
 — of the Scriptures, only sure ground
 of demonstration of..... 266
 Cyclopædia Bibliographica..... 486
 Darling's Cyclopædia Bibliographica... 156
 Davidson (Dr.) on Biblical Criticism 475, 549
 —, style of..... 567
 Demon of Socrates, the..... 379
 Descartes..... 493, 511
 Discourses from the spirit-world, by
 Stephen Olin..... 601
 Divinity of Christ, Dr. McCulloh's view
 of..... 272-275
 Dusterdieck's Die drei Johanneischen
 Briefe..... 316
 Duty of the Church with respect to
 Asia..... 44, 48, 57
 Education, ministerial, in the M. E.
 Church..... 464
 —, Thirteenth Annual Report of the
 Wesleyan Committee of..... 479
 Eichhoff's Tableau de la Littérature du
 Nord au Moyen Age, &c..... 628
 Eleatic school of philosophy..... 335
 Eliot's Discourses..... 467
 Eloquence, select British, by Dr. Good-
 rich..... 150
 Encyclopædia Britannica..... 326
 Enthusiasm of Chateaubriand..... 112
 ἐπιλαβέσθαι, in Hebrews ii, 16,
 meaning of..... 301, 453
 Eras of nations..... 433
 Ethical science, a reform needed in... 510
 European literature, letter on recent... 623
 Evangelists, agreement of the..... 355
 —, a supposition by which to account
 for coincidences among the..... 361
 —, John's Gospel compared with those
 of the other..... 357
 —, similarity in diversity, and diver-
 sity in similarity of..... 360
 Evil, origin of. (See *Origin of Evil*.)
 Ewald's Jahrbücher der Biblischen
 Wissenschaft..... 316
 Exegesis of Hebrews ii, 16..... 301, 453
 Exposition of 1 Corinthians iii,
 1-17..... 394, 592

- Faith, according to the teachings of the
 "Spiritualists" Page 174
 —, the Eclipse of..... 169, 464
 Fall, the..... 568
 —, though possible, not necessary ... 571
 Father Reeves..... 446
 —, a model class-leader..... 447
 Finley, (Rev. J. B.,) autobiography of. 595
 Formation of a Manly Character 311
 Freedom, advance in human..... 432, 434
- Garden Walks with the Poets, by Mrs.
 Kirkland..... 141
- General of the Jesuits, mode of elect-
 ing a..... 620
- Genuineness of the Pentateuch, ac-
 knowledged by the ablest his-
 torians 76
- Geographical science..... 249
- Geschichte der Reformation in Schott-
 land, by Rudloff..... 161
- God, attributes of, attempt to prove
 from *design*, considered 35
 —, Clarke's (Dr. S.) argument for the
 existence of, drawn from our
 ideas of *space* and duration, con-
 sidered 32
 —, does nature lead us to the idea
 of a 39
 —, existence of, not assumed, but
 recorded by the Scriptures 41
 —, names of, in the Pentateuch..... 83
 —, the *a posteriori* argument for ex-
 istence and attributes of, con-
 sidered 35
 —, the *a priori* argument for exist-
 ence and attributes of, considered
 —, trine nature of, attempt to prove
 by reason, considered 32
- Gorrie's Episcopal Methodism as it was
 and is 603
- Gospel, nearly the entire globe open to
 the preaching of the 438
- Gospels, Strong's Harmony of the 354
- Government of Japan 292
- , principles of Church 147
- Greek and Roman mythology 471
- Church, works on the 621
- Griesbach, (Dr. John James,) his editions
 of the New Testament 563
- Guizot, recent publications of..... 305
- Habits, intellectual and physical, which
 should characterize a minister... 548
- Hagenbach's Christliche Kirche der
 drei ersten Jahrhunderte..... 477
- Haldane, brothers, Life of 154
- Hart's Epitome of Greek and Roman
 Mythology 471
- Hassé's Anselm von Canterbury... 479, 576
- Hebrew MSS. as a means of correcting
 the text 556
- Hedding, (Rev. Elijah,) birth and early
 years of 9, 10
 —, character as a bishop 16
 —, closing scenes of his life..... 20-29
 —, his catholicity 18
 —, his energy of character 12
 —, his success..... 12
- Hedding, (Rev. Elijah,) intellectual
 character and literary attain-
 ments of Page 17
 —, is admitted by N. Y. Annual Con-
 ference, June 16, 1801 10
 —, licensed to exhort in 1799..... 10
 —, licensed to preach 10
 —, ordained bishop, May 28, 1824... 15
 —, ordained deacon, 1803..... 12
 —, ordained elder, 1805 12
 —, self-distrust 16
 —, severe illness, 1832 19
- Hengstenberg (Dr.) on the Pentateuch
 Hengstenberg's Hohelied Salomonis ... 479
- Henkle on Church Government 147
- Hetherington's History of the Westmin-
 ster Assembly of Divines 607
- Hilgenfeld der Galaterbrief..... 318
- Hirscher's Sympathies of the Continent
 156
- Holland De l'Homme et des Races Hu-
 maines 625
- Holliday's Life and Times of Rev. Al-
 len Wiley..... 461
- Holmes's Wesley Offering 604
- Hosmer on the Higher Law..... 143
- Hudson's Shakspeare..... 467
- Humanity, an object of adoration, as
 held by M. Comte 503
- Humboldt, Lives of the brothers Alex-
 ander and William..... 475
- Huss, Neander's opinion of 105
- Hyperides, the New Fragments of 58
- Idolatry, according to the teaching of
 the Spiritualists 174
- Immigration into this country..... 437
- Immortality of the soul, not demon-
 strable apart from Scripture 33
- Infidelity..... 180
- Inquisition, the 306
- Instauratio Maxima, what may be ex-
 pected from the..... 512
- Instauration, universality contemplated
 by the Baconian 490
- Intellectual regeneration demanded by
 the times..... 510
- , how only it can be achieved 511
- Intelligence, defined 123
- , influence of, on personal piety... 128
- , relation of, to the efficiency of the
 Church in aggressive operations 131
- , relation of, to the efficiency of the
 Church in her coöperation with
 the world 129
- , relation of, to the piety and effi-
 ciency of the Church..... 123
- Investiture, quarrels respecting the
 right of..... 581, 585
- Ireland, early arts of,—1. Poetry, 411;
 2. Architecture..... 422
- , early authors of 406
- , early laws of 424
- , early literature of 410
- , the heathen and mediæval civili-
 zation of..... 404
- Itinerancy at the beginning of the pres-
 ent century, trials and labours of, 11
- introduced into the Prussian
 Church..... 100

- Jacobi, (Prof.), letters from... Page 157, 490
 Jacobus's Notes on the Gospels 614
 Jacoby's Handbuch des Methodismus... 618
 Jansenius, Cornelius..... 192
 Japan and the Japanese..... 282
 —, commercial importance of..... 288
 —, foreign intercourse with, not toler-
 ated 287
 —, government of 292
 —, persecution of all foreigners and
 Christians in 285
 —, position of woman in..... 288
 —, printing, when known in..... 289
 —, prospect of commercial and social
 intercourse with, and its prob-
 able results..... 297-301
 —, religion of..... 295, 297
 Jesuits, mode of electing a general of
 the..... 620
 —, the, and their hostility to the
 Port Royalists 200
 —, the, in Japan..... 283
 John the Baptist, was he, or Elijah,
 with our Lord on the Mount of
 Transfiguration..... 456
 Journal of Rev. Francis Asbury..... 599
 Kingsley's Phaethon 608
 Kitto's Daily Bible Illustrations..... 139
 Law as the ground of moral obligation
 Laws, the early, of Ireland..... 424
 Layard's Monuments of Nineveh 326
 Learning as a sign of the times 431
 —, influence of, on personal piety .. 128
 —, in the Church 125
 —, in the clergy 126
 Literature, early, of Ireland..... 410
 Logic excluded from Comte's philoso-
 phy 505
 Manners, the book of..... 309
 Marie Angélique Arnauld 193
 —, death of..... 203
 —, letter by..... 199
 —, saying of, respecting the suffi-
 ciency of Scripture..... 202
 Materials for a critical investigation
 of the Old and New Testa-
 ment 551, 558, 559
 Matter, created or eternal, reason un-
 able to determine..... 35
 Matthäi's Die Auslegung des Vaterun-
 ser 619
 Maurice's Prophets and Kings..... 317
 M'Clure's Memoir of the Translators... 470
 M'Culloh on annihilation of the wicked
 — on the divinity of Christ..... 272-275
 — on the resurrection 275
 — on the Scriptures..... 257
 Mère Anastatic..... 209
 Metaphysics excluded from Comte's
 speculations..... 505
 Methodist Episcopal Church, extent of
 the, at the present time 18
 —, extent of the, half a century
 since 18
 — property case 136
 — missions 322
 Microscopist, the..... Page 140
 Ministerial education in the M. E.
 Church 464
 Miracles..... 181, 462
 Miscellanies of Neander 106
 Missionary labour, nearly the entire
 globe open to..... 438
 —, wants of the present age 443
 Missions, Methodist..... 322
 Monarchy, restoration of, in France 313, 468
 Monastery of Port Royal 191
 —, demolished by the Jesuits, 1710.. 208
 —, founded in 1204..... 193
 Morality, Comte's standard of..... 501
 Moral obligation, benefit received, the
 ground of..... 513, 516, 522, 526
 — declared by the New Testament... 530
 — imposed out of regard to the well-
 being of its subjects..... 521
 —, insufficiency of all other reasons
 which can be assigned for..... 516
 — shown from the divine law 526
 —, substitutes for the true ground
 of..... 516-526
 Morell's Analysis of Sentences 166
 Motives, as affecting the freedom of the
 will..... 262
 — of human action 13
 Mystics of the fourteenth century,
 Neander's essay on 105
 Mythology, Hart's Epitome of Greek
 and Roman 471
 Names of God in the Pentateuch 83
 National Magazine, noticed..... 146
 Natural theology, limits and embarrass-
 ments of 36
 Nature, does it lead us to the idea of a
 Creator 39
 Neander, aim of, in the sixth volume
 of his Church History 104
 —, his essay on the Mystics of the
 fourteenth century..... 105
 —, his miscellanies 106
 —, his opinion of Huss 105
 —, his opinion of Wiclif..... 104
 —, Krabbe on..... 136
 —, plan pursued by, in the former
 volumes of his Church History.. 104
 —, recently published writings of... 102
 Necessitarians, fallacy of, on the sub-
 ject of motives..... 262
 Nero 535
 Newman, (Mr.) dogmas of... 171, 172, 177
 —, dogmas of, carried out 173
 New Testament, ancient versions of... 560
 —, Barnes's Commentary on..... 138
 —, criticism, history of modern..... 563
 —, materials for a critical investiga-
 tion of the..... 559
 — MSS., the uncial and the cur-
 sive 560
 —, present received text of the..... 562
 —, Scholz's (Dr.) critical work on... 564
 Olds's Philosophy and Practice of Faith 615
 Old Testament, materials for a critical
 investigation of the..... 551, 559
 Olin, (Dr.) Life and Letters of..... 600

- Olin, (Dr.) "Spiritual" Discourses by..... Page 601
- Oracula Sibyllina 167
- Ordination not a Christian, but the continuation of a Jewish civil practice..... 278
- Original sin, Calvinistic theory of..... 271
- Origin of evil 568
- , Hegel's theory of..... 568
- , Leibnitz's assumption respecting the..... 568
- , Mosaic account of the..... 569
- , Muller's theory of..... 569, 573
- , Rothe's theory of..... 568, 573
- Pantheism, rise of 335
- Paradisiacal state of Adam and Eve 269
- Parallel Passages in the Old Testament Parker, (Theodore) and the new school "Spiritualists" 163-185
- Pascal's Provincial Letters 156
- Pastoral Theology, by Vinet..... 307
- , Cannon's (Dr.) Lectures on 470
- Paul, Life and Epistles of..... 316
- , Second Epistle of, to Timothy.... 334
- Platonism..... 341
- Peck's Formation of a Manly Character Pelletan's Profession de Foi du Dix Neuvième Siècle 625
- Pentateuch and the art of writing in the Mosaic age 87
- and the times of the Judges..... 88
- , genuineness of the, acknowledged by the ablest historians..... 76
- , Hosea's allusions to the, 785 B.C. 78
- , names of God in the..... 83
- , possessed by the Samaritans..... 77
- , seeming anachronisms of the 92
- , statements of the, respecting its author..... 91
- , summary of arguments for the genuineness and authenticity of
- , theology of the, in relation to its genuineness 96
- , traces of the, in Amos, 787 B. C. 79
- , traces of the, in Books of Kings. 80
- , written prior to the Babylonian captivity 77
- Philosophy, comprehensiveness of Aristotle's 509
- , Eleatic school of..... 335
- , Ionic school of..... 332
- , Italic school of..... 334
- , of Comte..... 513
- , of Comte not universal..... 510
- Poetry of the vegetable world..... 463
- Port Royal 191
- , valley of, in 1824..... 211
- Port Royalists, persecution of, by the Jesuits 200, 204, 207
- Positive Theology, by Lowry 464
- Positivism of M. Comte..... 498
- , a mutilated fraction of Baconian philosophy systematized 504
- , examined at length..... 499
- , standard of morality in the system of..... 501
- Potts's Preacher and King 466
- Present age, character of the..... 427
- Probationary state, the Page 261
- Prussia, the Church in..... 157, 480
- , the Jesuits in..... 139
- Paynode's De la Monnaie, du Crédit et de l'Impôt..... 627
- Quarrel between William II. and Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, respecting the right of investiture..... 581, 585
- Races, the seven, of Asia 45
- Rationalists and spiritualists answered in "The Eclipse of Faith" 170
- Reason and faith, antagonism of..... 39
- and revelation, respecting the nature of man and the origin of evil 42
- , the *a posteriori* process 35
- , attempt of, to demonstrate the existence of God, *a priori*..... 31
- , attempt of, to demonstrate the existence of God from our ideas of *space* and *duration* 32
- , attempt of, to prove the immortality of the soul 33
- , attempt of, to prove the triune nature of God 32
- , efforts and results of, as shown in history..... 36, 38
- , incompetence of, in matters of religion..... 29
- , unaided by revelation, retrogressive..... 36-38
- Reasoning, analogical 220
- , method of, pursued in "Vestiges of Civilization" 231-235
- Reeves. (See *Father Reeves*.) 447
- Reform, an intellectual, demanded by the civilized world 510
- , needed in ethical science..... 510
- Reformation, D'Aubigne's History of, Vol. V..... 599
- Reforms, as conducted by irreligious men 131
- , influence which the Church may exert upon..... 130
- Regeneration, Sears on 467
- Religion, practical bearings of the question 43
- , reason incompetent in matters of 29
- Religions of Asia 46
- of Japan..... 295, 297
- Religious spirit pervading the writings of Aristotle..... 342
- Remusat, as a historian..... 577
- Resurrection, as held by Dr. McCulloh 275
- , the human body at the..... 471
- Reuss's Geschichte der Heiligen Schriften Neuen Testaments..... 619
- Revelation does not fear investigation 551
- , how to conduct an argument on the truth of..... 263
- , impossibility of a, debated... 171, 178
- Rogers's Eclipse of Faith 464
- Romans, Epistle to the, examined 40
- Rome: its Edifices and its People 458
- Roothan, late general of the Jesuits.... 619

- Rudloff, Geschichte der Reformation in Schottland..... Page 161
- Rule's Brand of Dominic..... 165, 306
- Russia, growth of..... 437
- Samaritan Pentateuch, the 553
- Samaritans, the Pentateuch in Greek, Samaritan, and Arabic, possessed by the..... 78
- Schneider, (K. F. T.) a student of Neander's, and editor of his posthumous works 103
- Scholz, (Dr.) critical work of, on New Testament 564
- Science, new discoveries in, and new applications of..... 429
- , the, of geography and statistics... 249
- , triumphs of, in the domain of commerce..... 429
- Septuagint, the 552
- Signs of the times..... 426
- , as seen in the political world..... 432
- , as seen in the religious world... 437
- , as seen in the world of learning.. 431
- , as seen in the world of nature ... 428
- , as seen in the world of science and art 428
- Smith's History and Religion of the Gentile Nations..... 478
- Society, American Geographical and Statistical..... 255
- , moral and religious tendencies of, apart from a saving knowledge of divine truth 30
- Socrates..... 373
- , accusation of..... 388
- , as a teacher 384
- , birth and early years of..... 374
- , causes of the unpopularity of..... 387
- , death of..... 392
- , demon of..... 379
- , his views of his mission..... 382
- , method of, with a sophist.... 339, 385
- , personal appearance and habits of..... 383
- , trial of..... 389
- Socratic age, the..... 332
- Sophists, the..... 336, 376
- , Socrates's method with the.. 339, 385
- Spicilegium Solesmense..... 481
- Statistical science..... 249
- Steam, applications of..... 430
- St. Cyran..... 192
- Stoughton's Lights of the World..... 614
- Strauss's theory of historic credibility. 184
- Strickland's Manual of Biblical Literature..... 604
- Strong's Harmony of the Gospels..... 354
- , 362, 474
- Strong's Manual of the Gospels... Page 474
- Stroud's New Greek Harmony of the Four Gospels..... 614
- Suidas, Bernhardt's new edition of.... 327
- Sunday-school books 142
- Tachnitz's Canones et Decreta Concilii Tridentini..... 621
- Targums..... 553
- Telegraph, the magnetic..... 431
- Temptation, the, of our first parents... 572
- Thierry's Essai sur l'Histoire de la Formation et des Progres du Tiers-état..... 629
- Times, signs of the..... 426
- Timothy, Second Epistle of Paul to.... 534
- Tract Society of the M. E. Church..... 485
- Transfiguration, presence of John the Baptist at the 456
- Translators, M'Clure's Memoirs of the..... 470
- Unitarian view of the unity of God and regeneration 467
- United Church of Prussia..... 158
- Urban, Pope, bribed by William II..... 583
- Vail on Ministerial Education in the M. E. Church 464
- Versions, ancient, of the New Testament..... 560
- , of the Peshito, or old Syriac version 555
- , of the Samaritan Pentateuch 553
- , of the Scriptures..... 551
- , of the Septuagint..... 551
- , of the Targums, or Chaldee versions..... 553
- , of the Vulgate..... 555
- Vestiges of Civilization, reviewed..... 213
- , aim and premises of..... 238
- , fanciful analogies in 224
- , infidelity of the..... 247
- , method of reasoning pursued in the..... 231-235
- , style of the..... 215
- Vinet's Pastoral Theology 307
- Vulgate, history of the 555
- Wardlaw on Miracles..... 462
- War of the Fronde..... 198
- Wiclif, Neander's opinion of..... 104
- Wiley, (Rev. Allen,) Life and Times of..... 461
- Woman's Record 308
- Worship, the mode of..... 280
- Writing, the art of, known in the Mosaic age 87
- Wythes's Essay on the Pastoral Office. 602

INDEX OF TEXTS.

OLD TESTAMENT.

Gen. i, 1..... Page	41	Dent. xvii, 18..... Page	91	1 Chron. i, 43..... Page	93
— ii, 1-4	85	— xxix, 21	91	— xx, 8.....	100
— ii, 17.....	527, 569	— xxxi, 24-26.....	91	Job xiv, 14.....	43
— iii, 5	574	— xxxii, 4.....	574	Psa. ii, 2-4.....	53
— iv, 1, 16.....	85	Josh. v, 5	89	— ii, 8.....	50
— v, 24	86	— xvi, 10.....	94	— xvi, 1.....	530
— vii, 16	86	— xxiv, 28.....	89	— xvi, 2.....	526
— xii, 6.....	92	Judg. i, 20.....	90	— xxiii, 2.....	447
— xiii, 6, 7.....	92	— i, 22-25	93	Prov. xvi, 4.....	526
— xiv, 14.....	92	2 Sam. v, 7-9.....	99	Isa. xxxv, 8.....	43
— xvii, 1.....	527	— xxiv, 6	93	— xl, 3.....	456
— xxii, 18.....	304	1 Kings iv, 24	96	— xlix, 6.....	303
— xxxvi, 31.....	93	— ix, 16.....	94	Ezek. xxv, 23.....	543
— xlix, 10.....	546	— xii, 28, 33	80, 81	Amos ii, 10-12.....	79
Exod. iii, 23.....	98	— xvi, 34.....	94	— iii, 2.....	79
— vi, 2.....	84	— xvii, 1.....	80	— iv, 4, 5.....	79
— vi, 26, 27.....	94	— xviii, 23, 33.....	80	— v, 21	79
— xii, 4, 7.....	88	— xx, 42	80	— v, 22	79
— xvii, 14.....	91	— xxi, 3, 10.....	98	Mal. iii, 1	456
— xxxiv, 6, 7.....	43	— xxii.....	98	— iv, 5	456
Num. xxiii, 19.....	97	2 Kings iv, 1, 16, 23	80		
Dent. i, 1.....	95	— xvii.....	77		
— vi, 3	528				
— ix, 22-24.....	94				

NEW TESTAMENT.

Matt. iv, 25	Page 357	Mark xii, 27.....	Page 43	Luke xiii, 10, 22... Page	359
— xiii, 3	127	Luke vi, 1.....	357	— xiii, 24	270
— xiii, 31.....	52	— ix, 51.....	358	— xiii, 34.....	357
— xiii, 33.....	52	— x, 16	359	— xvii, 11-19	359
— xiv, 31.....	302	— x, 17	359	— xviii, 14	359
— xv, 1	357	— x, 22.....	273, 275	— xviii, 15.....	358
— xvi, 8.....	426	— x, 27	531	— xix, 13.....	447
— xvii, 3.....	456	— x, 38, 39.....	358	— xx, 38	43
— xviii, 19.....	84	— x, 38-42.....	357	John iii, 16.....	531
— xxiii, 37.....	357	— xi, 13, 14.....	359	— v, 1	357
— xxv, 46.....	43	— xiii, 9.....	359	— vii, 2, 10	358
— xxviii, 15.....	96				

John viii, 59.....	Page 358	Gal. iii, 16.....	Page 304	2 Tim.....	Page 534
— x, 21.....	358	—	—	— i, 5, 6, 14.....	540
— x, 22.....	358	Eph. ii, 20-22.....	398	— i, 8.....	542
— x, 40.....	358	—	—	— ii, 1, 6.....	545
— xi, 1-46.....	359	Phil. ii, 7.....	302	— ii, 2.....	543
— xi, 7, 54.....	358	— iii, 10.....	126	— ii, 9.....	545
— xii, 1.....	358	—	—	— ii, 10.....	545
— xx, 28.....	274	Col. i, 16, 17.....	274	— ii, 14, 15.....	545
Acts xvii, 25.....	526	—	—	— iii, 10, 11.....	540
— xxi, 33.....	302	1 Thess. v, 23, 24.....	450	— iii, 14, 15.....	540
—	—	—	—	— iv, 6.....	549
Rom. i, 20-22.....	40	2 Thess. ii, 11.....	98	1 Peter ii, 5.....	398
— i, 21.....	38	—	—	—	—
— v, 12-13.....	671	Heb. ii, 16.....	301	1 John ii, 16.....	573
— viii, 38.....	303	— ii, 16.....	453	— iv, 19.....	531
— xii, 1.....	91	— v, 4.....	453	— v, 4.....	444
— xv, 4.....	36	— xi, 26.....	528	— v, 7.....	273
—	—	— xii, 14.....	258	—	—
1 Cor. iii, 1-17.....	392, 394	—	—	Rev. iv, 8, 11.....	43
— iii, 11.....	532	1 Tim. ii, 14.....	572	— iv, 11.....	526
— vi, 3.....	303	— iii, 16.....	273	— xiii, 8.....	533
—	—	— vi, 12, 19.....	302	—	—

